Abhay Venkitaraman Over the past decade, Canadian governments on both sides of the aisle have implemented reforms to the country’s child benefit regime. These efforts have significantly increased the generosity of welfare provision for households with children. What impact did these policies have – and with child poverty rates on the up in the aftermath of the pandemic, what more needs to be done? Across advanced economies, child poverty rates in the OECD   generally exceed  those for the general public. Child poverty has a detrimental impact on children subject to it. Alongside facing reduced life chances, children in poverty are disproportionately at risk of   social isolation , reduced   cognition , and psychological distress, alongside a wide range of other negative effects. Moreover, people impoverished in childhood tend to have   worse labour market outcomes  later in life. This increases their reliance on transfer payments, impacting society at large. One country that has taken steps to reduce child poverty is Canada. Over the past decade, the country has taken significant steps to improve the generosity of transfer payments targeted towards households with children. This analysis will focus on two in particular: the expansion of the Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) in 2015, and the implementation of the Canada Child Benefit (CCB) the year after; both these reforms have succeeded at reducing child poverty rates. However, their effectiveness at doing so has waned, highlighting the need for policy reforms. What are the UCCB and CCB? The  Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) was introduced in 2006 by Stephen Harper’s newly elected Conservative government. Payments were universal, meaning households were not excluded from receiving the UCCB based on their income. Moreover, they were taxable, meaning they were classified as income and therefore subject to income tax. Initially , only households with children below the age of 6 were eligible for the UCCB. However, in 2015, the government expanded the UCCB. Eligibility was increased, with all households with children below the age of 18 being able to claim the benefit. This was accompanied by more generous payments for children aged 0-5. That  same year, the Liberals, led by Justin Trudeau, won Canada’s general election, sweeping back into power with a majority of seats. Trudeau’s government proceeded to implement a radical overhaul of the country’s child benefit regime. In 2016, three welfare benefits – the UCCB, the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB), and the National Child Benefit (NCB) – were replaced by the Canada Child Benefit (CCB). Unlike the UCCB, the CCB is means-tested and is not subject to income tax.   Currently , households can claim $7,787 per year (roughly £4,400) for each child under the age of 6 and $6,570 (roughly £3,700) for every child between the ages of 6 and 17. However, once a household’s adjusted family net income (AFNI) exceeds $36,502 (roughly £25,700), the amount of benefit a household receives falls as the household’s income increases. The rate at which benefit payments taper off depends on how many children a household has. The CCB represented a   “significant increase”  in benefits compared to the programmes it replaced. It put Canada in a position where its child benefit regime was   “especially generous” , particularly for low-income households, compared to the rest of the OECD. This increase in generosity was augmented by the   indexation of the CCB to inflation  in 2018, which ensures the value of CCB payments keeps up with living costs.  However, due to the fact the CCB represented the replacement of a universal benefit with a means-tested one, some high-income families faced   “reductions in benefits”  due to the policy. The impact of the UCCB expansion and CCB on child poverty Between  2015 and 2019, the share of children in low-income families fell from 20.9% to 17.7%.   Families  are classified as ‘low-income’ if their adjusted after-tax income is less than half of that of the median household. (Baker et al., 2021) finds that both the UCCB expansion and the CCB reduced child poverty, although the latter was more effective at doing so.  Other measures of living standards highlight the positive impact of the CCB. Men (Men et al., 2023) notes that the more generous payments the CCB provides for children under the age of 6 have reduced food insecurity within households with younger children. Placing Canada in a global context, the success of the policies is clear.   Between  2008 and 2018, the country experienced one of the largest declines in child poverty rates within the OECD. Canada saw a dramatic reduction in child poverty between 2019 and 2020. The share of children in low-income families fell from 17.7% to 13.5%, largely due to temporary pandemic-related welfare programmes.  However, the figure rose to 15.6% the year after and increased an   additional 2.5%  between 2021 and 2022. Importantly, anti-child poverty non-profit group Campaign 2000 has found that the CCB’s effectiveness at reducing child poverty has waned. Whilst, on average, the benefit has reduced the share of children in low-income households by 8.8%, it only did so by 7.8% in 2022. The impact of the CCB on labour supply A common concern surrounding means-tested benefits like the CCB is that they reduce work incentives. With means-testing, households gradually lose welfare benefits as they earn more. This reduces the opportunity cost of exiting the workplace and thus acts to reduce labour supply. Not only does this reduce economic growth, but the loss of labour income this disincentive generates undermines the ability of benefits to reduce poverty. Evidence regarding the CCB’s impact on labour supply is mixed.   (Baker et al., 2021)  finds that the implementation of the CCB had no significant impact on the labour participation of women. However,   another study  finds that secondary earners in households claiming the CCB’s benefits tapered off the more they earned “[significantly] decreased” their working hours in response. The authors note that almost all of this reduction in labour supply was attributable to women. Policy Recommendations Make children of non-citizen parents eligible for the CCB UNICEF Canada  has noted that a household’s eligibility for the CCB is tied to the immigration status of the parents. This means that even children born and residing in Canada may be unable to access the benefit if their parents are not Canadian citizens or permanent residents. This is especially unfair, given that those parents likely pay taxes to finance benefits they cannot claim. Allowing these households to claim the benefit would broaden the range of households eligible for the benefit, enhancing its ability to reduce poverty. This is especially the case given that immigrant households in Canada are   disproportionately likely  to be impoverished. That being said, implementing this policy is likely to be challenging politically, given the country’s current   anti-immigrant backlash . Universalise the CCB As aforementioned, means-tested benefits like the CCB distort work incentives because benefits taper off the more claimants earn. Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence that suggests the CCB does this, although other studies do not concur. Given the potential reduction in labour supply stemming from the means-testing of the CCB, it may make sense for the benefit to be universalised, such that a household’s income levels do not influence how much benefit they receive. This could limit the negative impact of the CCB on labour supply – particularly if universalisation is financed through economically efficient taxes. Alongside positive effects relating to labour supply, universal benefits are   typically  less complex to administer and are less prone to error and fraud than means-tested ones. Concluding Remarks Whilst the Canadian child benefit reforms of the past decade have left child poverty rates significantly lower than they otherwise would have been, it is clear that the country has a long way to go. The most recently available data suggests that over a million children are subject to the indignity of poverty and that the problem is only getting worse. The aforementioned policy recommendations would likely further efforts to address child poverty in a manner that minimises trade-offs. That being said, it is unlikely they will be implemented in the near future, given a Conservative government with hardline positions on both immigration and government spending lies on the horizon.

Jakub Fegyveres Carbon markets are, currently, a highly topical issue in contemporary environmental policy. Included as one of the three mechanisms for cross-border "voluntary cooperation" within the framework of the Paris Climate Agreement, they are currently one of the main drivers of emissions reduction, as well as providing a source of climate financing. Currently, there are 33 non-voluntary carbon markets in operation around the world, though this number looks set to grow. Presenting their 2023 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 143 of 154 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stated "that they plan to or will possibly use carbon credits [...] as a means to finance climate action and achieve national targets." In addition, at this year’s at Cop29, new rules for carbon markets were set out after previous deadlock on the issue, signalling a new intent and hope in this important sphere of climate policy. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the shape carbon markets should take, and the ways in which they may be utilised to their fullest extent. Before doing that, however, some background is required. Put simply, carbon markets are a mechanism which enables the assigning of a price to a volume of the greenhouse gas (GHG), making possible its subsequent trading. This occurs either in the form of allowances or credits, traded on so-called “compliance” and “voluntary” carbon markets, respectively. Compliance markets, typically set up by states or regions, are entered by companies through legal obligation. They operate on a cap-and-trade system, meaning a total permissible volume of emitted carbon dioxide is decided upon. A set number of allowances , which allow their buyer to emit a certain volume of carbon dioxide (typically 1 tonne per allowance), is sold to the highest bidder through an auction process, unless freely given away, as is the case for some chosen industries. In contrast, as their name indicates, voluntary markets are not participated in under the threat of sanction, and they act as the venue for the sale of carbon credits , rather than allowances. This means that companies seeking to offset their emissions, or even become net-positive can, in theory, buy the requisite number of credits to justify these claims. It is worth underlining the importance of these markets’ potential success, as substantial and continuous emissions reductions are necessary in order to meet the 1.5°C target set in Paris in 2015, which would contribute towards avoiding the   worst effects  of warming. Further, the currently dire state of financing adaptability initiatives, especially in the Global South, also underscores the importance of the usage of carbon markets, especially the voluntary variant. As things stand, with the recently agreed   $300bn  New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) failing to meet expectations and requirements, this issue has gained renewed pertinence. There are two principal ways in which carbon markets should be improved to achieve these targets. The first applies to compliance markets, such as the European Union’s (EU), Japan’s or China’s Emissions Trading System (ETS), which operate on a cap-and-trade basis. The size and reach of this “cap” are often rightly called into question, given the markets’ substantial potential to act as an even larger force promoting emissions reduction. For instance, despite being the world’s largest carbon market, China’s ETS   only covers  around 40% of the country’s CO2 emissions.   It is worth mentioning, however, that markets such as the EU’s ETS do provide for a 62% emissions reduction by 2030, and virtually all markets are set up with a continually decreasing cap. Secondly, with a view to increasing their value, the cause of bolstering the markets’ credibility, a lack of which   experts view  as the cause of the two most recent carbon market crashes, should be given the utmost attention. This issue has gained increasing prominence, as research has necessitated questions of whether the agreements that underpin voluntary markets, designed to affect the removal of a given volume of carbon dioxide, are actually being honoured. In light of the recent   discovery  that 90% of carbon offsets issued by the biggest certifier are “worthless”, it is no surprise that voluntary markets have suffered from a lack of credibility, which has a real impact on their usage and, ultimately, the state of the climate. Similarly, a 2024   study  in Nature found that, of the projects it investigated, only 16% of the credits issued actually resulted in the promised offsets. Naturally, this justifiable lack of trust has stunted the growth of voluntary markets, worth less than   $1bn  as of 2023, and a 20%   dip  in the price per credit year on year. In practice, increasing trust in compliance markets could happen through a third-party review, or the widespread implementation of pre-determined standards and reporting procedures. There is evidence in the form of steps in the right direction in this area, namely in the form of the “ Core Carbon Principles ”, released recently by the Voluntary Carbon Market Integrity Council. If implemented properly, these standards could chart the course for considerable voluntary market growth, helping direct much-needed capital and investment towards adaptation efforts in the Global South.         Sources https://www.unep.org/topics/climate-action/climate-finance/carbon-markets https://unepccc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/final-report-published-sep-2022.pdf https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/the-interplay-between-voluntary-and-compliance-carbon-markets_500198e1-en.html https://newclimate.org/news/the-promise-of-voluntary-carbon-markets-unlocking-finance-for-the-global-south-may-be-a-myth Summary for Policymakers — Global Warming of 1.5 ºC https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-53645-z https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/18/revealed-forest-carbon-offsets-biggest-provider-worthless-verra-aoe https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/nov/10/cop29-what-are-carbon-credits-and-why-are-they-so-controversial https://carboncredits.com/carbon-credits-in-2024-what-to-expect-in-2025-and-beyond-250b-by-2050/#:~:text=Falling%20Prices&text=In%202024%2C%20the%20average%20price,more%20reliable%20and%20long%2Dlasting . https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1157416

India Gordon The UK is at a pivotal moment in its history with the proposed Terminally Ill Adults (Assisted Dying) Bill having passed its second reading in the last month. If approved, the Bill could transform end-of-life care in the UK, marking a significant step forward in patient autonomy. However, to truly ensure the safety and dignity of patients, adequate safeguards are needed to address the procedure’s intrinsic practical and ethical challenges. need to be robustly defined to protect vulnerable individuals while balancing its practical and ethical challenges. The Law The right to life underscores various human rights charters, including the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights. Advocates of assisted dying argue that the procedure is an intrinsic extension of this right as individuals should be able to determine when and how they want to end their life. They believe that terminally ill patients are entitled to dignity in their medical autonomy, especially when all treatment options have been exhausted. In the UK, assisted dying remains illegal under the Suicide Act 1961, which prohibits anyone from assisting another in ending their life. While there have been numerous previous attempts for legislation change, no bill has succeeded in becoming law. However, with a recent poll finding that 75% of respondents supported the legalisation of assisted dying in the UK, policymakers face the challenge of balancing its potential practical and ethical considerations while preserving the dignity of terminally ill patients. The Terminally Ill Adults (Assisted Dying) Bill Lobbied by MPs such as Kim Leadbeater and various patient advocacy groups, the Terminally Ill Adults (Assisted Dying Bill) proposes legislation reform that would allow patients aged 18 and above, who have been given a prognosis of six months or less in their terminal illness, the option to end their life with a doctor’s assistance should they wish to do so. The bill specifically stipulates that two doctors need to establish that the patient has adequate mental capacity to make a fully-informed decision, meaning they need to demonstrate that they are acting out of their voluntary wishes and understand the nature of the process and the potential effect it may have on their relatives. Therefore, the primary purpose of the bill is to prioritise patients' dignity in their decisions during the end stages of their life. The bill also looks to avoid the criminal prosecution of terminally-ill patients' relatives who travel with them abroad to countries like Switzerland, where over 500 British citizens have sought access to assisted dying services from Dignitas since its establishment in 2011.  The Opposing View: A ‘Slippery Slope’ Opponents of the bill, including senior MPs and religious organisations, believe that legal assisted dying procedures inherently risk a ‘slippery’ slope. They warn that there is space for potential misuse and coercion that could lead to a significant number of patients seeking assisted dying and expanding eligibility of conditions existing beyond originally proposed legislation. Those against assisted dying frequently cite the potential vulnerability of terminally ill patients to pursue assisted dying procedures if they feel pressured to. The risk of relatives who seek financial gain, such as inheritance, may exploit terminally ill patients’ vulnerability and coerce them into pursuing euthanasia. And even if there are no parties posing ill intent present, some patients may pursue assisted dying if they believe themselves to be an emotional or financial burden on their loved ones and healthcare services, in which case assisted dying becomes a seeming obligation rather than genuine choice. These practical concerns are further exacerbated by the psychological toll that terminal illness can have on people, which critics argue renders a patient’s capacity to make fully-informed decisions precarious in its objectivity.  Critics of assisted dying draw attention to the psychological toll that terminal illnesses can have on people, rendering their capacity to make fully-informed decisions precarious in its objectivity. Another significant concern of legislation is the potential for expanding the types of conditions that would deem a patient eligible for assisted dying services, which has already occurred in Switzerland and Belgium. While the Bill’s current proposal limits eligibility only to those with terminal physical illnesses, opposing parties fear that it could eventually seek to include mental health conditions. For instance, in May 2024, Zoraya ter Beek, a Dutch citizen, travelled to Switzerland to end her life after enduring years from chronic depression and anxiety. Her case sparked conversation about the ethical implications of extending assisted dying to individuals with non-physical conditions, raising questions about the boundaries of eligibility and the adequacy of safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals. While there are concerns about logistics and ethical challenges regarding euthanasia, proponents of the bill argue that by preventing the legalisation of assisted dying in the UK, citizens are faced with declining health which can worsen their quality of life in terms of their physical and mental wellbeing. And because options for assisted dying are only currently available abroad, patients may actually feel inclined to pursue it earlier than they may want to, as advocates argue that these patients may worry that their declining health will render them unable to in the future. Therefore, it is clear that individuals need access to end-of-life care without unnecessary delays or uncertainties. Conclusion: Future legislation Ultimately, the challenges facing these legislation exemplify the need for policymakers to ensure that any future legislation contains robust safeguards that protect the safety and dignity of terminally-ill patients. Avoiding coercion - The proposed Bill suggests that if doctors suspect patients are making decisions out of coercion or emotional manipulation, they can refer them to external psychologists. However, without formal training, doctors may only recognise overt signs of pressure, overlooking more subtle signs, which inherently undermine the necessity for patient autonomy. Assessing mental capacity - When assessing a patient’s mental capacity, a panel of multidisciplinary professionals should be consulted. Instead of solely relying on only two medical doctors’ judgements, combining the expertise of doctors, trained psychologists and clinical ethicists, would more reliably assess a patient’s mental state. This would mitigate the risk of wrongful decisions.  Address gaps in current palliative care - Finally, legislation could also benefit from improving the standards and availability of current palliative care. By ensuring that patients have access to adequate medical and emotional support, this minimises the risk of them choosing assisted dying due to feelings of isolation or unrelieved suffering. References Dignitas has helped 540 British people die, MPs told Public Opinion - Every parliamentary constituency in Great Britain backs assisted dying Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill The slippery slope of assisted dying BPS Response to the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill: Health, Social Care and Sport Committee Call for Evidence

Aditi Someshwar The European Union is one of the most powerful and significant geographic blocs in history. The Union extends decision-making dominance across countries both within Europe and beyond, positioning itself as an overarching ideological faction with implicit power at the global stage. However, is being a member of the Union worth the price one pays in accession? This remains a question that begs an answer.   Who may enter the Union?  Being within the geographic confines of the European continent is not enough to be a part of the EU. This esteemed membership comes at a cost of conforming to the whims of dominant member states and their political beliefs - Germany, France, Belgium, formerly the UK. Many countries try consistently to attach themselves to this elite group, yet fall short of acceptance which is both caused by and causes great political turmoil. There are a plethora of complex reasons for why certain countries get chosen into the EU as compared to others. However, the most pertinent are expectations of dominant ideology, stability of political systems, and geopolitical implications.  Heavy Costs of Accession   Expectations of dominant ideology fall under the EU’s understanding of themselves as democratic, equitable, secular and implicitly capitalist. While their expectation of similar practices across member states is not noteworthy, the coercive power the EU can wield over these states in changing and influencing political practices is pertinent. If a state does not want to follow their rules and respect their basic values as aforementioned, they won't be admitted.  For instance, Turkey, which first bid to join the Union in 1987, still to this date remains on the outskirts of integration. 15 new member states have been accepted since they first made their formal application. The main pushback for Turkey as part of the EU comes from viewing the nation as ideologically distinct from the EU’s Identity, particularly in regards to frameworks of human rights and justice. France’s biggest objection to Turkey’s EU bid is their constitutional differences in human rights and press freedom which do not meet EU standards. This follows along the lines of standard criteria against which countries are scored when joining the Union and expected to amend domestic law for.  More importantly, the idea of pushing “ideological homogeneity” is not just directed towards aspiring member countries but already established members such as Poland and Hungary. These countries are repeatedly allocated less funds or no funds at all from significant European institutions because of their illiberal practices. These are heavy costs to bear for nations already a part of the Union, who without this funding suffer severe economic challenges. If we take the example of Hungary, we observe that the country permanently lost 1 billion Euros in funds from the EU as of 1st January this year. This comes at a difficult time for the nation amidst a recession and a consistently shrinking economy. These funds have been blocked on the grounds of concerns with rule of law, breaching of asylum rules and sidelining of earlier EU judgements. The EU affairs minister for Hungary, János Bóka, as quoted in the Financial Times, states that it is “very difficult” not to interpret the withdrawal of funds as “political pressure”. Further elucidating how nations which do not assimilate to the Union’s demand bear the cost of discrimination which has devastating impacts on their economy.  It is also imperative to mention however that certain countries are further isolated from joining the Union due to their perceived ideological standing as “separate” from that of the EU. Regardless of aspects of democracy and rule of law, Turkey also displays noticeable demographic differences with most EU countries, with a large Muslim population. This paints Turkey as separate from Europe in the minds of many EU citizens and governments; with an emphasis on the country’s incompatibility with the EU’s secular and liberal identity. While Turkey’s stance is both secular and modern as a state today, this taught perspective on the Islamic world taints their perception in the European continent.   The EU’s need for overarching ideological homogeneity goes hand in hand with their want of political stability which comes in the form of democratic governments and low civil unrest. Many countries such as North Macedonia have been tasked to create more constitutionally inclusive environments for the ethnic groups residing within the country and neighbouring them. The negotiations framework put forward with the country’s candidate status in July 2022 required them to undertake constitutional changes to include ethnic groups living in their country as protected and equal citizens. Including classifying the Bulgarians, Croats, Montenegrin, Jews and other minorities as part of these ethnic groups.  These inclusive strategies to establish political stability do not extend to the ongoing refugee crisis. In reality, countries with high numbers of refugees are deemed increasingly unstable due to their increased diversity. For instance a large concern with Turkey joining the EU is their status as the largest host of refugees within the region and the instability this population will bring to the region’s security, economies and culture.    Finally, geopolitical nuances command significant influence over nations and their accession into the EU. It is largely known that Russia aims to protect its borders through any means possible and hence places priority in controlling and actively participating in national proceedings of its neighbour states. This thwarts many nations’ want to be a part of the Union. Georgia is the latest country with a public desire to join the bloc in hopes of better economic growth and political stability that has its hopes blocked by the geopolitically charged position it finds itself in bordering Russia.  Georgia gained candidate status to the EU only in 2023, however 2024 saw the country lose progress as the Union claimed that Georgia adopted a law in favour of the Russians with its explicit interests in mind. 2024 also saw the Georgian Dream Party attain power in the national election, which came as a surprise to many citizens due to their anti-EU stance that goes against the majority of the public. This election has since been labelled rigged with interference from the Russian government and sparked nationwide protests against the ruling party. The situation has become increasingly precarious over the last months of the year. The Georgian public seems to be clear in its wants to join the EU and distance itself from Russia, however the government seems to have different beliefs. Further, foreign actors such as Russia itself seem to play a role in the decision making process of the nation, creating an even more upsetting reality for citizens. Russian interference is an imperative reason for the EU to vote against Georgian accession, leaving the nation’s citizens in a certain no-win situation with only detriments to themselves.  Any Answers?  The EU remains powerful as we enter 2025, hence acceptance into the block continues to be exclusive with significant consequences for those who wish to assimilate themselves. While the EU guarantees economic support and security, its implicit expectations are of homogeneity and stability, which only comes with an acceptance of set hierarchies. These expectations can come with a severe cost to many nations within the European continent. Whether the trade-offs are worth investing in is something only time will tell and citizens can decide.  References Akhfaitar, F. (2024, July 6). Analyzing Turkey’s EU membership status . Modern Diplomacy. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07/07/analyzing-turkeys-eu-membership-status/ Baccini, F. (2024, December 27). Georgia’s democracy on the Brink: Protests continue amid allegations of rigged elections and Protestor crackdown . The Parliament Magazine. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/georgian-protesters-stand-up-to-increasingly-authoritarian-crackdown Biskup, P., Chorąży, P., Dzierżanowski, P., Kozioł, A., Kaca, E., Szczepanik, M., Szymańska, J., & Zając, T. (2024). (publication). 20 years of Poland in the European Union . THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Retrieved January 3, 2025, from https://pism.pl/publications/20-years-of-poland-in-the-european-Union . Dunai, M., & Tamma, P. (2024, December 31). Hungary loses EU funds as economic slump deepens . Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/fe893219-7ac3-4ff4-a01f-5cfc3e99be7c?sharetype=blocked   Magiera, O. (2024, November 6). The path to EU membership: Where do the candidate countries stand? . European Newsroom. https://europeannewsroom.com/the-path-to-eu-membership-where-do-the-candidate-countries-stand/ Thomas Mackintosh, M. D. & R. D. (2024, November 30). Georgia: Thousands protest in Tbilisi after Eu bid suspended . BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c62jp68p315o Uras, U. (2023, September 20). Analysis: Is Turkey’s bid for EU membership over?  Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/analysis-is-turkeys-bid-for-eu-membership-over

Jakub Fegyveres What is the most important area of environmental policy? In my opinion, especially in this context, the relative importance of a given policy should be synonymous with, and measured by, its impact. It may be intuitive to turn to the most well-known policies; the ban on electric vehicles, or the 1.5-degree Celsius target agreed in   Paris  at COP21. These policies, and many others like them, were formed by educated policymakers, operating on the basis of a political mandate handed to them by an electorate sufficiently content with such advances. There is a school of thought, therefore, which emphasises the importance of the wider policymaking environment. In other words, the importance of adequate environmental education. The current state of school curricula from around the world, as they relate to climate change, is woefully inadequate. This point is easiest made with reference to the United States (U.S.), where fossil fuel companies are able to exercise an influence what the nation’s children learn to a shocking extent. In 2016,   for instance , a lobby group called the Oklahoma Energy Resources Board produced a book, which it distributed to the state’s schools free of charge. In it, a character called Petro Pete, who attends Petroville Elementary School, has a bad dream, in which all petroleum by-products disappear, making Pete’s life much more difficult. Upon waking, he cannot help but exclaim “all of my petroleum by-products are back!” American schooling is rife with examples of this kind of tacit industry promotion, which blurs the line between education and propaganda, ultimately producing a less informed populace, as it is designed to. There are less overt examples of this corporate influence, which is certainly not limited to the United States. British Petroleum (BP), for instance, rather than creating stories of children extolling the virtues of petroleum, prefers to advance its agenda by promoting a   neoliberal model  of STEM education. This is designed to “dissuade young people from questioning or understanding the role of corporate power in the climate crisis”, limiting the spectrum of environmental policies they might consider legitimate or beneficial. Placing the direct influence of multi-national corporations aside, it is also evident that national curricula are failing, even without their interference. A recent wide-ranging   survey  of teachers and students in 36 European countries found that, while 68% of students wanted to learn more about the environment and climate change, three quarters of teachers felt they lacked adequate training to deliver this education. Similarly, a 2019   Afrobarometer paper  placed the climate literacy rate across Africa at 37%, though with vast differences depending on region and level of education. The latter point has also been demonstrated in a European context, as a 2022   study  found that “Individuals with secondary or tertiary education were much less likely to deny climate change than those with primary level of education.” Needless to say, these facts underscore the need for a sufficiently robust climate curriculum in primary education. Any citizen’s basic understanding of a crisis of this magnitude should not be determined by their education level, which tends to   correlate  with their socio-economic circumstances. As long as it remains so, any body politic is entirely vulnerable to a politicisation of the question of the existence of anthropogenic climate change, which education of a sufficiently good quality renders vanishingly unlikely. However, while the issue remains in question, there is political capital to be gained from it,   especially  through   disinformation  and populist rhetoric, ultimately leading to   more damaging policies . Therefore, it is clear that climate change should play a central role in the curricula, beginning at the primary stage. As a first step, it is crucial that education receives recognition (and funding) as a legitimate and useful tool for combatting climate change, as well as disinformation about it. This is all the more important because of the politically disadvantageous nature of analogous policies, which only societally manifest themselves in the medium- to long-term. In addition, the   existing system  of confining teaching about the crisis to science-related subjects, even though experts contend that it should permeate across the curriculum more extensively. To   exemplify , a History lesson about the industrial revolution may mention the emissions it created, and first language lessons might engage with relevant literature. This   interconnectedness  should also extend to building awareness of the intersection between social justice and the climate crisis, challenging the aforementioned neoliberal narrative. Finally, as a more general point, it imperative that these teaching guidelines should emerge out of a detailed dialogue between the public,   experts  and policymakers. For this process to be most fruitful, it is also essential that it take place in an environment as free from politicization as possible,   ideally  within the auspices an international forum, such as the United Nations.     References https://www.teachthefuture.uk/blog/climate-education-is-lacking-across-europe https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10091220/1/The%20Oil%20Industry%20in%20Our%20Schools%20FINAL%20SS%202020.pdf https://www.earthday.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Climate-Education-Report.pdf https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/climate-solutions/education-key-addressing-climate-change https://academic.oup.com/esr/article/38/1/153/6333558 https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement https://davidsuzuki.org/story/fossil-fuelled-deniers-in-politics-hurt-everyone/ https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2021-01-12-link-between-climate-scepticism-and-support-right-wing-populists-study https://caad.info/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/The-Impacts-of-Climate-Disinformation-on-Public-Perception.pdf https://www.teachthefuture.uk/tracked-changes-project https://cdn.prod.website- files.com/5f8805cef8a604de754618bb/637d29ede1d41e1b334e55a3_Guiding%20principles.pdf https://www.earthday.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Climate-Education-Report.pdf Franta, B. (2021) ‘Weaponizing economics: Big Oil, economic consultants, and climate policy delay’, Environmental Politics  31:4, 555-575. Newell, P.; Paterson, M. (2010) Climate Capitalism . Cambridge University Press.

Udaya Pal Donald Trump’s incoming return to the White House has many skeptical and concerned about the implications for the future of US relations with the Middle East. He’s been very vocal about his desire to return to a time of US isolationism, outlining a foreign policy characterised by high tariffs, transactional relationships, and a rejection of multilateral organisations. His first term demonstrated his appetite for reckless and aggressive behaviour, but his ambitions were curbed by an uncooperative political establishment. Now, he comes into office with the Republican party seemingly firmly under his thumb, and both houses of the Congress under Republican control. How will his new foreign policy agenda manifest itself amongst an incredibly volatile Middle East?   The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has changed significantly since his last spell in power, and the region is currently facing its most serious challenges for generations.            However, US Middle East policy has remained fairly consistent through presidential shifts in recent years. Obama, Trump and Biden all structured their approaches around ensuring regional order, premised on Arab Israeli normalisation (repeatedly failing to make progress towards Palestinian statehood). Trump in his second term isn’t expected to deviate from this agenda or dramatically upend any existing regional alliances; but this isn’t to say that Trump’s second term will simply be an extension of the Biden era. His aggressive, ad hoc brand of politics will undoubtedly manifest itself in his Middle East policy, but it remains difficult to predict how this will affect the fragile balance in the region.   Israel-Palestine Conflict – No End in Sight   Trump’s self-portrayal as a master of international peace brokering, as well as his self-stated opposition to American foreign involvement may lead some to believe that his administration may work towards peace between Israel and Hamas. Considering how Trump’s last administration treated the conflict, however, it is clear that securing a long-lasting peace that takes into account the aims and protections of the Palestinian people is unlikely to be his priority this time. His last term in office ended with the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, alongside the cancellation of UNRWA funding and a $200 million reduction in aid to the Palestinian Authority. There is rising concern that Trump could continue making impulsive decisions, further destabilizing the delicate situation and threatening fragile peace between Israel and its enemies.            His cabinet and diplomatic nominations also signal a difficult future for Palestinians. Nowhere is this more evident than in his choice of Mike Huckabee as ambassador to Israel. Huckabee has openly questioned the legitimacy of a distinct Palestinian identity, stating, 'there really isn’t such a thing.' He firmly opposes a two-state solution, supports expanding Israeli settlements and asserting Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, and denies the existence of an ongoing occupation in the region.            Biden’s stance on Israel faced heavy criticism (and probably cost him politically), for allowing Netanyahu to continue his campaign against Palestine and Lebanon with full impunity, regardless of the scale of destruction and its human impact. This is expected to continue under Trump, with even more rigour. He’s debated sanctioning the ICC following the announcement of their arrest warrant for Netanyahu, and publicly challenged the ICC’s legitimacy over Israel. Ultimately, Trump’s second term in office won’t do much for bringing about meaningful peace to the conflict, and will possibly worsen the condition of the already devastated Palestinian population.               Trump’s new administration is expected to view Gulf-Israeli normalisation as one of its central regional priorities. The Abraham Accords, one of the most notable of his foreign policy achievements, have only been signed by two Gulf states (UAE and Bahrain). Trump may well focus on bringing other key regional players on board, as part of his efforts to frame himself as a revolutionary peacemaker. The Biden administration has repeatedly promised Saudi Arabia enhanced security ties with the US, as well as access to advanced military technology (similar to what UAE received upon signing). If Trump succeeds in bringing peace to the Israel Palestine conflict, Saudi Arabia could perhaps be persuaded to join the accords. However, this now seems unlikely, given Saudi Arabia's prerequisite of Palestinian statehood, a goal that appears improbable under Trump’s leadership.   Escalating Tensions with Iran?   Possibly the largest difference between Biden and Trump’s Middle East approach will be in how he handles Iran. Trump pursued a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy against Iran during his first term, and made Iran one of his foreign policy focal points. Biden hadn’t taken such a hard stance on Iran until the war on Gaza, but Trump has already expressed that this will soon change, as he prepares to resume where he left off with Iran. Trump’s reckless unpredictability in dealing with Iran previously worsened tensions and now threatens to escalate the situation further during a precarious time for the region. His sudden withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, without consulting Congress or other signatories, has led to Iran reportedly enriching uranium up to 60% purity (Tehran were only permitted to enrich up to 3.67% under the terms of the former deal). The designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation (marking the first time the US labelled a government entity as such) fuelled Tehran’s anger, but the most significant escalation occurred with the assassination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. The airstrike (on Iraqi soil) was viewed by Iran as an act of war, prompting the launch of retaliatory strikes on US bases, and is an act Tehran have stated they still want revenge for. Heightened conflict with Iran would spell disaster with the region, especially given the ongoing conflicts currently being fought by Iranian-backed proxies. Furthermore, Trump would struggle to find regional allies to support in his efforts against Iran. China’s efforts to broker a Saudi-Iranian peace deal seem to have succeeded, as evidenced by the recent visit of the Saudi military chief of staff to Tehran.   Stable Relations with the GCC   Trump’s last administration maintained good ties with the Gulf states. The energy sector will be a key concern for both parties, with Trump’s pro fossil fuel agenda quite possibly providing a boost to the hydrocarbon ambitions of many of the oil producing powers in the region. However, this is unlikely to slow their clean energy transition goals. Gulf climate policies such as net zero and clean energy are largely driven by economic diversification strategies, aimed at reducing dependency on oil revenue as well as growing domestic concerns over energy security. Additionally, global financial flows have been increasingly in favour of green energy investments. In 2023, new wind and solar installations surpassed all other contributions to the global energy mix, and by the end of 2024 clean energy investments are expected to exceed $2 trillion (2/3 of global energy investment). Gulf energy transition policy is to keep up with the shifting energy market, and will most likely remain unhindered by Trump’s enthusiasm for fossil fuel. Trump’s personal organisation has multi billion housing and real estate developments in Saudi Arabia and Oman, strengthening his own personal relationship with these regional hegemons. Another unconventional figure who may play a key role in Trump’s Gulf diplomacy will be his son in law Jared Kushner. Affinity Partners, Kushner’s private equity firm, has received heavy investment from both UAE and Qatar, as well as a $2 billion investment from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund. Kushner won’t hold a formal position in the administration but is expected to play an active role in diplomacy, as he did during the Al Ula Summit in January 2021, which addressed the GCC rift with Qatar.   An escalation of the war in Yemen?   The war in Yemen has caused one of the worst ongoing humanitarian crises in the world, with over 21 million people in need of assistance. During Trump’s last administration, significant arms sales to UAE and Saudi Arabia were approved, as well as logistical support for coalition airstrikes. Biden’s Yemen policy brought an end to weapon sales, and showed support for a UN-led peace process (but resumed air strikes after Houthi attacks on Red Sea cargo ships).  Trump is expected to shift significantly from Biden’s approach, possibly resuming weapons sales and returning to a much stronger stance against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels as part of his return to a ‘maximum pressure’ Iran strategy. Trump will likely expand the scope of military operations against the Houthis, and possibly escalate maritime and air operations as well as increase support for Arab coalition led military action against them. Sanctions against the Houthi rebels and their finances may also be intensified, all of which would only serve to worsen the humanitarian emergency amongst the Yemeni population.   The road ahead   Ideally, Trump’s approach should focus on tackling the many humanitarian crises currently devastating the region, through increased aid relief and diplomatic efforts. Unfortunately, this doesn’t seem like it will be a priority of the incoming administration. The U.S. is uniquely positioned to facilitate progress on issues like Palestinian statehood and negotiations to end Yemen’s civil war, but these long-term goals appear highly improbable under Trump’s leadership. Crucially, the Middle East cannot afford for Trump to return to his erratic ‘foreign policy by tweet’. Civilians have suffered unimaginably already, and the region’s ongoing conflicts could spiral even further out of control at any time. Right now, the Middle East needs Trump to be a mediator, not a catalyst. References https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/trumps-return-and-implications-for-the-middle-east/ The Washington PostTrump to designate Iranian military unit as a terrorist grou… ​ By Jonathan Swan, Kate Kelly, Maggie Haberman and Mark MazzettiKushner Firm Got Hundreds of Millions From 2 Persian Gulf Na… ​  By David D. Kirkpatrick and Kate KellyBefore Giving Billions to Jared Kushner, Saudi Investment Fu… ​ Jared Kushner expected to be pivotal to Trump admin’s Middle East efforts without taking a formal job | CNN Politics https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/saudi-arabia-s-sovereign-wealth-fund-plans-to-cut-overseas-investments-124102901539_1.html https://apnews.com/article/trump-huckabee-ambassador-israel-ace1894ce731c36622d5f09982a0a9b2?utm_source=chatgpt.com https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/11/21/a-trump-storm-cometh-for-the-icc-00183727 https://www.timesofisrael.com/is-trumps-pick-of-huckabee-as-envoy-to-israel-a-harbinger-of-west-bank-annexation/?utm_source=chatgpt.com https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/13/who-is-mike-huckabee-the-evangelical-pro-settlement-envoy-to-israel?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Aditi Someshwar Food is central to all of our lives, an essential ingredient for our mind, body, and soul. It is also a severely overlooked dimension of how countries exercise power. Cuisine and culinary premise is an unconscious yet effective mechanism of influencing perception and image with very real world consequences in the form of bilateral treaties, trade agreements, and tourism.  Setting The Plate - Culinary Exchange To understand the way in which culinary diplomacy is practised, it is imperative to understand the different levels of depth within influence. The three successive steps to achieving significant soft power influence are cultural exchange, democratic change and systemic change. Cultural exchange demands the dissemination of propaganda on a global scale; the act of consuming food and acknowledging a culture via consumption allows people to experience the ideas of a culture in the most sympathetic manner. This cultural exchange is evidenced with the increasing popularity of South Korean cuisine worldwide, particularly with the notable household ingredient, kimchi. Through the South Korean government getting kimchi protected Unesco’s list of intangible cultural heritage, they were able to make a strong cultural statement and influence people across the world to internalise and take seriously cultural materials such as ingredients, cook books, restaurants involving their cuisine. Democratic change requires ‘alien’ food’s symbolisms, norms and messages to become ingrained into the society, where the local population actually start actually using and considering the foreign cuisine as a part of their own daily lives. Indian food in the UK follows this exactly as flavours like “Chai” and “Tikka Masala” have been completely adopted locally and considered a part of most British people’s usual food habits.   Finally, democratic change becomes systemic change when soft food-power (through cultural propaganda) has embedded the norms and values so deep within the government and society that it can play a role in effectively influencing decision making processes. This is where culinary diplomacy holds true power as it can influence policy. Serving the Platter - Policy Potential The first policy potential is in regards to the image and reputation management a country can levy through food culture. Sushi and Ramen culture has been well exported by Japan, with the aforementioned merit. Both products have been able to retain their Japanese identity while simultaneously being viewed as modern and trendy. The Japanese government has been committed to selling the correct image of Japan and has done so by strictly regulating customer experience globally. The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries formed a panel of experts to inspect Japanese restaurants across the world for authenticity, with warnings and consequences for those that were not meeting standards. While Japan still only wields single-issue based soft power in this regard, its growing acceptance helps shape their global identity and the acceptance of their framed identity. Another major policy potential of culinary diplomacy is when strengthening ties of trade and tourism. This is successfully seen in Malaysia, where the government has focussed on food as a significant part of the tourism strategy. The Malaysian government has utilised food heritage to promote and improve ideas and perception of themselves as a perfect holiday destination given that food is believed to be a primary source of attraction for many tourist groups. Policy makers also saw this as a method to enhance their export sector. The “food paradise” that Malaysia branded itself as was majorly effective as it pushed for food tours and activities which both supported the local economy and allowed tourists to connect with the local culture intimately. Since the introduction of food tourism into the policy room, tourism numbers have increased significantly, and the sector now stands as the third largest contributor to the Malaysian economy.  Finally, the most optimistic use of food diplomacy is to influence conflict prevention through creating cross-cultural understanding and fostering community between various distinct groups. A pioneer instance of this is the annual food festival in France which promotes refugee chefs taking over restaurant kitchens across the country. The restaurants pay the chefs for their labour and cover costs while the festival gets a cut of profits which they donate to relevant charities. This cultural exchange through food deeply humanised refugees within the French community and fostered understanding and acceptance within the public. The festival has spread to the US and the UK as well, being practiced in major cities like New York, San Francisco and London.  Clean Plates - The Future  It is evident that culinary diplomacy leverages great soft-power influence and can lead to strong policy implications. However, it is pertinent to mention that we live in an incredibly globalised world, that has no means to stop exponentially expelling cultural borders. This raises great concerns for a future where culinary diplomacy continues to be increasingly effective. This discussion of homogenisation of culture is directly referenced in The End of History?  By Francis Fukuyama who argued for a framework of democratic peace. Hence, while it is clear that culinary soft power used effectively can promote nations to think and consume in a way that fosters cultural understandings that change ideologies, it also runs the risk of leading to no policy influence due to expedited growth of a unified global culture with fewer differences to exploit as diplomatic assets. References  Fukuyama, F. (2017). Francis Fukuyama (1989), “the end of history?”, the National Interest, 16, pp. 3-18 [173-89]. Foreign Policy, 197–214. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315255156-18 Fukuyama, F. (2020). The end of history and the last man. Penguin Books. Hussin, H. (2018). Gastronomy, tourism, and the soft power of Malaysia. Sage Open, 8(4). https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244018809211 The Indian influence in the UK: Beyond curry and culture . Sociology Institute. (2022, December 22). https://sociology.institute/diaspora-transnational-communities/indian-influence-uk-curry-culture/#the-journey-to-a-new-home-historical-migration-patterns Palat, R. A. (2015). Empire, Food and the Diaspora: Indian restaurants in Britain. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(2), 171–186. https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2015.1019603 Refugee Food Festival 2024. Refugee Food Festival 2024 - made with softr.io . (n.d.). https://festival.refugee-food.org/ Reynolds, C. J. (2012). The soft power of food: A diplomacy of hamburgers and sushi? Food Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 1(2), 47–60. https://doi.org/10.18848/2160-1933/cgp/v01i02/40518 Safronova, V. (2024, January 23). Kitchen diplomacy: How governments use food as a soft power. The Parliament Magazine. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/food-diplomacy-gastrodiplomacy-europe

Syed Hussain BRICS' ambitious bid to level the global financial playing field presents more questions than answers in the evolving landscape of international monetary relations. While the alliance's recent expansion and high-profile Kazan summit signal growing momentum, critical analysis reveals significant structural impediments to achieving true financial parity with the U.S.-led system. The summit's unprecedented attendance by over 30 nations, including EU partners and NATO member Turkey, suggests growing international interest in alternatives to Western financial dominance. The fundamental contradiction lies in BRICS' heterogeneous economic composition. With India's demographic expansion contrasting Russia's population decline, China's manufacturing dominance versus Gulf states' energy focus, and Brazil's agricultural emphasis, the bloc lacks the economic coherence necessary for monetary coordination. This diversity, while potentially advantageous for trade complementarity, poses serious challenges for currency stability and policy coordination. Furthermore, the absence of a unified central bank raises critical questions about monetary governance. The proposed gold backing (40%) for the "unit" payment system seems to ignore the historical lessons that led to the U.S. abandoning the gold standard in 1971. This regression to commodity backing could potentially limit monetary policy flexibility precisely when emerging economies need it most. China's dual strategy in particular exposes the limitations of BRICS' financial independence agenda. While Beijing supports Moscow through innovative "burner bank" arrangements, its careful maintenance of Western economic ties reveals a pragmatic recognition of continued dollar system dependence. This strategic hedging suggests even BRICS' most powerful member lacks full confidence in the bloc's financial alternatives. The recent behavior of Chinese banks, rapidly withdrawing from Russian transactions following U.S. secondary sanctions threats, demonstrates the practical limitations of operating outside the Western financial system. The current dollar system's dominance—evidenced by its role in 88% of global foreign exchange transactions and 60% of central bank reserves—stems from deep structural advantages that BRICS has yet to replicate: unparalleled market liquidity, transparent regulatory frameworks, entrenched payment systems, and a relatively predictable policy environment. Historical attempts at challenging dollar hegemony, from the Euro's introduction to various regional currency initiatives, illustrate the difficulty of displacing established financial infrastructure. The dollar's network effects and incumbent advantages have proven remarkably resilient. Technical challenges abound in the proposed "BRICS Bridge" payment system, including settlement mechanisms between disparate national systems, reserve management protocols, regulatory oversight frameworks, and cross-border dispute resolution procedures. The system's reliance on blockchain and digital currencies introduces additional complexities around technological infrastructure, cybersecurity, and regulatory compliance. Experience with existing cross-border payment innovations suggests that technical solutions alone cannot overcome fundamental issues of trust and governance. However, dismissing BRICS' initiatives entirely would be shortsighted. The bloc's effort represents a significant political signal about dissatisfaction with dollar hegemony. Even if the immediate challenge to dollar dominance remains limited, the push for alternative systems could accelerate the trend toward financial multipolarity. Three potential scenarios emerge: First, BRICS systems might gain traction primarily within member states and aligned nations, creating a parallel but limited financial ecosystem. Second, while BRICS alternatives may not dominate, they could prompt reforms in existing international financial institutions, leading to more inclusive global governance. Third, the initiative might contribute to a slowly evolving multipolar financial system, where different currency blocs coexist without clear dominance. Each scenario presents distinct implications for global financial stability and international trade patterns. For Western policymakers, BRICS' challenge necessitates careful recalibration. European Council President Michel's acknowledgment of Western "lecturing" suggests growing recognition that maintaining financial dominance requires more than technical superiority—it demands diplomatic finesse and responsiveness to emerging market concerns. The U.S. faces strategic choices between actively opposing BRICS initiatives (risking accelerated de-dollarization), engaging constructively to shape parallel systems, or reforming existing institutions to address legitimate grievances while preserving core advantages. Recent sanctions experiences have highlighted both the power and limitations of financial statecraft. For investors and market participants, BRICS' initiative demands attention without panic. While the dollar's near-term position appears secure, prudent portfolio diversification across currencies and markets becomes increasingly important. The potential for gradual shifts in global financial architecture suggests the need for flexible, adaptive investment strategies. Historical analysis of currency regime transitions indicates that such changes typically occur gradually, allowing markets time to adjust. BRICS' bid to level the global financial playing field faces formidable obstacles, yet its significance extends beyond immediate prospects for success. The initiative reflects deeper structural changes in the global economy and growing demands for more equitable financial governance. While revolutionary change appears unlikely, evolutionary adaptation of the global financial system seems inevitable. Recent developments in digital finance and changing geopolitical alignments may accelerate this evolution. The key question isn't whether BRICS will supplant dollar dominance, but how its challenge will reshape the international financial architecture. Success may ultimately be measured not in displacement of existing systems, but in catalyzing reforms that create a more balanced and inclusive global financial order. This suggests that while complete financial parity remains elusive, BRICS' initiative may succeed in tilting the playing field toward greater equilibrium—a development that could benefit the global financial system's stability and resilience in the long run. The challenge for policymakers and market participants alike will be managing this transition while maintaining global financial stability.

India Gordon This year, the UK witnessed a level of national violence not seen since the 2011 riots. However, the violence this time seemed to have a clear ideological fuel: far right-wing populist sentiments driven by anti-immigrant and Islamaphobic rhetoric. These views, having been repeatedly reinforced by leading political figures, mainstream media, and social media platforms, have become deeply ingrained in British society. From this perspective, the riots serve as just one stark example of the concerning spread of extreme right-wing thinking. The urgent question then is, what can policymakers do to prevent future outbreaks of violence? The July 2024 Riots This past summer, following the tragic murder of three young girls during a ‘Taylor Swift’ themed dance class, the UK witnessed an arguably unprecedented level of violent protest in response.  Across cities like Liverpool, London, and Birmingham, organised demonstrations quickly devolved into civil violence with widespread looting and assaults against many immigrant-owned small businesses, hotels housing asylum seekers, and mosques. The National Police Chiefs’ Council reported that over 1200 people were arrested for their involvement in the unrest, including nearly 150 juveniles. While the need to condemn the unlawful killing of these young children was undoubtedly important, the ‘protests’ that followed quickly spiralled into senseless violence largely motivated by far-right ideology. Many protesters fixated on the ethnic background of the perpetrator, echoing an anti-immigrant narrative that overshadowed the murders. This came after some online circles misidentified the latter as a ‘Muslim refugee’ who had arrived in the UK by crossing the channel last year. Such violence sparked a national conversation about race and immigration in contemporary British society, with prominent figures, such as MP Nigel Farage and far-right activist Tommy Robinson (real name Stephen Yaxley–Lennon), framing the Southport tragedy as a consequence of a national immigration ‘crisis’. Despite it later being revealed that the perpetrator of the attacks was a British-born citizen from Cardiff, the son of Rwandan first-generation immigrants, the rhetoric risked generalising and alienating all immigrants and their children as security risks, only fuelling further tension within communities. Furthermore, these riots were met with arguably an insufficient government response. The responses of key political figures seemed to only downplay the significance of the riots. Sir Keir Starmer, who had been elected as Prime Minister just a few weeks prior to the unrest, responded by calling the violence an act of ‘thuggery’. Such language was arguably dismissive,  treating the unrest as an isolated act committed by a minority of troubled individuals. However, such a view arguably fails to consider the bigger problem - that is, the 2024 riots are a symptom of long-standing anti-immigrant rhetoric, fueled by years of political and social turmoil. Recent years have seen increasing traction of far-right sentiments According to figures released by the Home Office, nearly 100,000 racially-motivated hate crimes have been seen in the past year, with a noticeable 25% increase in religious hate crimes compared to 2023. This troubling trend of incidents could be fundamentally explained by the increasing widespread dissemination of far-right ideology,  in no small part due to rhetoric peddled by leading political figures and media outlets. The Brexit campaign, spearheaded by then UKIP-leader Nigel Farage, built its platform off nationalist and anti-immigrant messaging. It primarily argued that contemporary immigration levels were unsustainable, redirecting blame for socio-economic disenfranchisement some citizens have encountered to immigrants. Mounting pressures facing the NHS, the lack of employment and access to adequate housing, and apparent increases in civil disobedience, have all been misattributed as products of immigration. This thinking evidently resonated with many voters. According to exit poll data conducted by Lord Ashcroft, over a third of ‘Leave’ voters cited concerns of immigration control as a primary motivation for their voting. Ultimately, however, it’s important to recognise that while socio-economic challenges may make some individuals susceptible to extremist rhetoric, this in no way excuses the violent actions, including those seen this past summer, that they choose to take. The increasing anti-immigrant sentiments perpetuated by influential figures and media outlets like the Daily Mail and Great British News (GBN) have only further stoked the fire of populist sentiment, producing a narrative that immigration poses an inherent threat to national security and heritage. For example, these outlets have repeatedly run misleading headlines concerning ‘nearly 4000 thousand’ foreign-born criminal individuals living in the UK, despite no sufficient evidence to back such claims. Meanwhile, Farage, a regular commentator for GBN, faced criticism for fuelling conspiracy theories after insinuating that authorities may have been withholding vital information regarding the identity and background, including the immigration status, of the Southport attacker. This pattern of misinformation and sweeping statements may only serve to enforce social divisions, fostering an ‘us vs. them’ mentality against immigrants and, in some cases, extending to those who don’t oppose immigration. Left unchecked, such divisive rhetoric has resulted in tragedy. For instance, the 2016 murder of Labour MP Jo Cox was committed by a far-right radical, who had come to disagree with Cox’s support for immigration during her advocating for the ‘Remain’ campaign. Online platforms have only amplified these extremists sentiments The dissemination of these anti-immigrant and far-right rhetorics have been facilitated by online spaces. The aforementioned misinformation regarding the Southport attacker’s identity originated online, quickly spreading and normalising racial prejudices. For instance, the Guardian reported that 38 charges had been filed following the riots regarding online hate speech, which included offensive language and the distribution of images ‘intending to stir up racial hatred’. This highlights the dangers posed by unregulated digital platforms in perpetuating extremist ideologies. Figures like Robinson have built significant online presences, and with a click of button have easily been able to rapidly mobilise mass support for their views. During the 2024 riots, Robinson took to X (formerly Twitter) to propagate strongly Islamophobic and xenophobic messaging. In fact, research from the Centre for Countering Digital Hate revealed that Robinson’s tweets had garnered more than 400 million views, demonstrating the sheer influence afforded by such platforms.  The buying of Twitter by Elon Musk has been linked to an increase in far right sentiment with Musk himself having used the site to voice his concerns regarding so-called ‘two tier’ policing in the UK - the notion that those of the right are treated more harshly than minority ethnic or left-leaning demonstrators. However, this could be considered hazardous misinformation since data published by the Home Office shows that black individuals are seven times more likely to be subjected to a ‘Stop and Search’, compared to their white counterparts. In fact, formal counterterrorism legislation has arguably failed to account for right-wing terrorism at all. This is because cornerstones of British counterterrorism legislation like the Prevent strategy, tend to overly focus on intervening in the early stages of Islamic extremism, leading to a disproportionate targeting of Muslim individuals. This neglect of recognition for other types of extremism can perhaps be explained by policymakers, like Starmer’s aforementioned ‘thuggery’ comments, inability to view far-right violence as a legitimate security threat.  Conclusion: Future Policy To combat the problem of increasing right-wing violence, policymakers should perhaps look to adopt more comprehensive legislation, particularly in digital regulation and social services. Holding Social Media Companies Accountable Although they are primarily private companies, these platforms arguably have a duty of care to prevent the dissemination of misinformation and harmful content, such as extremist views and hate speech. This can be achieved by implementing stronger regulatory standards. A few example practices may include stronger content moderation, more transparency regarding how algorithms prioritise user content, and more streamlined reporting methods for harmful content. Reforming Counterterrorism Legislation The limitations of UK’s counterterrorism legislation, particularly the Prevent strategy, should also be re-evaluated to account for the legitimate threat of far-right violence. This should primarily be done by recognising and reforming the current racial bias perpetuated by the strategy, as well as expanding its definition to include right-wing extremism.  Supporting Communities Any efforts to combat far-right violence would also benefit from more long-term considerations that aim to bridge the social tensions that arise from such divisive sentiments. It is imperative that policymakers tackle the root causes of extremism, such as underlying social inequalities and attitudes, especially when trying to reduce the appeal of far-right sentiments among young people. For example, communities may benefit from increasing funding for job training and education initiatives, especially in economically deprived areas. Additionally, mandatory critical media literacy lessons could help people to recognise misinformation and manipulated narratives, which would help to build individual accountability. Despite the chaos that unfolded this past summer, there remains hope for change. While many took to the streets to take part in the violent riots, thousands of others also turned out for counter-protests, denouncing the xenophobia and Islamophobia that had been incited and demonstrating a willingness to challenge the prejudices of extremist ideologies. By addressing the roots of right-wing extremism through policy reform, it’s more than possible for the UK to work toward a future that is safer for all. References Why are there riots in the UK? Arrests and charges related to violent disorder continue Only prosecute children over riots as last resort, says youth justice chair Southport attack misinformation fuels far-right discourse on social media   UK riots: Sir Keir Starmer makes 'guarantee' for 'thugs' and announces 'emergency security' for mosques Hate crime, England and Wales, year ending March 2024 How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… and why Why should we Vote Leave on 23 June? Are there 4,000 foreign murderers and rapists living freely in the UK? Jo Cox killed in 'brutal, cowardly' and politically motivated murder, trial hears Former counter-terror chief accuses Farage of inciting Southport violence Elon Musk calls PM ‘two-tier Keir’ over police response to UK riots Twitter Is a Far-Right Social Network Musk's X helps Tommy Robinson rack up 434 million views during UK riots Stop and Search - By ethnicity   UK: Shawcross review of Prevent is 'deeply prejudiced and has no legitimacy'

Millie Gould It is no secret that Donald Trump has some controversial and downright conspiratorial views on climate change, with him even going as far as to call climate change “one of the greatest scams of all time” . Despite there being a consensus amongst 97% of climate scientists  that climate change is not only real but anthropogenically caused, Trump’s recent re-election for a second term signifies the return of climate denialism to the Oval Office.    As this article is published, the Climate Clock states that we have less than 4 years and 250 days to limit global warming to 1.5°C  and avoid irreversible damage to the planet we share. This means that these crucial years of climate action will be dominated by Trump’s anti-climate agenda, as he leads one of the most economically and politically powerful countries, and as a result the rest of the globe, sleepwalking further into the depths of climate crisis.  The discourse surrounding the recent US presidential election has been dominated by discussions regarding immigration policy and abortion bans, whilst environmental issues have been severely side-lined. Yet, if Trump’s environmental policy during his previous term in the White House is anything to go by, climate change should be front and centre as we enter the latter half of the ‘make-or-break’ decade  for our natural environment. Apart from his consistent anti-climate rhetoric, and vocal support for the fossil fuel industry, Trump was responsible for significant environmental policy rollback whilst in office between 2017 to 2021. More than 100 pieces of environmental regulations  and policies were rolled back, repealed or weakened under the previous Trump administration, leading to substantial legal challenges from environmental advocacy groups and organisations. Arguably the  most infamous of these changes, of course, was his withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement .  One of Joe Biden’s first acts as President in 2021 was to reinstate the US’s membership of the Paris Climate Accord , along with the revision and strengthening of the National Environmental Policy Act . This signified a decisively pro-environmental shift from the attitudes of the previous administration. Whilst the Biden administration was not without criticism, with the US remaining rated as Insufficient on the Climate Action Tracker , the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 contributed to and enabled record-breaking growth in clean energy . However, it appears likely that much of this momentum and progress will be short-lived. The Trump administration has already pledged the rapid reversal of Biden’s key climate policies , as most of these were achieved through executive authority which can be rescinded. To make matters worse, president-elect Trump has previously claimed he has every intention to pull out of the Paris Agreement for a second time , despite the increasing occurrences of climate disasters around the globe intensifying the need for climate finance. Such an act would “ cripple” the agreement , according to the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, potentially also encouraging other countries to follow suit. Furthermore, such potential could discourage other wealthy countries from contributing to the global fund for climate aid during the COP29 negotiations currently occurring within Azerbaijan , despite a Biden Administration delegate being in attendance. Climate scientists  have argued that a second term of Trump in office will likely mean maintaining temperatures at less than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels will be unachievable. It is not just scientists who are rallying together against Trump’s reckless approach to climate governance - even Darren Woods, the CEO of Exxon Mobil , the USA’s largest oil and gas company, has publicly urged Trump not to pull out of the Paris Agreement for a second time.  Despite widespread warnings, it is improbable that climate action will be championed substantially at all within the US federal government under Trump unless there is significant resistance from within his own party. This is due to the Republican Party having gained a ‘governing trifecta’ , in which the president's party also has control over both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Such a situation sets a dismal tone for the latter half of this crucial decade. If the US does not lead by example, as the world’s most dominant economic power, it is unlikely that other countries will be willing to raise the stakes with their own ambitious climate action agendas.   That being said, all hope is not lost. Despite Trump having vowed to reverse much of the climate change policy implemented under the Biden administration, it is unlikely that this progress will be completely undermined. For example, the IRA has sent a clear signal to the market that further long-term decarbonisation efforts are to come as America continues to build a low-carbon economy. Similarly, subnational actions such as cities, states and businesses may be emboldened to take on leading roles in the fight against climate change, as they did under the first Trump administration through campaigns such as the America Is All In pledge . These initiatives have only become stronger since 2017 , demonstrating the powerful movement towards clean energy from bottom-up leadership organisations.  Thus, whilst the climate agenda may have to fight an uphill battle within the US under Trump’s second term, there is significant momentum and grass-roots public support indicating that clean energy will continue to grow rapidly. Sub-national organisations have a unique opportunity to demonstrate just how much support there is for the US to take the lead in climate action, even if the Trump administration is not on board.

Jakub Fegyveres The 29th iteration of the annual Conference of Parties (COP), is taking place over two weeks, beginning on the 11th of November in Baku, Azerbaijan. Tens of thousands of delegates, NGO representatives, and lobbyists will descend on the city for a fortnight, during which the existential issue of climate change tends to be most politically salient. Its pivotal role in negotiating the requisite worldwide response, coupled with a failure to arrive at sufficiently ambitious targets thus far, warrants fundamental questions regarding the conference’s efficacy.  Climate change is the largest continuous threat  humanity faces. Its size inherently necessitates wide-spread action, especially from nation states with the policymaking and legislative capabilities to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and promote sustainable industries. Serving as a regular formal   meeting of the signatories of the 1995 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) , the COP brings together the framework’s 198 signatory Parties . It represents a global forum which allows for sufficiently impactful climate deals to be negotiated and signed. It is no surprise that COP’s importance has been reflected in the agreements that have been negotiated under its auspices thus far. For instance, COP3 saw the signing of the Kyoto Protocol , which sought to limit GHG emissions by 5% between 2008 and 2012, judged against 1990 levels. More recently, at COP21, the Paris Agreement  was signed, legally committing states to a goal of limiting global warming at 1.5°C, while seeing GHG emissions peak before 2025 and decline at least 43% by 2030. Significantly, a major (and unique) selling point of these deals is the universality with which they were adopted, as all official COP deals are agreed by consensus. The conferences also provide ample opportunity for side-deals to be made between a smaller number of parties, as COP28 demonstrated . This progress naturally contributes to media cycles, which can elicit the impression that climate change is being managed with relative success. As things stand, this is not the case. In its recent Emissions Gap Report , the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) found that, if we continue along our current trajectory, temperatures will rise by 3.1°C over the course of this century. The UNEP’s second prognosis is even more dire. They report that, even if all states were to meet their climate promises, presented to COP every five years in the form of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), global temperatures would still rise by a catastrophic 2.6°C. Similarly, the 2023 Global Stocktake, conducted by UN institutions to measure progress towards the Paris Agreement goals, starkly warned  that “much more is needed on all fronts.” It is obvious, therefore, that there has been a lack of successful implementation and sufficient ambition. As a major institution designed to promote ambition and facilitate widespread action, it is clear that COP has failed to produce sufficiently impactful policy agreements to rise to the challenge thus far. The sheer number of lobbyists that attend the conference, for whom it proves a major access point to policymakers, point to why this is the case. COP28 saw a record  2,456 lobbyists, but the phenomenon is hardly a new one. Since the COP9 in 2003, it is estimated  that a total of at least 6,581 lobbyists from the fossil fuel industry have been in attendance. Alarmingly, lobbyists are also routinely accredited  as members of national delegations, giving them even clearer means of influence over negotiations and, ultimately, policy. It is unsurprising, therefore, that 112 organisations have called on  the EU’s climate Commissioner to ban fossil fuel lobbyists from EU delegations, for instance. Relatedly, the hosting of the conference in petrostates such as the UAE (COP28) and Azerbaijan can serve to undermine COP’s legitimacy, as well as stunting its ambition. The ties of high-level personnel provided by these host countries also tend to raise eyebrows. The President of COP28, Sultan Al Jaber, was simultaneously CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, famously exploiting  the talks to further his business interests. This year’s President, Mukhtar Babayev, has also been described  as a “veteran” of the oil industry. These facts suggest unavoidable conflicts of interest on both the national and individual level, with ultimately damaging effects. Looking ahead, COP30 is set to take place in Brazil, another major oil exporter . The conference also has a diversity problem. During preparations for this year’s conference, this issue was brought centre-stage, as a result of Azerbaijan’s presentation of an all-male 28-member organising committee. Although this was quickly rectified , there are systemic inequities , leading to ongoing underrepresentation, that cannot be solved as quickly. While it is worth noting that these issues have been somewhat addressed  recently, much wider social change is necessary to make future COPs truly representative. On a more hopeful note, a new round of the important NDCs is due to be presented as soon as next year, in advance of COP30. These have the potential to chart a more ambitious and sustainable course. The UN also strengthened its rules  on COP lobbyists last year, requiring a more rigorous registration process, although their presence in national delegations still requires addressing. Lastly, and significantly, it seems like the need for more ambitious policies is being prioritised by this conference’s organisers. In fact, COP29’s President, Mukhtar Babayev, has outlined  his vision of the conference’s pillars to be “to enhance ambition and enable action.” It remains to be seen whether his words will be lived up to.  References United Nations, 10/09/2021, "United Nations Press Release,"   https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14445.doc.htm University of Cambridge, Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, n.d., "Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership,"   https://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/cop-climate-change-conference#:~ =The%20198%20Parties%20to%20the,Eastern%20Europe UNFCCC, 11/12/1997, "Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,"   https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf UNFCCC, n.d., "The Paris Agreement,"   https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement Cipher, n.d., "Top Takeaways from Historic COP28 Deal on Fossil Fuels,"   https://www.ciphernews.com/articles/top-takeaways-from-historic-cop28-deal-on-fossil-fuels/ UNEP, 2024, "Emissions Gap Report 2024,"   https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2024 London School of Economics, Grantham Research Institute, n.d., "What Is the Global Stocktake,"   https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/explainers/what-is-the-global-stocktake/ Amnesty International, 01/12/2023, "Global Record Number of Fossil Fuel Lobbyists at COP Undermines Critical Climate Talks,"   https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/global-record-number-of-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-at-cop-undermines-critical-climate-talks/ Corporate Europe Observatory, 11/11/2023, "Fossil Fuel Lobbyists Attend UN Climate Talks More Than 7,000 Times,"   https://corporateeurope.org/en/2023/11/fossil-fuel-lobbyists-attend-un-climate-talks-more-7000-times Global Witness, 14/11/2023, "Over 100% More Fossil Fuel Lobbyists Last Year Flooding Crucial COP Climate Talks,"   https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/over-100-more-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-last-year-flooding-crucial-cop-climate-talks/ Transparency International, 13/11/2023, "112 Organisations Call on EU Climate Commissioner to Ban Fossil Fuel Lobbyists from EU Delegations at COP29,"   https://transparency.eu/112-organisations-call-on-eu-climate-commissioner-to-ban-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-from-eu-delegations-at-cop29/ Global Witness, 20/11/2023, "New Investigation Reveals How COP28 President Used Role to Pursue Oil and Gas Deals,"   https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-reveals-how-cop28-president-used-role-pursue-oil-and-gas-deals/ The Guardian, 05/01/2024, "COP29 Will Be Led by Mukhtar Babayev, Azerbaijan Ecology Minister Who Is Oil Industry Veteran,"   https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/jan/05/cop29-will-be-led-by-mukhtar-babayev-azerbaijan-ecology-minister-who-is-oil-industry-veteran COP29, n.d., "Letter to Parties and Constituencies,"   https://cop29.az/en/media-hub/news/letter-to-parties-and-constituencies The Guardian, 15/06/2023, "Fossil Fuel Lobbyists Will Have to Identify Themselves When Registering for COP28,"   https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jun/15/fossil-fuel-lobbyists-will-have-to-identify-themselves-when-registering-for-cop28 Future of Food, n.d., "Creating a More Equitable COP: The Barriers Facing Civil Society and Global South Presence,"   https://futureoffood.org/insights/creating-a-more-equitable-cop-the-barriers-facing-civil-society-and-global-south-presence/ Gowling WLG, 2024, "What Is COP29 Focused on and What Do Businesses Need to Know,"   https://gowlingwlg.com/en/insights-resources/articles/2024/what-is-cop29-focused-on-and-what-do-businesses-need-to-know The Guardian, 19/01/2024, "Women COP29 Climate Summit Committee Backlash,"   https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/jan/19/women-cop29-climate-summit-committee-backlash International Energy Agency, n.d., "Brazil Oil Profile,"   https://www.iea.org/countries/brazil/oil

Lois Glover Historically, mental health has been a heavily stigmatised, taboo topic and in many ways remains that way. Whilst mental health has gained increasing political and public attention, many misconceptions continue to circulate. From minimising symptoms to ridiculing therapeutic practices, a harmful legacy of misinformation has been created. Political decisions often convey an undertone of neglect toward mental health issues, despite the serious consequences of this disregard. It is important to recognise the economic and societal reverberations that have occurred from this issue as well as establish a comprehensive plan to improve service access, crisis support and the overall mental health infrastructure. How might the government address health care inequalities, if budget constraints limit the ability to meet the growing demand for mental health services? The Harmful Repercussions of the Mental Health Crisis Mental health conditions vary widely in intensity, with some individuals experiencing mild symptoms while others face severe challenges. As with all health issues, unaddressed mental health conditions often worsen over time. This can be particularly concerning in cases involving severe disorders like schizophrenia, major depression, or bipolar disorder, where untreated symptoms can pose significant safety risks for both the individual and the community. In fact, a risk to oneself or others is a central factor in diagnosing these conditions. The recent tragic attack in Nottingham, where university students Barnaby Webber and Grace O’Malley-Kumar lost their lives, highlights potential dangers of inadequate mental health support. Valdo Calocane, the assailant, had a documented history of mental health issues and hospitalizations, yet inconsistencies in his treatment may have contributed to the devastating outcome. More consistent and accessible treatment could prevent such tragedies, demonstrating the need for dedicated mental health resources to better support individuals and protect communities. Furthermore, in January 2023 the government conducted a review into patient safety within mental health inpatient units, following numerous reports of abuse and deaths. When people cannot access preventative care or early interventions, they may end up in crisis situations that result in other systems being negatively impacted. For instance, mental health-related crimes stretch limited resources within the emergency services and the criminal justice system.  The initial costs of expanding mental health services may seem high, but neglecting this investment leads to even greater long-term expenses. Preventative mental health services and early interventions are far less costly than treating acute cases in emergency settings. Bridging Gaps in Accessibility and Funding: Policies and Plans After the coronavirus pandemic, the government introduced the Mental Health Recovery Action Plan, a £500 million initiative to address the surge in mental health cases. This funding, along with additional one-off initiatives, intended to aid mental health recovery from the pandemic. The Minister for Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Nadine Dorries states that the funding will “enable us to bring forward our NHS Long Term Plan commitment”. However it is not clear whether the temporary nature of some of the initiatives will make a pivotal change. Although some funds are directed towards areas like learning disability services, there is a lack of emphasis on structural reforms, particularly regarding critical staff shortages and wait times, which hinder sustainable progress. Regions across the UK continue to face significant funding disparities in mental health services. For instance, the East of England struggles with delays within the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS). But the limited resources in the North East results in obstacles for patients. While some areas struggle to meet demand due to staff shortages, others lack resources for specialised care. Although the government aims to expand CAMHS, targeting these disparities will require specialised support and regional tailoring of policies to ensure equitable access to mental health services.  While mental health has moved up on the policy agenda, actual implementation lags, with patients often waiting months for care. Many argue that mental health remains underfunded in comparison to other health areas. Opponents of increased funding point to overall NHS budget constraints, while advocates stress that untreated mental health issues lead to higher long-term costs and deteriorate public health. Suggestions to an Improved Direction The rise of mental health cases cannot be discussed, without addressing the demand for mental health professionals, a key factor in any effort to reform mental health infrastructures. Without enough qualified professionals, even substantial financial investment falls short. The most effective treatment for most conditions requires a team of psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, counsellors and more. Despite the implementation of collaborative care models, a greater push for cohesion is required. This would be beneficial to patients who are often left isolated or without support, during strenuous waiting times. This gap in care can pose risks for patients and their communities, highlighting an urgent need for fair and accessible support. It is also important to intervene in the early stages of a condition. Routine mental health screenings could be conducted to help detect issues at earlier stages. For instance, services within schools, workplaces and primary care settings. Additionally, current training programs for mental health professionals, should emphasise cultural competence to better serve diverse populations. Racial prejudice is not extinct. It is still prominent within the healthcare system and should be addressed accordingly across the NHS. Tailored training that fosters cultural sensitivity can better serve diverse populations, reflecting the inclusivity that is much needed. To tackle workforce shortages, creating clear, appealing career paths for mental health workers is essential. Introducing students to diverse roles- from healthcare assistants to support workers- could inspire more to join the field. Financial incentives like scholarships and loan forgiveness could further attract young professionals, helping build a stable workforce. For current staff, retention programs that address burnout would make a substantial difference, as high demand often leads to mental health specialists facing overwhelming workloads. The Future  In 2017, the government proposed reformations of the Mental Health Act 1983, to resolve inequalities. This legislation permits the detention of individuals in psychiatric facilities if they pose a risk to themselves or others. To modernise the act, new policies aim to limit the detention of individuals with autism and learning disabilities unless they have a co-occurring mental health condition, as well as reducing the disproportionate detention of ethnic minority communities. The reform also looks to provide better support for mental health within the criminal justice system. It is also important to prevent the use of police or prison cells for those experiencing mental health crises as this often leads to greater damages. The plan to create alternative care facilities ensures safer and more suitable environments for patients in crisis.​ Ultimately, giving patients greater autonomy and tackling systemic inequalities shows the government is taking a step in the right direction. In conclusion, improving mental health infrastructure in the UK requires a multifaceted approach that addresses both immediate and long-term needs. Comprehensive reform is essential to meet the rising demand, ensure equitable access, and support a robust workforce. This means investing in early intervention programmes, enhancing cultural competence, and providing clearer career pathways and support for mental health professionals. By balancing structural funding with targeted initiatives, the UK can build a more resilient and responsive mental health system, benefiting individuals and society as a whole. References: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mental-health-recovery-plan-backed-by-500-million https://www.gov.uk/government/news/better-mental-health-support-for-people-in-crisis https://www.gov.uk/government/news/better-care-for-mental-health-patients-under-major-reforms https://www.cps.gov.uk/east-midlands/news/man-sentenced-killing-three-people-and-attempted-murder-three-others-0 https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7547/