September 2022 witnessed outbreaks of violent conflict between the armed forces of multiple nations within the Russian sphere of influence which resulted in over 300 casualties over the course of a few days. The first of these conflicts occurred when Azerbaijan launched an offensive along the Eastern Armenian border claiming it was in response to Armenian aggression but resulted in Azerbaijani troops briefly occupying portions of Armenian borderlands. Meanwhile, deadly clashes erupted between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as they engaged in combat along their disputed border. Whilst the death toll alone should be enough to capture the attention of the international community, it is also important to note that these conflicts erupted soon after Russia suffered a setback at the hands of Ukrainian forces during their Kharkiv counteroffensive. Furthermore, three of the four nations (Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) involved in this conflict are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) headed by Russia. Therefore, the security of these nations is intimately tied to Russia’s ability to guarantee security in the region. These conflicts did not originate in September 2022. The conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is a legacy of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the resulting disagreements between Central Asian successor states concerning the proper delimitation of borders that were essentially porous before 1991. These countries share a 970 km border of which only 503 km is considered to be settled. This has resulted in over 150 clashes between the two countries and their border communities in the past 11 years with a marked escalation in 2021 followed by the most recent clashes which were the deadliest yet. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is much older with its origins lying in the particularly brutal wars during 1918-1920 between their predecessor states. The conflict then lay dormant as both countries became part of the USSR. However, hostilities were renewed as the USSR began collapsing with Armenia and Azerbaijan clashing over the status of the Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh region within Azerbaijan. These clashes resulted in the First Nagorno-Karabakh war which ended in 1994 with the Bishkek protocol and the establishment of the largely internationally unrecognized Armenian-allied Republic of Artsakh. Artsakh controlled the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region and occupied seven Azerbaijani districts located between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. This occupation continued until the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war which resulted in an Azerbaijani victory with the victors reclaiming the seven districts lost earlier whilst also reclaiming parts of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan also secured a protected transportation route through Armenia connecting the newly liberated districts to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. To maintain the new ceasefire, a 2000 strong Russian peacekeeping force was deployed in the region for a minimum period of five years. Few states that emerged after the fall of the USSR have enjoyed an extended period of time free from war, conflict, and other internal insecurities. However, it has been argued that the CSTO has played a relatively important role in shielding signatory states, especially non-Russian post-Soviet states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), from foreign state-led intervention. An important mechanism through which this was achieved was Article 4 of the CSTO which compels the military alliance to collectively respond to external aggression directed at any of the signatory states. The last time that this article was invoked was in January 2022 when the Kazakhstani government appealed to the CSTO for assistance in quelling violent anti-government protests. In response to this, the military alliance mobilised a multi-nation peacekeeping unit which assisted government forces in restoring stability in the country. This was the first time Article 4 was invoked to address internal security issues. However, no such aid was forthcoming when Armenia invoked the Article in response to what it considered to be Azerbaijani incursions into Armenia. Instead, the CSTO sent a fact-finding mission headed by its Secretary General to assess the extent of the damage which many Armenians considered to be an ineffectual response to the Azerbaijani attack. When this is viewed in conjunction with the failure of Russian peacekeepers to prevent the outbreak of fresh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it casts a dim light on Russia’s ability to guarantee security in the Caucuses either through the CSTO or by itself. Furthermore, the CSTO has also proven to be largely ineffective in dealing with intra-signatory state conflict as in the case of the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan clashes where both states can block resolutions that could send peacekeeping forces. Both countries are hosts to Russian military bases that are important to Russian regional security infrastructure. So, Russia has largely relied on personal diplomacy to iron out most differences between these countries because it needs to ensure that any solution to the border problem is acceptable to both sides. Therefore, as Russia mobilises more troops and expends greater resources on the war in Ukraine, it becomes less likely that Russia would also be able to pay attention to the various mechanisms that are in place to maintain security within other parts of Russia’s sphere of influence. The Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan conflict has seen a de-escalation with both sides entering new rounds of discussions to resolve the border delimitation issue. However, tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan remain high as both countries rush to arm themselves while calling on their regional allies for increased support. As Europe plans to ramp up its import of gas from Azerbaijan, any prolonged conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia would further threaten European energy security. Furthermore, Turkey’s close strategic and military ties with Azerbaijan increase the potential for official or unofficial NATO involvement in a conflict at Russia’s borders with a country that the CSTO is beholden to protect. Finally, Iran has also promised to act in response to any attempt to ‘change the borders’ between Armenia and Iran. All in all, any potential prolonged conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has the possibility of quickly spiralling out of control and becoming a multi-state conflict and because of this, it is crucial for the international community to step in with high-level diplomacy and stem any further outbreaks of violence.

If you’ve been following the Conservative Party’s Machiavellian Game of Thrones adaptation in the news then you will already know that, after a thoroughly entertaining 45-day episode with Liz Truss, Rishi Sunak has become our third Prime Minister of the year. Seen by some as a Diwali gift to the world and by others as the same Tory pig with more lipstick , Sunak inherits a government that is arguably under more pressure than ever before. The big question is can he handle it? Broadly speaking, there are three main problems Sunak needs to deal with in his premiership. Firstly, he needs to quickly deliver a budget that restores market confidence by addressing the £40B black hole left over from the Kamikaze mini‑budget and putting forward a coherent long-term economic strategy with support from the Office for Budget Responsibility. He also needs to mobilise the Conservative Party behind a common legislative agenda or, at the very least, mitigate the impact of any factional dissent. Finally, as a Prime Minister with no democratic mandate, he desperately needs to earn his authority over government administration and restore public favour in his party, which is currently polling behind the SNP in terms of seats. Unlike his two predecessors, Sunak doesn’t seem to be impeded by his own arrogance. He would have been perfectly within his right to begin his inaugural address outside Number 10 with “I told you so” has been the only candidate in the July leadership race not to commit to tax cuts . Instead, he spent a great deal of time praising his rivals before revealing his vision for the future with confidence and acknowledging the high standards required of him as Prime Minister. This was perhaps no surprise as Sunak’s presentational coherence far exceeds that of Truss and Boris Johnson but his thorough overview of the problems facing the country and acknowledgement of potential doubts showed a level of self-awareness we might not have expected from Britain’s wealthiest politician. If history is anything to go by these days, we might be tempted to draw comparisons with our old friend “dodgy Dave”. Both left their all-boys boarding schools to study PPE at Oxford before making a name for themselves in the business world, writing for a few right wing think tanks and manoeuvring their way up the Conservative Party ecosystem. The continuity of Jeremy Hunt as Chancellor would certainly confirm these suspicions, which means Britain is heading into the second round of austerity but there are problems with this strategy. The disastrous consequences of austerity volume 1 are now common knowledge so there is not much political appetite for a sequel and Sunak can’t really afford to lose more ground in the polls. This is further complicated when considering that the mandate upon which Sunak claims legitimacy was that of Johnson’s 2019 general election victory, where the austerity programme of George Osborne was comprehensively renounced. Even if he were to wriggle his way out of that predicament, making further cuts to public services just isn’t feasible when for example, the NHS is carrying out 12% less procedures than in 2019 and the idea that this gap can be substantially closed by improving operational efficiency is a complete fantasy. Then there’s Sunak’s cabinet to consider, summarised in true Tory fashion by Foreign Secretary James Cleverly as “not having our first XV on the pitch”. Dominic Raab, as Justice Secretary, failed to resolve the barrister strikes, as Foreign Secretary, went on holiday during the Taliban takeover of Kabul and, as Brexit Secretary, refused to support his own Brexit deal , has miraculously found himself back in the cabinet again and is probably as surprised as the rest of us. Meanwhile, the inclusion of Suella Braverman, Michael Gove and Penny Mordaunt might seem like strategic choices to broaden party representation and prevent rebellion but could easily come back to bite, particularly in the case of Braverman, whose volatility poses a substantial threat to the stability of Sunak’s leadership. Having said all this, he seems to know better than anyone how to tame the wolves of the Tory Party and his record‑breaking seven‑year transition from backbench MP to Prime Minister should not be overlooked. Less than thirty minutes after writing an article in support of Johnson’s leadership bid, Nadhim Zahawi proclaimed his “full support and loyalty” to Sunak in an embarrassingly desperate attempt to win favour. He might just be the only person with the political acumen to handle all these moving parts with care and restore a level of decorum to British politics, the likes of which we haven’t seen in years. The most recent available polling data shows that, whilst Starmer is still comfortably ahead, Sunak has significantly higher approval ratings than Truss did so we can expect Labour’s lead to decrease. The odds are certainly stacked against Rishi from all sides of the table but if Keir is not slightly worried then he should be. Written by Alex Freeney

Whilst almost all media outlets were preoccupied with the national mourning of Queen Elizabeth II and her state funeral, worrying developments were coming out of Leicester. Growing tensions amongst the South Asian community between Hindus and Muslims reached boiling point on 17 and 18 September, when unrest erupted into riots on Leicester’s streets. Had they occurred a week later, it is wholly reasonable to assume it would have made front page news, and deservedly so. The unrest in Leicester represented the first widespread Hindu-Muslim communal violence witnessed within the United Kingdom, amidst a growing problem on the Indian subcontinent. However, the unrest was largely underreported. Most articles covering the riots were predominantly cursory in their coverage of its causes. The media were quick to directly link the violence to a violent disturbance in the city on 28 August after India played Pakistan in the cricket, with little inquiry into the other potential external factors at play. Whilst the India-Pakistan cricket rivalry is noted for its zealousness, ensuant violence over two weeks later, suggests there are potentially more serious factors at play. In highlighting the nuanced influences of ethnic nationalism, namely Hindutva, the power of radicalisation amongst diaspora communities, and to a lesser degree, demography, it can be suggested that the events of Leicester may not be as isolated as they first appear. The misinformation spread over a plethora of social media platforms, amplified the issue where, for the sake of solidarity, communities (both Hindu and Muslim) came to show support to their ‘brothers’ against each other. On the Indian subcontinent, Hindu-Muslim conflict has become so prevalent, particularly since the election of Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014, that it “no longer constitute[s] news”. Whilst communal violence is therefore not a new phenomenon, its emergence within the United Kingdom is concerning. Hindutva is an extreme form of Hindu nationalism, noted for its “ethnic absolutism”, in the sense that it promotes Hindu cultural hegemony in India akin to that of Aryanism in Nazi Germany. It is widely considered Islamophobic. The Hindutva movement comprises of many organisations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), and the BJP, the ruling party of India since 2014. Collectively, these organisations form the Sangh Parivar, all sharing one goal, working towards the creation of a Hindu Rashtra (the ethnonationalist dream). The election of Modi and the BJP has significantly solidified the grip of Hindutva on Indian politics, with the Hindu Indian diaspora becoming a “major source of funding for the Hindutva [movement].” Some in the diaspora actively disseminate an “aggressive [ethnonationalist] brand of Hindutva identity” through provocative and calculated social media posts, often with radicalising effects. In the United Kingdom, Hindutva is not adhered to by a majority of the Indian diaspora community. Largely, it tends to be supported by a small, wealthy fringe minority. Nevertheless, the Sangh Parivar, and the wider Hindutva movement, certainly seek to assert their influence and play provocateur abroad. It is becoming increasingly clear that the containment of communalist Hindutva incidents to the Indian subcontinent is unlikely; Leicester potentially provides an example of this. In the instance of Leicester, whilst the tensions existed from the August cricket game, it is wholly reasonable to assume that the presence, no matter how small, of Hindutva-leaning supporters acted as one of the catalysts to the eruption of rioting in addition to the misinformation spread from both sides. The chants of “Jai Shri Ram” from masked Hindu men in Leicester as they marched through Green Lane Road (a predominantly Muslim area) demonstrates the fascistic techniques of the Hindutva being adopted in the United Kingdom; a worrying indication that increasingly radicalised religious sentiments are being shared in this country. Whilst there is no official Muslim equivalent to the Hindutva movement within this context, this is not to say that Muslim communalism is a less influential factor in Hindu-Muslim tensions and unrest in Leicester. The adoption of fascist Indian rhetoric from a minority of the Hindu community, seen in the marches down Green Lane Road, provided opportunity for radical actors within the two communities to radicalise the youth in response. In India, instances of communalism play off one another – with communalism seeping into the diaspora community in the United Kingdom, it is fair to suggest that the rules of engagement will largely be the same. However, the damage that it will cause is unclear, as this is one of the first major incidents that have occurred so recently. Whether the form of polarisation takes shape as street violence (as seen in this instance), lynching, or rallies, it is wholly unpredictable. Some Muslims radicalise in response to the Islamophobia of the Hindutva, and vice versa, fuelling the anger and hatred that already polarises them further. Whilst violence was perpetrated by both sides after the August cricket match, it became a ‘tit-for-tat', retaliatory affair, reminiscent of the communalist violence seen back on the Indian subcontinent. The communalist, almost tribalist, nature of Hindu-Muslim relations can be attributed to the ethnonationalism of both the governments of India and Pakistan, who both criticized the Leicester riots, but only in relation to their respective peoples and religions. The Indian High Commission condemned the events in Leicester, particularly those against the “Indian Community” and the “Hindu religion”. Similarly, the High Commission of Pakistan censured the “systematic campaign of violence...against the Muslims of [Leicester].” These binary views serve to reinforce extremist views, both on the subcontinent and within the diasporas, by blaming the other for the eruption of violence. Notwithstanding, to determine as to whether the unrest in Leicester was an isolated incident, it is important to look at the city’s demography. In India, instances of Hindutva translating into communal violence predominantly occurred over the fear of becoming a minority in a place like Leicester, known for its diversity. In the United Kingdom, Muslims outnumber Hindus for the most part. In Leicester, however, where 40 per cent of the population is of South Asian descent, the split is almost perfectly even. Hindutva can be seen to be largely triggered by the fear of the Indian Hindus becoming a minority, given in Leicester the Hindu population largely matches that of the Muslim community, the city provides the ideal target for Hindu nationalists to radicalise and provoke young South Asian men. It is unlikely we would see similar events take place in Birmingham or Bradford, where Muslims greatly outnumber Hindus. Thus, whilst demography is not the overall cause for the unrest, in this view, it is certainly a contributing factor. Therefore, it can be argued that the Leicester riots showed evidence of Hindutva radicalisation, suggesting this unrest was a part of a greater trend taking root in the diaspora. However, the effects of demography on the capacity for communalist violence to take place suggests the Leicester riots were unique and isolated in the sense that it was the most likely target in the United Kingdom. Whether this communalist sentiment takes root throughout other British South Asian communities remains to be seen. However, one of the main takeaways from this article is the deadliness of misinformation and how it can ignite the many minority groups to begin communal violence in Britain between diasporic communities. Written in collaboration with Drishti Patel and Gokul Krishnakumar

As COVID-19 progressed, data revealed just how prevalent the inequalities in accessing healthcare were for black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities with them being disproportionately affected. It was reported the BAME community was 1.9 times more likely to die during COVID-19 compared to their white counterparts, this is nearly double the likelihood, however, why is this? Several factors could explain this: their occupation making them more vulnerable to suspecting the virus, the location of where they live, household composition and pre-existing health conditions. Despite this recent data being published, has the UK government actively taken measures to reduce these inequalities for the future? In 2001, the Race Relations Amendment was introduced with the NHS to 'have due regard to eliminate unlawful discrimination' with it being unlawful to discriminate on the grounds of race, colour, nationality and ethnic origin. This was established with the aim to increase accessibility and promote equality. The establishment of this amendment led to staff being trained, undergoing performance assessment procedures, being subjected to disciplinary measures and in some cases were even required to leave employment if they could not abide by the amendment. Hospitals and NHS trusts were also required to monitor and publish data of differential treatment towards racial groups, their investigations of overcoming these issues and how they dealt with it. Although, in theory this should have significantly reduced inequalities for BAME communities regarding healthcare, it didn’t make much of an impact as COVID-19 clearly highlighted. Despite there being an increase in data being recorded, completion levels remained low, making it difficult to identify areas of disparities in healthcare across the UK. Whilst, the introduction of this amendment has led to monitoring, which was not previously recorded or at least in a regulated, formal way, it has not quite had the impact with which it was established with. The amendment also only focused on BAME patients experiences but disregarded to take a more holistic view and monitor BAME staff and their experiences too. It could be said that the most valuable resource the NHS has is its staff, with approximately one in five of its workforce being BAME. Despite this, BAME staff are treated considerably worse where they don’t have the same career progression opportunities, with them being 1.74 times less likely than white short-listed candidates to be appointed. A NHS report commissioned by employees revealed that BAME staff are twice as likely to be disciplined compared to white staff. To combat this, in 2015 the NHS Workforce Race Equality (WRES) was founded with the intention to monitor BAME staff experiences to provide equal access to career opportunities and fair treatment in the workplace. Not only is it important to have staff being treated equally, it also would result in higher quality patient care increasing patient satisfaction by having a valued workforce. Every year the WRES report shows there has been improvements however a lot more change is needed especially in specific hospital trusts where there has been very minimal improvements. To have more significant improvements the government needs to identify specific areas which require bigger change and to provide interventions and education to staff as well as closely monitoring these locations. Although, collecting and monitoring data is very useful to understand where the inequalities for BAME patients and staff lies across the UK it is more important what is done with this information and the proactive measures enforced to reduce these inequalities. The government and NHS need to work together to actively break barriers to decrease the gap between communities. This could involve communicating messages which are tailored to different cultures and religious viewpoints. For example, during COVID-19, the government could have put more of a conscious effort to be more inclusive and communicate more effectively. Specifically, regarding high-risk events such as Eid and weddings which tend to be on a much larger scale. Language barrier also contributes to the inequalities for BAME communities as it reduces their accessibility to healthcare. To decrease the gap, the NHS could create an initiative where BAME patients have the option to have a translator of their spoken language to be present during their appointment. Although, this is currently available at some hospitals it is only in action on a small scale due to resources being very limited. To resolve this, the government needs to spread their costs more equally where they look at socioeconomic maps regarding the BAME community to identify areas in the UK which would benefit the most from this scheme. This would reduce miscommunication and anxiety where BAME communities who may be of older age and don’t have family, could potentially feel quite anxious and maybe even apprehensive to go to the doctors as they feel as though they cannot communicate effectively. There needs to be more awareness when presenting information especially in relation to the COVID-19 vaccination. A lot of BAME communities may not be willing to trust the government due to past historical issues and institutionalised racism. To combat this there should be more reinforcement of facts and to give credible evidence and data to support what is being communicated. A policy intervention could be using community leaders to help spread information about vaccinations. Although, this was seen later during the COVID-19 period, it was an independent move, not a governmental organisation. Inequalities for accessing healthcare amongst the BAME community stems from institutionalised racism. The gap of inequality will continue to be there unless conscious efforts are made to reduce this. Although, the current government initiatives are good as there is increased monitoring on the treatment and conduct for BAME patients and staff, this is only of use if proactive measures are taken into action from the data being collected. The government needs to make an active change by reducing language barriers and being more inclusive when communicating public health measures. As reports and data has shown the inequalities are reducing however a lot more is still yet to be done for the BAME community and currently the government is not wholeheartedly putting in their efforts to make active change.

“The right to free speech is more important than the content of the speech” — Voltaire From all the present foundations of modern society, its most fundamental hallmark is the presence of free speech, and the subsequent right to wield it. From toppling oppressive regimes to starting or ending wars—the power of speech is unparalleled. But speech is more than simply a power to be tapped into. It represents the deep intricacies of a society—its values, its ideals and its principles, and its problems—its prejudice, its discrimination and its systemic inequalities. Other freedoms have limitations, for example, the freedom of assembly and associations can be suspended in times of crisis. Does that mean freedom of speech can have limitations on its use? If so, what limitations? Who decides or enforces them? First, I look at what speech can be harmful. The term “hate speech,” while lacking a universally accepted definition, generally refers to any offensive discourse which targets an individual or a group of individuals based on inherent characteristics such as race, religion, sex, gender, etc. Why is hate speech so specially defined? When hate speech is targeted toward a certain group/individual, there occur very tangible and observable effects on the group/individual. While this could occur to any hate speech recipient, these effects are most often only seen among marginalized groups. (TW) A most recent example is that of Andrew Tate, a professional kickboxer turned internet celebrity, who was recently banned from several social media platforms for violating their community guidelines. Tate has historically made overtly sexist and problematic remarks such as: Victim-blaming: saying #MeToo victims to “bear some responsibility” Promoting violence against women Claiming women have “no innate responsibility or honour” Claiming 40% of his reason to move to Romania was to do with more relaxed sexual assault laws In addition to above mentioned instances, Tate also has had a history of promoting hegemonic and toxic masculinity ideas and violence. Supporters of Andrew Tate often claim that his words are “humour”, or at the very least, are just words, and are hence protected by the freedom of speech offered around the world. In making these arguments, it is important to take note of the very real harm caused by problematic speech as highlighted above. Sexist humour can “directly harm women by eliciting depression, eating disorders, disruption of focused attention, appearance anxiety, and body shame.” It can also incite discrimination from others—in the Tate example, several reports of teachers noticing misogynistic behaviour from middle or high school students with direct references to Tate’s content have been made. This is not mere “offense”—women exposed to sexually objectifying media showed negative self-focus to an extent which disrupted attention and reduced performance on other cognitive tasks—which can be a differentiating factor between getting a certain job, degree or any other goal. An important item to note with the aforementioned research is the effect this has on men. Men that were exposed to media that was sexist or sexually objectifying toward men showed no such differences—thus establishing a relationship between the harm from discriminatory language and the distribution of privilege and power in society. Women are affected by such media not because they are in any way weaker than men (as some misogynistic arguments might make it seem), but because of historically prevalent and systemically abundant sexism against them in societies all over the world, which has not existed nearly as extensively against men. The point here is that speech is a force like any other. In the same way as striking someone causes harm and is therefore punishable, hate speech can cause measurable and observable harm to its recipients, and therefore should be punished. An important point to note lies in the situation that men in the above experiment were unaffected when exposed to sexist media—even though the idea for speech regulation lies on underlying harm, women should not be allowed to make sexist remarks against men either, in the same way, that assaulting someone who doesn’t feel hurt still counts as assault. But who should regulate this speech? A clear choice would be governments. A major problem, however, is the power and authority held by governments across the world. Take recent anti-monarchy protests in the UK, that led to arrests of dissenters. Governments have been taking a greater role in suppressing dissent, and if tasked with regulating free speech (as they currently do), the freedom to protest and express political dissent vanishes in an instant. Another choice, as occurred in the case of Andrew Tate, was mediums of information sharing, such as social media companies. Companies like TikTok, Meta and Google banned Tate not for any government laws he may or may not have broken, but for violating their community guidelines—something every user agrees to abide by. A potential problem in this regard would be in their reliance on private companies for advertising revenue, and from governments directly. These organizations have already been accused of being politically biased and swaying to appease private contributors. Further, even though he was banned, Tate amassed a massive following. His content has been viewed over 11 billion times on TikTok alone, and he was searched more times than Donald Trump. Would this incentivise other creators to create and spread such content? There exist problems with the current regulation of free speech and punishments of their violations—suppression, banning, criminal prosecution, etc.—but the most sustainable solution would be a collaborative one, including both the aforementioned stakeholders, along with the specific groups that were potentially harmed by the piece of speech. Finally, it is important to make note of the fact that restricting free speech is a temporary first step in promoting inclusivity and creating social equality. While speech must be restricted now, a permanent solution requires education, awareness and empathy.

England’s exam system has only been effective at upholding the notion of privilege through constricted tests and exams, resulting in an outcome of poorer mental health overall for young people. A September 2021 survey published by NHS Digital concluded that one in six children in England (17%) among the age range of 6 to 16 years had a “probable mental disorder”. This same rate was also the same between 17 to 19 year olds. The prevalence of this has risen by over 50% since 2017. Responding to a survey conducted by the Children's Commissioner for England in 2020, two-thirds of pupils regarded exams and excess homework as the leading driver of stress. Furthermore, a poll conducted by the NEU (National Education Union), 73% of teachers surveyed cited that the mental health of their students depreciated following the government's introduction of rigorous “reformed” GCSEs. These new GCSEs, introduced in 2017 by Michael Gove despite advice not do so, place more weighting on final exams at the end of Year 11, and less emphasis on other non-exam assessments and coursework. These statistics on young people in the English education system’s exam factory leads to the following question that needs asking. What is the substance of a fairer education system that promotes wellbeing and keeps social inequality to a minimum? The answer would be to look at Finland's education system. Finland’s school system has no examinations prior to leaving school. Instead, all assessments are conducted by teacher-based assessment. This method of assessment is pitched towards driving learning beyond in higher education. Teachers, educated to master’s level, in the process of assessing students can exercise a high degree of professional autonomy and discretion. Regarding the wellbeing of Finnish students, the country’s education system provides free school meals for all students and aims to remove social inequality. In addition, Finland outperforms the UK in health satisfaction of 15-year-olds alongside their success in OECD Pisa tests to measure reading, mathematical and scientific ability. Meanwhile, the English education system is overly centered on competitiveness and cramming information. The OECD in 2019 found that the UK ranked 69 out of 72 when assessing the life satisfaction of 15-year-olds, the steepest decline of any country since 2015 in children’s living standards. The Finnish system is underpinned by conceptualizing communication and collaboration skills in the classroom. The OECD’s Pisa measure, with Finland at the top, shows how the wellbeing of teachers and students in the English education system can be improved by providing ownership and autonomy over teaching and learning as the information age changes. The test of simply regurgitating information in exams is counter-productive; a well-rounded education can provide a supportive system for teaching children and allow them to reach their full potential beyond a standardized criteria of exam grading. The extreme stress of anxiety and exams in England asks what the point of this system is being in place. Former education secretary Damian Hinds in his article for the Sunday Times in 2019, acknowledged the stress of exams having a “disproportionate effect on young people’s wellbeing”, he insisted without any evidence that such stress was essential in “building character” and “developing resilience”. Realistically, it is statistically shown that the majority of people suffering from a mental health disorder is developed in early age, and large amounts of stress in childhood does not bolster resilience. Hinds’ article was narrow-minded to make a convincing case to show young people can pass exams and enter the top universities. It fails to show adequate levels of research and independent thought with reasoning with empathy. Then education secretary Nadhim Zahawi, mindlessly insisted the UK returns to the exam model that was paused during the pandemic, but without any explanation for this. Exams are a measure of aptitude, ranking specific skills alongside retaining facts under pressure, only representing a small percentage of skills a person requires to traverse the real world. Many global challenges facing us are complex, multi-faceted and entrenched. The ability to spout facts to solve these issues is not necessarily a solution. The English education system needs to become more forward-thinking, develop the social and emotional intelligence of young people, and emphasizes collaboration over competition. The longer the system we have in place continues, the system will fail the student to create diversity and more disparities in higher education.

Index-Linked Gilts are in part a standard U.K. Government bond. An investor loans money to the government on the promise that the funds will be paid back, with interest. Introduced in 1981, the indexing part differentiates this product from other bonds, in that interest and principal are coupled – ‘indexed’ – to the going rate of inflation. We must ask who benefits (cui bono) from this de-risking. Quite obviously it is the bondholder and the interests of private finance. It follows that we ought to probe why investors have become a privileged constituency. This is a historical question that captures the neoliberal turn. Under the neoliberal regime of sovereign debt management, financial markets are empowered as a political choice. Whereas democracy once constrained markets, the demands of the market were made beyond reproach. The postwar era witnessed a rather different relationship between the state and financial markets. Indeed, amongst the developed economies, the average real interest rate was negative 1.94% due to a concerted policy of ‘financial repression.’ The postwar period sought to reinvent the financial system as one that only served the public good – vested with a ‘social purpose’ - defined as the full employment of a given economy’s resources. The state as guardian of this public good would command more legitimacy than the defenestrated financial rentiers. No longer would the financier be able to claim fat rents, in the form of interest charged, or deny lending unduly. Real interest rates were thus held down to make public investment feasible. This was the postwar ideology. Index-Linked Gilts are alien to this zeitgeist. They reward the financier. They are thus indicative of a relationship between state and financial market recast. If not impelled by dependency, why else would the government cede such concessions to the investor class? The rationale of the postwar political economy was that the prosperity of a peoples should never be held to ransom by striking private capital. Fiscal vulnerability had to be created by policy: capital controls were eased, hot money flows resumed once again, and ‘liability management’ banking took off. The once slayed financial monster had been wilfully resurrected, set against the public goods demanded by national polities; unruly, untrammelled capital sloshed around the globe. Out went financial repression, in came the voguish crusade of financial liberalisation. A funny kind of liberty. The Bretton Woods order was demolished, as countries became financially needy, reliant on markets for financing their sovereign debt. Whilst the financial sector amassed ideological and material clout, the U.K. government’s deficit started to swell. But one more factor served to inflame the government’s financial headache: the spectre of inflation. 24.9% in 1975, and 17.2% in the year Mrs. Thatcher took office. For the financier, inflation is enemy number one. Why would one invest in government bonds if one knew that their nominal return would de drowned by runaway inflation. Policymakers, embedded in this new ideology of market dominance, were terrified of a ‘gilt strike;’ they feared a repeat of Summer 1976. They fretted that ‘the capital market... [was] dead.’ No longer was it understood that the aspirations of a polity should trump the shrieks of financial markets. This ideologically informed fear materialised. The gilt market went on strike in September 1979. The markets could now cash in the structural dominance they exercised over the state. Despite Governor Gordon Richardson’s point that gilt sales, for the most part, had been robust, newly orthodox notions of ‘market management’ demanded index-linked gilts. Richardson lost the argument. The government in 1981 thereby forced itself to make a wager: inflation would come down faster than the markets suspected; the government would make sure this happened, and investors would kill to have their investment protected against inflation. As inflation would fall, the bill on these bonds, since they were so aggregable to the markets, for the government, would fall to. This was the plan. By its own logic, it mostly succeeded. Above I have articulated the rubric under which inflation-linked Gilts were inaugurated. We have probed how the privileging of the investor class came to be. Now we turn to the normative question: Is this good policy? The question of how to mobilise affordable finance is of paramount concern. The postwar period accordingly enacted financial repression; the neoliberal period chose to make nice with private finance. In fiscal year 2023, public debt servicing costs are forecast to reach £104bn. Index-Linked Gilts account for 25.4% of the total stock of public debt. Amidst the immiseration of those exposed to brutal inflation and recession, we must ask if it is right that bondholders’ rents are protected. It is plainly unfair. Instead, the financial markets should be brought to heel, with the apparatus of financial repression reinstated. For decades, states have wilfully shaken out the economic toolbox: ceding sovereignty – the historic dividend won in two world wars – to actors who are often inimical to a democratically defined public interest. The ideological justification for this self-neutering has been the veneration of the financial markets as the wellspring of all prosperity. How lame is it, that under this common sense, a democratic polity must resign itself to the whims of these markets, their risk premia, their policy proclivities? Yes, interest rates have declined since 1980. But at what cost? Politics may be insidiously disavowed in such discussions amongst ‘practical men,’ but make no mistake its presence is inescapable: politics is about ‘who gets what’. As such, the political decision to issue index-linked gilts is the granting of a real rate of return to a privileged investor class. It is the pecuniary reward that ideology and structural dominance has netted for investors. And in return what has the polity received from this concerted appeasement effort? The U.K. economy still craves good investment, our infrastructure is crumbling and dirty, and our growth is anaemic. The optimal policy option would ensure good investment is diffuse and yields only a fair rate of interest. Private finance has been bestowed a great public function - the creation of credit and money; this license ought to be held contingent upon acting in the public interest. The licentious empowerment of the financial markets has only created a socially corrosive market ‘utopia.’

This article was written by contributor Harry Ward The dementia crisis is one close to my heart. As an Alzheimer’s Research UK (ARUK) Community Speaker with familial experience of Alzheimer’s, I can vouch for the charity’s fantastic work and the disease’s destructive effects. However, my personal story is just one of many. Around 900,000 people have dementia in the UK today, while 1 in 3 children born today will develop the disease. Given such high rates, the UK can now be said to be facing a dementia crisis. There is no ‘cure’ for this disease, yet it generates care costs upwards of £34.7bn a year, with that number expected to rise to over £94bn by 2040. Moreover, the disease is mounting ever increasing pressures on the NHS’s resources and a faltering social care system. The crisis, however, has been greatly exacerbated by Covid-19, whereby a quarter of people dying from covid also had dementia. Due to social restrictions fewer people have had access to their GP, meaning later diagnosis and longer waits for support. Furthermore, a third of dementia researchers have said that they could leave the profession as a result of the pandemic. While charities like ARUK and Alzheimer’s Society do superb work to help to solve the dementia crisis in the U, it will take government policy action to bring about conclusive positive change. This article considers two key policy areas: dementia research and adult social care. It explores past and current UK policy direction, before assessing what improvements must be made and recommends certain policies. Firstly, let’s consider dementia research. The UK prides itself on leading the way in this policy area. Then Prime Minister David Cameron published his ‘Challenge on Dementia’ in 2015, setting out government policy aims to be achieved by 2020. One such commitment was to spend £300m on dementia research over the 5 year period. This commitment was in-fact surpassed. Building on this success, the Conservative 2019 General Election manifesto included a promise to double dementia research funding over the next decade. This would result in an extra £800m for dementia research over the next 10 years. However, this promise has not been kept. There has been no further commitment or strategy for how the money will be invested. In fact, between 2018-19 and 2019-20, dementia research funding has fallen. So, where to go from here? Primarily, the manifesto promise needs to be upheld. Dementia is a crisis which can be solved, at least in part, by further research funding as we search for a cure to a disease that costs so many lives and so much money in the UK each year. Charities like ARUK and Alzheimer’s Society campaign relentlessly on this issue, and while charities can influence policymakers, their demands are currently falling on deaf ears. How do we fund this increase, especially given the cost of the pandemic? Any tax increase, on top of the current NI increase for health and social care, would be extremely unpopular currently due to the rising cost of living. Could reallocation of funding work? Labour have argued that they would ring fence 3% of GDP each year for science and research. A more proportioned policy response could be that suggested by Alzheimer’s Society, who urge the government to introduce a policy of spending 1% of the annual cost of dementia on research each year. This kind of policy would give dementia the attention it deserves. The cost is rising rapidly, as should the funding. Secondly, social care. Caring for those who already have dementia in a more sustainable and cost-effective, yet still high quality, way is key to reducing the burden on the NHS and helping those with the disease. In the past, the UK has failed to tackle the issue of an adult social care system. The current infrastructure is struggling under the weight of increasing demand. In 2019, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Dementia stressed the need for social care reform that recognises and reflects the needs of those with dementia as current support is inadequate and inaccessible. Plans for reform did come last year with the adult social care reform white paper. The planned reforms are extremely complex but are explained well by think tanks like the King’s Fund. How can social care policy be improved to help those currently living with dementia? One option is to increase social care funding by introducing a ‘Dementia Fund’ to fund community care. Such a Fund would make efficient use of NHS resources and would contribute to the Department of Health and Social Care and the NHS’s joint long-term vision of integrated health and social care moving forward. Another option would be to alter the 2021 social care reforms. The reforms set a care cost cap at £86,000 meaning no one would have to pay more than that out of their own pocket to fund their care. However, this cap is too high. The poorest might still struggle to pay £86,000 and could have to sell their home to fund such care costs. This defeats the main objective of the reforms. A final option would be to pay more attention to the paid and unpaid social care workforce. At the moment, paid social care vacancies are extremely high in England. Despite the money promised to solve the problem in the 2021 adult social care reforms, some suggest that this won’t be enough. The Government has recently relaxed immigration rules to try and fill the social care void. However, this is a very short term fix. Better policy choices would include establishing a professional body for social care workers in England to make sector more attractive via higher professionalism and management prospects. Furthermore, unpaid carers don’t get the recognition or support they deserve. This country needs a National Carer’s Strategy to ensure unpaid carers are supported. This could come from looking to other countries for policy ideas – for example, Austria offer rest bite holiday care programmes for carers while their loved ones are looked after by the state for a short period of time. Overall, there is no quick or easy fix to the UK dementia crisis. Solving the problem will take a variety of policy measures and increased funding to ensure that those who are currently living with, and those that will develop, dementia are supported adequately and sustainably. Dementia might never get the attention of diseases like cancer, however, with an ageing population, the numbers are only going to grow, along with the social and economic consequences of a frail health and social care system.

Russian militarisation around Ukraine has provoked antagonism with the United States, signalling a return of the tense debacle between the two superpowers. Crucial bilateral talks held on January 10th highlighted the irreconcilable standpoints of Russia and the US over the future of NATO and the issue of military deployments across Eastern Europe. This impasse has heightened tensions, particularly in the wake of suspicions that Russia intends to invade Ukraine. Ukraine has been excluded from these negotiations, however, entrenching it in a position of acute insecurity. The ongoing security crisis was triggered when the Kremlin issued a string of demands that entailed - if the United States and its allies were to agree - the re-establishment of Russia’s historic sphere of influence and a return to Soviet-era border boundaries. It also seeks to halt all instances of Western military action and deployment in those previously Warsaw Pact but now NATO nations. Russia has also demanded the withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from Europe, which it deemed to have a threatening presence. The forms and exact locations of these weapons have, however, been static for decades, begging the question of why now? These demands have have been reinforced through the amassment of military forces around Ukraine’s eastern border and repeated threats to utilize unnamed forms of military means to safeguard what it deems its rightful security interests. The Biden administration has so far only responded with threats to impose financial and technological sanctions on the Kremlin if it chooses to act upon its threats, specifically in reference to Ukraine. The United States has so far not seen evidence credible enough to prove the claims on the shifting nuclear weapons or a potential asymmetric attack. Sergei A. Ryabkov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, who was present on behalf of the Russian delegation at the negotiations, strongly insisted that it was essential that Ukraine “never, never, ever” became a member of NATO. This stance conflicted with that of Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, who reasserted the US wouldn't adhere to such a demand and offered this assurance: “we will not allow anyone to slam closed NATO’s open door policy.” This heavily suggests that the US would defend Ukraine’s right to join NATO and has no tolerance for Russia’s desire to forcefully alter international borders. Yet, despite the frenzied meetings, the situation is far from settled. In spite of Russia mobilizing 100,000 troops (according to White House estimates) that now surround Ukraine on three fronts, Ryabkov continues to state that Russia possesses no intent to invade Ukraine. Moreover, he has warned that if the West fails to agree to Russia’s demands to decrease the presence of NATO in Eastern Europe, it would face a host of indeterminate ramifications that would jeopardize the “security of the whole European continent.” Ryabkov has employed ambiguous language, being both carefully appeasing and indirectly aggressive, resulting in American officials becoming deeply wary of a potential invasion. Little progress has been made through bilateral talks to deescalate the security crisis from brewing in Eastern Europe. As NATO and the Biden administration prepare for worst-case scenarios about how the next few months may evolve, they are increasingly concerned about President Putin’s steps which may be more extensive than mobilizing troops over Ukraine’s border. Putin seeks to expand Russia’s sphere of influence to Eastern Europe and acquire written assurances that NATO will not expand again. If Putin is prevented from achieving this ambition, his advisers have implied during the negotiation process, he would unilaterally prioritize the security interests of Russia, having profound implications on the United States and Europe. Furthermore, there were hints during the diplomatic grueling that nuclear weapons may be held in close proximity to the US, slashing alert times in the case of a nuclear strike. The ramifications of such a reality has close parallels with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. This could cause immense disruption, or simply be the bullying and rhetoric of a Kremlin campaign of fear and pressure. It could also be an attempt by Putin to reiterate that, despite the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’, Russia obtains the capability to cause geopolitical change. Putin’s discourse is plagued with the language of warnings and threats directed at the West, stating that if they threatened or opposed Russia’s diplomatic goals they will face unpredictable consequences through Russia’s response. This refers to the asymmetric warfare that Russia may pursue if its diplomatic rivals threaten what they see to be their vital security activities. The antagonism between the United States and Russia has been previously and historically resolved through talks and the two nations have never been at war over issues regarding borders and territory. This raises the question, are these negotiations merely “talks”? Ukraine has the threat of an invasion at its doorstep, a very real security dilemma. American, European and Russian diplomats quarrel, whilst Ukraine’s future is at stake. Diplomacy is critical to conflict solution, but it is gullible to suppose that Russia will negotiate in the best interests of Ukraine, or to assume that Russia wishes to obtain a purely diplomatic solution. Most recently, the US has accused Moscow of placing saboteurs in Eastern Ukraine to justify an invasion of Ukraine. This was the case in 2014, when Russia sent military forces in plain clothing into the Donbas region, raising questions over whether the patterns of 2014 will reoccur. Russia’s military is well positioned to seize eastern Ukraine, a particularly likely threat if Ukraine joins NATO and the West doesn’t fulfill the Kremlin's demands. Russia is at an impasse with the West, clearly uninterested in partaking in meaningful diplomacy as the United States prepares to back an insurgency against Russia. An absence of American concessions has meant a failure to defend Ukrainian individuality and freedom, and a collapse in talks for Russia as they assert their sentiments on NATO. The key question is whether the West can diffuse Russian tensions and halt their ability to invade Ukraine through appeasement and negotiation, or whether war will return to eastern Europe in the Ukraine.

Turkey faces an economic meltdown as a result of Erdogan’s dismal macro-economic competency. The annual inflation rate has soared to a 20-year high of 54.4% following a crash in value of the Lira last year and has been compounded by rising commodity prices. These issues are anticipated to only worsen in the face of Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine. Turkey’s inflation crisis is a direct consequence of Erdogan’s efforts to centralise power, and therefore this article will explore how Erdogan has brought the country to the brink of economic crisis as part of his own political project to dominate Turkish politics. Formerly an economic power on the fringe of Europe, Turkey is now enmeshed between the hyperinflation trends visible in Latin America and the cronyism of the Middle East. The central cause of this collapse has been Erdogan’s attempt to transform a modern globalised economy into an emirate-style state by imposing his personalised presidential authority on state institutions. In 2014, Turkey stood as the world’s 16th largest economy, possessing a GDP of approximately $1 trillion in 2013, with investment, entrepreneurship and growth booming. Since this peak of success, the government has faltered into economic-illiberalism and political regress, leading to the destruction of a positive investment environment and an economy that was quickly falling into pieces. According to the IMF in October 2021, Turkey’s economy now stands as the worlds 21st largest, with the nation being estimated to have lost approximately 25% of its GDP since 2013, in large part due to the shortfall in investor confidence. Turkey’s economic crisis has been produced by Erdogan, and hence the countries policy approach has been labelled as ‘Erdoganomics’. Turkey’s president believes in outlandish economic policies that suggest lowering inflation is possible through the central bank lowering the country’s interest rates. ‘Erdoganomics’ has resulted in unpredictable and fickle economic management combined with double-digit inflation, market volatility and currency depreciation. The doctrine of ‘Erdoganomics’ remains politically and economically untenable, however, with little to no positives. One of the many signs of the resulting internal turmoil was Turkish citizens' frantic rush to convert their savings into dollars. Flight from Turkish assets has not only happened in the realm of currency, however, leaving Turkey’s economic prospects bleak. Turkey’s economic meltdown is not a product of malicious economic policies from outside nations or conspiracies to bring about Erdogan’s downfall, which is the narrative that has been forced on the Turkish people by the government. Turkey has a severe governance problem. The crisis originates from 2017, when Erdogan attempted to dispose of the nation’s parliamentary democracy and gained a narrow victory in a referendum to form an unrivalled head of state. The move to a quasi-totalitarian presidential structure, with no genuine checks and balances has concentrated large power in Erdogan’s hands. This is harmful as Erdogan holds an ad hoc strategy towards governance and peculiar theories on the economy, which have had demonstrable impacts on living standards. Furthermore, Turkey has become a revolving-door democracy, where Erdogan controls who is appointed in the branches of government, the media and the central bank. Following the election of Erdogan in 2018, under the system mandated in the referendum, Erdogan has displayed a pattern of hiring those who share his unorthodox views. Initially, he made his son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, finance minister before shortly firing him. In March 2021, Erdogan sacked his third central bank governor in under two years, later replacing him with a loyalist newspaper columnist, who had no prior experience in finance. Erdoganomics have therefore been proven to be economically unsound, prioritising loyalty over competence and experience when it comes to officials, while its policies are out of touch with traditional macroeconomic indicators. In December 2021 Turkish citizens witnessed their currency lose 60 percent of its value against the US dollar after Erdogan pressured the central bank to lower interest rates for four consecutive months. Prices in supermarkets change daily, urban poverty is more publicly visible and queues for subsidised bread are growing constantly in Istanbul. This is numerically visible too, with food prices climbing by 64.5% last week, and the cost of transportation jumping by 75.8%. Turkey’s economy is heavily reliant on imports to produce goods, and the rise of the lira against the dollar directly affects the rise of consumer prices, particularly food and clothing. Foreign currency debt is also especially problematic for Turkey’s private sector as companies are able to profit from holding stock of products rather than actually selling them because of the volatile nature of the lira. This exacerbates levels of income and wealth inequality that are already prevalent Erdogan has survived attempts to stop his personal political project, yet Turkey has far from benefited from it. Recovery from a deep and prolonged economic crisis requires ulcmore than domestic direction. A sophisticated, globalised economy cannot be run if it is underpinned by conspiracy theories. For effective economic management to take place, expertise is required. Turkey’s system of centralised presidential ruling implemented by Erdogan has thrown competent economists into the shadows, and replaced them with bureaucrats who are yes-men for Erdogan’s path into economic destruction. The Turkish economy cannot wait until the 2023 elections – the nation desperately needs a return to conventional economic management and leadership.

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine are at their highest since 2014 with as many as 190,000 Russian troops currently deployed at the border, intensifying fears that a full-scale invasion of Ukraine could be imminent. NATO members – particularly the US and UK – have openly come out in support of Ukraine, indicating that they will not hesitate to impose severe sanctions on Russia if they choose to escalate the situation further. Should an invasion begin, the economic consequences will be grand, with NATO members being forced to make tough decisions on sanctions that could potentially also be detrimental to themselves. The real risk for the global economy is that, for the sanctions to be as severe as NATO has suggested, they would have major implications outside of the Russian economy and state. Although the sanctions are mostly so far indeterminate, the most severe penalties are likely to come in two forms. The first would be via a boycott of Russian natural gas, with an indefinite postponement of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that would have one day supplied gas to Europe. The second would be through the removal of Russia from the SWIFT messaging network that is used by over 11,000 banks across the world. For the Russian economy, these sanctions could be significant. Oil and gas comprise over 60% of the country’s exports and 30% of its gross domestic product (GDP), and preventing the use of its pipeline would make this project obsolete, leaving Russia with nothing to show for its major investment gamble. UK Defence secretary Ben Wallace described this move as “one of the few chips that can make a difference”. The consequences of the pipelines postponement would not be confined to Russia, as this comes at a time when Europe is already experiencing an acute energy crisis. The EU relies on Russia for 40% of its natural gas imports, something that was likely to increase if Nord Stream 2 went ahead. As well as this, Russia is currently the second-largest exporter of oil to the US. Boycotting Russian energy would therefore mean NATO – and especially Europe – may struggle to meet energy demands that would have been fulfilled by the pipeline. Russia may also impose countersanctions that reduce gas flows to Europe through the original Nord Stream pipeline. Both consequences could result in an energy shortage; higher gas prices could be here to stay. The second option is the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT system and is often referred to as the ‘nuclear option’, and would have by far the biggest economic consequence for the Russian economy, at least in the short term. The SWIFT system allows money to be wired across countries and is a cornerstone in the international payment system. Should Russia be cut off from this platform, it would be cut off from the global economy. This would have devastating short-term impacts until they were able to find a viable alternative. Although painful, the impact of this may not be quite as significant as the West envisions. Amid threats of being cut off from SWIFT in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea, Russia began developing its own financial messaging system that, according to the Security Council of Russia, will prevent ‘a catastrophe’ should the sanction be imposed. However, the true use of this service will be unknown unless the sanction is imposed. Exiling Russia from the SWIFT system would certainly have consequences for the West too. Europe and the US are amongst Russia’s biggest trading partners (1st and 5th respectively), so there is no doubt that European and US trade with Russia would suffer significantly until Russia found a suitable alternative. Furthermore, it reflects poorly on Europe to make the Belgian-based SWIFT a politicised, and indeed weaponised, institution rather than a financial tool. This may encourage other countries in tension with the West, such as China, to also explore new financial mechanisms. This leads us to question whether many European countries would be readily willing to impose a sanction with such unintended and rolling consequences. Alongside the aforementioned sanctions, the UK and US have also suggested levying sanctions on banks and individuals associated with the Kremlin in the form of either asset freezing or travel bans. Although possible, there is wide speculation that there would be significant bureaucratic opposition from the UK Treasury and the business department which have blocked similar attempts in the past. If this was imposed it would of course make life difficult for said individuals, but it is unfortunately the ordinary Russians who will suffer most. Their already lowered standard of living is expected to fall, while the growth rate (that shrunk from 2.3% to 0.3% in the years following the annexation of Crimea) is also predicted to decline further. Although significant attention is given to the impacts of an invasion and its subsequent sanctions on Russia and the West, the consequences for Ukraine must also be highlighted. The economy has been in limbo since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – tourist visits are half of what they used to be in years preceding 2014 and foreign investment has still not recovered either. No matter the scale of conflict, any significant military action by Russia is likely to further damage these sectors or delay their recovery process, putting Ukraine in a much more uncomfortable position than Russia or any Western country. Since the beginning of the year, the value of the Ukrainian Hryvnia has declined 4% against the dollar, making it one of the worst performing currencies in the world, and investors have already begun to freeze funding and suspend expansion plans until they better understand how this crisis will play out. As Ukraine alone does not hold the power to effectively combat a Russian invasion or impose any sanctions, retaliation is very much out of their hands. Despite the huge economic consequences that an invasion of Ukraine would have, the question remains: will the sanctions be enough to deter Russia from escalating the situation and invading? For now, it seems far from certain that they will be. Most experts suggest that Russia is willing to take extreme risks in order to reach its political goals and, with it unclear what sanctions the US and Europe would be comfortable imposing (given the impacts on themselves), it does not appear that the suggested sanctions would materialise as enough to deter an invasion. However, as the US and Europe solidify their response to the invasion and as sanctions become clearer, the situation is subject to significant change.

Recently, there has been a backlash over Disney’s casting for the forthcoming musical “The Little Mermaid.” The trailer itself has received approximately one million and a half dislikes due to fans’ outrage and disappointment in the differential racial identity of the actress who played Ariel compared to the original red-head Caucasian animation. Whilst there is some opposition-held against the actress, much of the protest is due to the deliberate advertisement of political correctness within the remake of the classical franchise. In other words, the backlash was against what the media today calls “woke movies”, with its former term originally stemming from the Black Liberation Movement but has later been lexicalized by those who aim to advance social injustice progress. You may ask if the woke culture holds a fundamental aim of dismantling systems of injustice, why are movies of such a kind still an issue when the perks of being woke, whose actions would seem righteous, are so fascinating? This article hopes to answer the question by arguing that the proportional fixations of western films on politically- correct storytelling may have limiting influences on the evolution of both woke and pop cultures. It is worth noting that woke movies do not simply refer to movies with a strong female lead or a dark-skinned actor/actress, but essentially those that involve deliberate swaps of gender and/or racial ethnicities of characters coming from the pre-existing franchise. Most importantly, it is usually done to symbolically deliver a political message while overlooking the entertaining nature as a major goal of franchises. One consequence is that woke movies have caused the culture to slowly lose its political applicability. Instead of using the term and its associated rhetoric to establish concrete policies for marginalized groups, companies like Hollywood today create movies that intend to idealize the values that are favoured by the woke society that we live in. This is due to the fear of the “cancel culture” which has been on the rise as people start looking at posts written by comedians to politicians. Whilst keeping people and institutions accountable for their actions, it is also necessary to stay respectable for differences in our society. Otherwise, pushing political correctness in all aspects of society will leave no room for mistakes nor expressions for any individual.This may lead the younger audience to grow in a society that is very critical and therefore susceptible to follow wokeness ‘involuntarily’ to a certain extent Over time, the term goes through what is known as the Phases of image, where narrative detaches from its initial root from the Black movement and shifts towards a hyperrealism concept in favour of white supremacy. Bacon Jr. (2021) noted in Stazi. M’s article stated that “woke” is a modern-day equivalent of other terms which are used as a simulacrum to establish legislations to alienate people from the administrative state further. It becomes a cognitive shortcut to label anyone perceived as “too woke” as an activist, a socialist and an anti-American. When it comes to the nature of administration, the performing and proliferating nature of media may commercialize the movements behind woke culture into a symbolic idea. As a result, symbolic activism is the new social construct under which one feels more motivated to engage in actions with no real change, but enough to make them feel contributional to making a change. The more walls are being painted declaring equality, the less emphasis is placed on policy change, hence the issue with the ‘woke’ culture at present. Another consequence is that woke storytelling has reversed the ideals of diversity when the public begins to believe that the way to change is to be “opinionated” and even judgemental about other people. This is exactly what Barack Obama, the former president of the U.S.A, pointed out in his speech against Woke culture. He exemplified that, “If I tweet or hashtag about how you didn’t do something right or use the wrong verb, then I can sit back and feel good about myself because did you see how woke I was?”. Due to narratives being proposed through dramatic rhetoric, plots and players, people may feel wokeness as something to perform rather than embody and live. Ironically, instead of striving to create a tolerant environment, people are now driven to be hyper-sensitive towards any comments of its counterpart, craving for conflicts and rejecting political diversity. In the art field, the domination of woke culture has largely hindered the freedom of artistic expression and creativity. In an article rating over the classical movie “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington”, the author asked a rhetorical question: “Can you imagine Hollywood doing a remake of that movie?”. Although meant as a joke, the question underlies the fact that contemporary film is losing a platform to express cultural variation. Ideally, any kind of story is granted its artistic merit when the narrative challenges the viewers with their imagination and inspires discussion upon a reflecting topic without violating anyone’s trust. However, the reality is that creators no longer produce stories from an artistic point of view, but are limited by the cautious attitude in depicting potentially debatable topics. As a result, from the unexpected Spanish lines spoken by Chavez in Dr Strange, to the bisexuality of Superman, these “forced” modifications of characterization merely unify established, unique work into a category, rather than contributing to diversity. As a result, movies in the recent decade are becoming more forgettable and unoriginal. Hence, with more entertainers taking on a propagandistic approach of production, our future society led by younger generations will begin to normalize and eventually show inclinations toward propaganda over art, leading to a monoculture. As much as a movie is free to depict politics, the aim should not be to throw subjective ideas of political correctness upon its viewers at the expense of artistic expression. Otherwise, the incompatibility of the two realms may hinder the advancement in each of their distinct evolution. For example, the entertaining nature of cinema culture may turn the bases of politics into a hyper-realistic concept, leading to the lack of emphasis on concrete systematic adjustments. Hence, opposing effects of the woke initiative may occur as symbolic activism drives people to be hyper-sensitive towards comments made upon minorities, leading to an intolerant environment as opposed to diversity. In terms of art, creativity is hindered under the industrial domination of political propaganda, eventually leading to the loss of artistic diversity. Nonetheless, woke art is still the norm today despite its major contradiction. It is crucial to reconsider whether it is worth sacrificing art for political popularity and to challenge the appeals of “woke” culture.