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  • Healthcare in the USA: Where Do the Candidates Stand?

    Healthcare in the United States is one of the many topics that Republicans and Democrats diverge on greatly, and it highlights the fundamental differences in economic and social approaches of the two parties. This split has been increasingly significant since the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA, or Obamacare) was put in place, and a major part of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential platform was its repeal. This became even more important in 2017 after he failed to repeal it, and caused Republicans to lose control of the House in 2018. With the ACA now due to be debated in the Supreme Court in early November, it is undeniable that healthcare remains a crucial theme for the election. This is especially key in the midst of the pandemic (which is spiking to levels higher than ever in the US, just as huge rallies are held over key battleground states) with Trump’s record of dealing with the pandemic being heavily criticised. Despite the current situation, Trump continues to stand by the commitment to take it away. This could be devastating, as during the pandemic, an estimated 27 million people have lost their insurance coverage as they were fired from jobs which provided them. On the other hand, Democrats have passed many healthcare bills to increase provision among the vulnerable, and Biden plans to continue this legacy if he is elected. Trump’s sanity has been questioned before, but during the pandemic he has gone to new heights with suggestions of injecting disinfectant as a way of treating the virus, and has been slow to respond to increases in infection rates with restrictions. This has led to reductions in approval ratings, and has again shown his blatant disregard for truth and a lack of awareness for his actions. In the final presidential debate, Biden talked about building on the ACA to make more substantial, affordable healthcare available to more people. He proposes offering a public health insurance option, which would increase competition with private insurers, and therefore should reduce costs. The main argument against expanding public healthcare interventions is financing, and ensuring the budget is balanced. However, there will be healthcare cost savings if people get problems checked out early instead of waiting until they’re debilitating because they don’t have insurance - making preventative care the norm would be hugely beneficial on all fronts. Better health would also lead to less days off from work, never mind the improved quality of life, which would be dramatic for those with long term conditions who have been paying thousands for medicines. Trump is not forthcoming on what his alternative to the Affordable Care Act would be if he overturned it. In the final presidential debate on the 22nd, while arguing that ‘[Biden] did not do anything’ during his time in government, he failed to explain what protection there would be for the 20 million Americans who currently get their insurance through ACA, if it is repealed. The popularity of ACA is because of how it protects people with pre-existing health conditions, and while Trump has stated that he has a great alternative, he has failed to make one public. Pundits are uncertain as to Trumps’ viable alternative, and this could be the cause of Biden’s current substantial lead. Conversely, several Democrats have advocated getting rid of private healthcare altogether and going to a pure public system, which would be costly. A huge proportion of the US economy rests with healthcare insurers, and thus any transition to reduce their prevalence would necessarily be a gradual and carefully designed process. The election will be of paramount importance for the future of US healthcare. If Biden wins, we can expect to see expanding the existing protections for citizens greatly. There are members of his camp who have a vision to provide free healthcare to all citizens in a UK-style system. In comparison, Trump will press forwards with his previous attempts (which did not result in the change he wanted) to revoke much of the social protections that are in place now. With his approval ratings dropping over the course of the pandemic, could this be the turning point Democrats need to get back in office? The debate is interesting but goes back to a fundamental question of the ideal extent of government intervention. Over the past few decades, politics in the US has shifted increasingly leftwards, which may surprise readers. And generally, the government has just increased in size. It is a tragedy that so many people in one of the richest countries in the world cannot afford to keep themselves protected from accidents and illness. For a country with a huge fiscal capacity, and large defence spending, it is more of a question of prioritisation of government funds, rather than capability. I think the pandemic has exposed serious issues with the healthcare system in the USA and where it’s failing, and a plan like Biden’s will help to make the system more robust to shocks like these in the future. In a few hours time, we will know the trajectory of (at least) the next 4 years of American healthcare, which will no doubt have a prolonged legacy.

  • COVID-19 Misinformation & ‘Anti-Vaxxers’: How Do We Immunise Against the ‘Infodemic’?

    The news of success in both Pfizer, Moderna and Oxford’s Covid-19 drug trials has been welcomed by people across the globe, with Governments placing orders of millions in preparation for the biggest vaccination drive in modern history. In anticipation of this drive however, governments now face the profoundly difficult task of convincing those opposed to vaccinations that they are safe to receive. More broadly, they must tackle the Covid ‘infodemic’. Over the course of the pandemic, social media sites have been active outlets for conspiracy theorists, with their claims ranging from the virus being spread by 5G, to face-masks being implanted with tracking chips. As ludicrous as these ideas may sound, vaccine misinformation has tangible and potentially deadly consequences. In August 2020, Ipsos-MORI reported that only 53% of the population would be certain or very likely to get a vaccine against coronavirus. The same study found that 27% of those who claim to get the majority of information on COVID-19 from WhatsApp said they were unlikely or definitely wouldn’t get a vaccine. In 2019, the United Kingdom lost its Measles eradication status, with Dr Kate O’Brien, of the World Health Organisation’s immunisation department attributing this to increased misinformation regarding vaccinations. Moreover, this certainly isn’t just a problem specific to the UK - a 2019 world survey found that 22% of western Europeans believe vaccines to be unsafe. In May 2020, The World Health Assembly passed a resolution - WHA73.1 - which recognised tackling covid misinformation as a crucial component to tackling the pandemic. The UK currently does not have any legislation that regulates the validity of news posted on online platforms, even though several pieces of legislation have been proposed (most recently by the Labour Party). Earlier this month, Facebook, Twitter and Google agreed with the UK Government to the principle that social media giants ‘should not profit from or promote COVID-19 anti-vaccine disinformation’ and committed to responding ‘flagged content more swiftly, and to work with authorities to promote scientifically accurate messages’. However, emphasis on profit, alongside an absence of legislative authority, does bring into doubt whether such an agreement carries enough weight to disrupt vaccine misinformation. Equally, placing the fate of public health in the hands of private corporations with a history of political interference is a dubious decision. Meanwhile, even if the promotion of misinformation by paid interest groups were to be prevented, this does nothing to stop the circulation of conspiracy theories by groups or individuals. Selective exposure theories suggest that individuals tend to prefer information that reinforces their existing views. Hence, proponents of such views are unlikely to be deterred. Censorship laws are certainly not the answer; free speech is intrinsic to the health of liberal democracies. Rather, we must look critically at our entire political and civic cultures. Scholars and commentators often refer to our current era as one of ‘Post-Truth Politics’ - an epoch in which ‘objective facts’ have been publicly buried. Openness and transparency within government and politics have been replaced by deception, misinformation and anti-rational sentiments. In the era of ‘Fake News’, conspiracy theory and populism, the validity of statements is unimportant. Rather, power is won on the basis of who can arouse the most emotive and anti-rational sentiment with their dangerous discourses. ‘Post Truths’ do not merely manifest through online and social media. They infect the very heart of the political process, with election campaigns not won on the basis of ‘basic democratic norms of open and plural communication among citizens’, but ‘political mendacity, nonsense, buffoonery and silence’. Consequently, the effort to discourage misinformation and so called ‘alternative truths’ in post-truth democracies is an incredibly difficult task. So how are we to prevent misinformation? One essential recommendation is a government advertising campaign to accompany the vaccine rollout. Such a campaign must make clear the tangible and dangerous link between misinformation, fake news and public health outcomes. Whilst making clear that vaccinations are not to be made compulsory, governments must articulate just how important it is for their citizens to acquire herd immunity. Just as the ‘Stay Safe, Stay Home’ slogan has become etched into the collective mind of the British Public, vaccinations must be given the PR treatment and marketed to a hesitant electorate. Moreover, greater attention must be paid to understand why certain individuals may be opposed or hesitant to take vaccinations. Rather than dismissing ‘anti-vaxxers’ as ‘nuts’, Government researchers must seek to understand the exact concerns that individuals have over taking vaccinations. Hesitation towards vaccinations is a spectrum, right from opposition to hesitancy and to apathy, so no one rhetoric can provide the answer to dispelling myths. Hence, public health agencies must work to communicate transparently exactly how the vaccine works, what the dangers are and dispel the myths currently circulating. Finally, in the long term, as we take lessons from Covid, we must act preemptively in educating our young people how to use social media critically and effectively. Schools must work to provide their leavers with media literacy and critical thinking skills, so that they may scrutinise unreliable sources and differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate information. As a young person born into the social media age, I can say with confidence that children are woefully underprepared to deal with the difficulties and complexities that social media poses. Just as we are taught to protect ourselves against online predators, by scrutinising unfamiliar profiles and keeping our accounts private, young people must be taught to scrutinise the information they are unwillingly exposed to and question whether it comes from a reliable source. However, as important as these interventions are, if vaccine misinformation is just one symptom of a political culture of mistrust and opacity, the time for damage control is likely far gone.

  • "Maybe We’ll Get the Vaccine in 2025" - Snapshots of Vaccine Inequality Around the World

    The defining problem of 2021 will be disseminating Covid-19 vaccines to the most vulnerable around the world. Whilst some countries are seeing the light at the end of the tunnel, some have suffered disproportionately more, and will have a much more drawn-out recovery for a variety of distinct reasons. The situation for many of the poorest and least secure nations has continued to deteriorate during the past year, with more challenges showing up daily. The impact of Covid-19 has been very ‘uneven’ between and within countries; more prominently so when considering the vaccination programs. This will have effects for decades, and the stark global injustice is clear. The Economist Intelligence Unit has predicted when countries will have mass vaccinations, and with most of Africa not being protected until 2023, questions will arise as to how richer countries can help in some of these areas as it becomes a humanitarian crisis. The map shows a pattern of economic privilege, with Europe and the USA being the first to gain access, middle income countries next, and poorest trailing behind. There are a few interesting anomalies, where the picture is slightly more complex. Geographically challenging regions In Kashmir, insufficient resources and planning alongside a particularly harsh winter have caused snowfall to be extremely disruptive, blocking highways and flights. The unrelenting snowfall has resulted in people having to carry their dead or debilitated members many miles to reach hospitals as roads are blocked, and citizens face an inability to access basic necessities like water. While India is manufacturing the Oxford AstraZeneca vaccination, which is expected to provide 90% of their vaccinations, transporting the vaccine to remote places and distributing it will be challenging, on top of the political delays in the vaccination process. Areas controlled by armed groups Around 66 million people around the world are under the control of armed groups. They are some of the most vulnerable to Covid-19 due to malnourishment, lack of medical facilities and overcrowded living spaces. While they have the right to vaccinations under international law, this is fraught with difficulty. The states in which these people live have an obligation but often not the ability to provide this, either due to a lack of resources or the fact that international aid frequently is given on the condition of zero contact with the terrorist groups. It’s a Catch-22 situation: countries are obligated by international law to provide vaccines for people they cannot access due to the same countries hindering their ability to provide vaccines through restricting contact. This is the fate of those living under Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, Al Qaeda and Hamas, and a future where they are secure from Covid-19 will be very challenging to achieve. Vaccines as a tool for political conflict Concerns have also been raised about the equality of Israel’s vaccination process. Despite having the most rapid vaccination program in the world, currently having vaccinated over 18% of their population, they have refused to provide for any Palestinian, claiming a lack of responsibility and jabs. The WHO have called for them to provide assistance, as Palestine’s healthcare system is close to collapsing, with thousands of healthcare workers having contracted Covid-19 and not a single one being vaccinated. Amnesty has called Israel’s approach ‘institutionalised discrimination’, citing Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva convention to remind Israel of their responsibility toward Palestinians. Those living under Hamas rule will also have to rely on the slow Covax program. 'Heads I win, tails you lose' A revealing New York Times article shows the stark unfairness in the global system, telling the story of a South African factory preparing to make around a million vaccinations, only to have every one shipped to European distribution centres. Many countries fall through the gaps of Covax for ‘not being poor enough’ and the program’s complexity means dangerous inefficiencies for such a time-sensitive crisis. For many South Africans, their best option to acquire a vaccine is to try and get on an over-subscribed clinical trial for a vaccine which, if successful, will go to the developed nations who have pre-ordered millions of doses, effectively crowding out the market for these poorer nations. Middle-income countries also feature stark within-country inequality which is threatening the majority of citizens’ access to vaccinations. In South Africa, concerns about the governments’ vaccine plans have led to the threat of potential legal action from their Health Justice Initiative (HJI). Fatima Hassan from the HJI called the global situation a ‘global vaccine apartheid’ and warned that South Africa’s vaccination program could follow the same problems as it did with AIDS denialism, unless the country takes a more proactive role. She highlights that although the WTO and 140 world leaders have called for the Covid-19 vaccine to be free and available to all, systemic global shortages will ultimately require rationing, potentially in the form of pricing, making it unattainable for many of the poorest. Care and diligence must be taken in the coming months to prevent needless death and suffering because of a capitalist system in crisis, where the line between health as a human right and health as a commodity is being blurred. In the long run, those more fortunate to receive vaccinations and recover from this pandemic should be attentive to the experiences of these people, and what can be done to help put it out of headlines and into history books as soon as possible. Quote in the title is from Mtshaba Mzwamadoda, 42, South Africa

  • The ‘Green Recovery’ and What We’re All Missing

    ‘Coronavirus has provided a stark reminder of what happens when humanity’s relationship with nature breaks down.’ - Justin Addison, Second Secretary at the UK Delegation to the OSCE, 3rd June 2020 Covid-19 has been the biggest blow to our society in generations. The economic and social costs of this pandemic are immeasurable and will be long-lasting, with Rishi Sunak stating that the economy will undergo a ‘permanent adjustment’. But as we start to move from panic mode to recovery mode, we have an opportunity to redirect global economic activity towards averting the climate crisis we currently face. The actions taken now, including the huge business bailouts from the exchequer, will determine the future of our economy, and as such, our environment. With climate change having risen up on political agendas, several countries have announced that instead of focusing on bailing out high-carbon industries, they will look at how to prioritise sustainability in their recoveries. Both France and Scotland quickly announced huge investments in ‘green covid recoveries’, and the UK Government has also pledged to turn this into an opportunity to create green jobs and transform the economy towards a more sustainable future. ‘The government will build back better, build back greener, build back faster.’ - Boris Johnson, UK Prime Minister, 30th June 2020 But what does Boris’ ‘clean, green recovery’ actually mean? UK business leaders have particularly emphasised the need to focus economic support in industries which are environmentally-friendly, and making loans conditional on business plans being in line with climate goals. They have called for increased research funding for sustainable buildings, clean and domestic energy production and electric vehicles. In the proposed policies, the Government has pledged millions to four key areas of the economy: transport, infrastructure, innovation and planning system reform. The UK was the first major economy to commit to net zero emissions by 2050 in law. While these are commendable policies which show a real commitment to reaching a future where the country is more environmentally friendly, there are further steps required in reaching our carbon targets and ensuring the rest of the world also emphasises climate-aware policies on their agendas. The UK’s green plan arguably doesn’t deliver the best value for money, when considering long-term climate change solutions. Moreover, it is a symptom of states and institutions across the world ignoring the problem of excessive emissions in favour of creating temporary ways of capturing carbon, using an ‘accounting trick’ which avoids legally binding international carbon emission targets. For example, the target to plant 75,000 acres of trees in Britain every year by 2025 and the pledging of £100 million for researching Direct Air Capture technology indicates a strategy of focusing on creating carbon sinks to offset increasing over-pollution and over consumption. This has been criticised as a way of avoiding the long-term underlying need to reduce energy consumption in the first place, given that the capacity for forests to absorb carbon emissions decreases over time. The work is also not finished once the trees have been planted; protecting ecosystems to ensure long-term healthy forests is a costly and necessary process which hasn’t been accounted for in the government target. At this crucial time in the economy, long-term solutions to reduce our underlying carbon production, like continuing to develop the technology for reliable renewable energy sources and green transportation alternatives, cannot be ignored in favour of short-term vanity projects to artificially lower carbon emissions. Covid-19 and climate change are undoubtedly the biggest international issues in decades, and yet Trumpism and Brexit are symptoms of general increases in populism and falling political support for internationalism. The global community must work together to ensure climate accountability and share technology and resources, for a painless transition to a low-carbon world. It is true that before the word became so hyperconnected, a pandemic would not have spread so quickly. But, while physical isolationism is the short-term solution to covid-19, we must ensure this does not lead to long-term reduction in global interconnectedness, which can lead to great innovation and progress. Covid-19 and climate change must be faced by an international community which is ready for forward-looking cooperation. Covid has shown us the urgency of information sharing when investigating the epidemiology and spread of the disease, and we have much to gain from applying this lesson to the problem of climate change by sharing technological developments that can help countries reach their Nationally Determined Contributions. The under-emphasised resource in this discussion is each other, and countries must fight against the recent trend of foreign policy becoming more inwards-focused, in order for us to recover from covid-19 with long-term ambitions to make the world a safer and greener place.

  • Britain’s Electric Car Revolution, Is It Even Worth It?

    In November 2020, the UK brought forward its ban on petrol and diesel cars from 2040 to 2030, with some hybrids being allowed into 2035. This announcement comes just a few months after the Johnson administration unveiled their new green ‘industrial revolution’ and 12 months before the UK hosts the COP26 climate conference. The new target of 2030 is one of the most radical electric vehicle policy targets in the world. While clearly ambitious, this policy is backed by the fact that electric car prices are decreasing across the board in response to major investment and the market share is set to continue increasing. However, the ambitions of the green-minded are riddled with technological, environmental and ethical issues that pose major structural issues to the UK’s, and indeed the world’s, aims at quelling the climate crisis. It was revealed in November 2020 that the UK & the 17 largest EU economies bought over a million hybrid/electric cars with around half of these being full electric cars. This is a huge increase in sales and has greatly been impacted by EU and UK state action to fine companies that don’t decrease their fleets’ emissions. While the past year’s numbers may predict a positive future for electric cars, the current economic climate - under the strain of Brexit - looks to stunt Britain’s electric shift. Currently, the UK’s future trade arrangement with the EU will result in large import tariffs on cars as Europe seeks to insulate its own industry from outside competition. As it stands, many British-made cars use Japanese and third party made parts which don’t qualify for tariff exemptions under the current ‘locally-made’ rules. This will push up the costs of electric cars for British consumers who buy the vast majority of their cars from Europe, while simultaneously sabotaging sales by British based car firms that export 4/5 units to the EU. Another disputed issue is the approach governments take towards the move to electric cars. The Volvo chief executive has recently expressed discontent with the general attitude of many governments as ineffective. The UK’s hard ban on petrol and diesel was therefore welcomed by Volvo, believing a new industry can’t be built on subsidies and fines but major legislation. Despite legislation being identified by many as the key factor to change, this poses its own issues. Governments cannot act far out of the interests of those who elected them and so for the foreseeable future if consumers cannot be encouraged to commit to electric cars the operation is under major threat. For example, the lack of changing points has always been an issue of contention. In response to this the Government has announced £500m towards charging infrastructure to increase consumer confidence. While this is a positive and essential step there is no time frame on this investment and even if it’s swift, it’ll still take years for consumer behaviour to be impacted. Following on from this, the pandemic also massively impacts consumer choices. In January 2020 as much as 16% of consumers wanted to buy an all-electric car, yet this figure fell to 4% in November as a result of falling incomes. Price is the most important factor for the majority of UK consumers when it comes to cars, and with electric cars still more expensive it further complicates the route to Johnson's green revolution. Even if consumers do make the switch, are there any substantial environmental benefits? Likely not. One of the major benefits of electric cars is of course the fact that they produce no greenhouse gases when being used. While in the long run this is undoubtedly better than non-electric cars, during the much more complex and demanding manufacturing process the cars must drive on average 50,000 miles to offset emissions. Most importantly is the production of the batteries which is not only costly but very harmful to the environment. Environmental problems expand to the precious metal procurement of the essential battery materials of cobalt and lithium, both of which are mined arduously. Lithium mining requires huge amounts of water which in the Americas, Australia and Africa can be problematic. Further still, contamination of entire plains and water sources has been known to occur during this process. If the UK can remove itself from the blame for this environmental damage done in electric car supply chains, then it still has to grapple with major ethical issues. Cobalt has come to be known as the blood diamond of the electric car industry, being tied to many cases of child labour and appalling mining conditions. Standing over all of this is the dilemma of how the electricity that powers the car is made. If the UK cannot shift its electricity production to nuclear or renewable sources, then the issue of emissions is simply moved from cars to fossil fuel factories. The future of the UK’s shift to electric is facing a leviathan of opposition. Even as demand for electric cars rebounds it will only lead to far higher demand for electricity to be produced which in itself faces a marathon before it can call itself legitimately climate-friendly. 2030 is perhaps a naïve target, but it may perhaps inadvertently still be the best target. With such a strong line by the government consumers and producers will be heavily incentivised to invest in electric cars and new cleaner technology in mining and battery production. The quest for a truly green economy may remain on the horizon, but it’s not yet out of sight.

  • Is the Pandemic Making the Oil Industry Greener?

    The oil industry had a crisis year in 2020. Royal Dutch Shell posted a loss of $21.7bn last year and the US giant Exxon Mobil suffered a $22.4bn loss. Oil prices even turned negative. Much of this can be explained by the pandemic depressing demand for oil. But even before the pandemic hit, the oil industry was having to plan for a future away from fossil fuels. Could COVID-19 accelerate this trend? European and American producers are pursuing radically different strategies, with completely opposite forecasts of the oil market. In Europe, oil companies are clearly responding to the pandemic by turning more rapidly away from oil. BP has been a particularly notable case of this. Before the pandemic, they led the industry in promising to reach net zero emissions by 2050. And as a result of the pandemic, they announced 10,000 job cuts, along with plans for a near ten-fold increase in electric vehicle charging points. The reasoning behind these plans can be partly explained by pressure from shareholders over the climate crisis; they want to see oil companies do more to tackle climate change. But the main reason is of course a profit-motivated one. BP believes that oil demand may have peaked in 2019, a radical shift from its earlier belief in 2019 that oil demand would continue to grow in the 2030s. With the pressure from governments and investors to tackle climate change, BP also believes that certain trends, such as remote working, will be accelerated by the pandemic; this would lower demand for oil more rapidly than previously thought. Aside from BP, other European companies are taking action. Shell is moving away from fossil fuels, and towards hydrogen and biofuels. France’s Total quit the American Petroleum Institute (API), citing the API’s resistance towards tackling climate change and its support for Donald Trump quitting the Paris Climate Agreement. The plan for these European countries is generally to keep oil production as their main revenue drivers over the next decade, while using the profits from oil to invest in cleaner forms of energy. So it’s not going to be an immediate shift away from fossil fuels, but rather a period of high investment in clean energy, followed by a slower shift towards these forms of cleaner energy. The outlook still seems positive for climate activists though; European firms are clearly taking action. The mood in the USA, however, is exactly the opposite. While Europe has betted on oil demand falling away over the following decades, American companies expect oil demand to rebound, especially as they see developing economies like India picking up soon. And as such, ExxonMobil and its rivals Chevron haven’t made any big investments in renewables. But activist investors and large pension funds are pressuring American oil companies to do more. In fact, the world’s largest biggest investment fund, BlackRock, has threatened to sell its shares in the worst polluting businesses, demanding that companies disclose their plans to achieve net zero emissions. Exxon in particular, is under increasing pressure from shareholders over the climate crisis. It was once the most valuable public listed company in the world, and didn’t really have to bother about shareholder discontent. But since 2014, it’s lost a huge $266 billion in market value and made multiple costly investment errors. And once a company starts to struggle, activist investors come along. Exxon is even facing a campaign to take over board seats to drive change from within. There are signs of this pressure having an effect; they’ve created some small emissions targets, but they simply don’t go far enough. Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan analysts have pointed to recent news that oil prices have recovered to pre-pandemic levels, as a reason to be optimistic about Exxon’s future. But this wouldn’t quite be accurate. While oil prices may have recovered, demand hasn’t. Indeed, the rise in oil prices is partly explained by expectations of a quick, successful vaccine rollout and economic recovery. This is by no means guaranteed. The price rise can be significantly attributed to supply constraints; the prestigious OPEC group cut its oil production and African producers have seen declining output recently. So the price rise isn’t down to a recovery in the oil sector, but rather a continuation of its struggles in supply, and some hopeful expectations. So who is pursuing the better strategy: the American or European producers? The answer to that question will determine the future of the energy sector. At this stage, the Europeans seem to be the more prudent side in trying to diversify away from oil. Governments are slowly starting to take the climate crisis seriously; the UK will stop the sale of diesel and petrol cars from 2030, which will hugely reduce demand for oil in the UK. The arrival of President Biden in the USA poses a big challenge to the current thinking of American oil companies. He’s already rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement and stopped the leasing of federal land for oil and gas. It’s looking increasingly likely that the American companies will be left behind in the race to diversify. The oil industry has suffered repeated, painful shocks in recent years. In 2007, prices plummeted due to the recession, in 2015 OPEC flooded the market and depressed prices once again, but the pandemic has been the most brutal of all. However, it has offered the perfect storm for a shift to clean energy. The Europeans have seized it. It’s time for the Americans to do the same.

  • Evergrande- Perhaps Not To Be Ever Grand?

    The Evergrande Group, China’s leading real estate developer, has found itself with debt totalling over $300 billion, while it has over 800 unfinished housing projects and unhappy shareholders. After missing its most recent deadline on September 29th of a $46 million interest payment the chances of the property giant meeting its next deadline on 18th October are slim. Such a default would not only throw the Asian financial market, but also the Chinese government into turmoil. To understand how Evergrande has spiralled so far into debt, we need to look back to 1996 when Xu Jiayin, once China’s richest man, founded Evergrande at a time of mass urbanisation in China, helping spark a boom in property prices. In the early 2000s, China began to privatise state-owned enterprises, allowing wealthy entrepreneurs to join the Communist Party of China. Consequently, Xu increased his proximity to power as he became a member of China’s ‘People’s Political Consultative Conference’ – an integral part of the Government that advises on foreign relations. With such a strong political-economic backing, it gave investors the assurance to loan tens of billions to Evergrande. Evergrande’s business model works by selling apartments before they are completed to ensure a continuous flow of cash. The company has since become increasingly reliant on loans from state banks, whilst the nexus between the Chinese government and Evergrande has meant that the state has become more dependent on the property giant’s ongoing success. As a result, Evergrande’s downfall, and the government’s response, will not only significantly impact China, but will demonstrate whether the Chinese government is moving away from solely prioritising economic advancement. As Evergrande accrued more and more debt, the Chinese government became increasingly concerned about their borrowing, as well as the trend it set within the market. Their borrowing rates were so high that the Chinese government feared it could jeopardise the sustainability of the entire retail estate market, a major part of the economy. Alongside this, the Government has since begun to feel that their investments could be channelled into more productive industries; Evergrande’s strategy of aggressively buying up land to drive up house prices has made property unaffordable for millions. As a result, the Chinese government decided it had to interfere, regardless of the potential consequences on the property sector. This interference came in the form of the ‘three red lines’ for home developers, introduced in August 2020. This laid out a strategy to limit property developers’ debt according to three standards- the ratio of net debt to equity, liabilities to assets and cash to short term borrowings. This means the more a firm owe, the less they can borrow. Unsurprisingly, this came as a significant blow for Evergrande. The world’s most indebted developer went on to breach all three of the ‘red lines’ and was subsequently banned by regulators from any further borrowing. To overcome this, Evergrande pre-sold more than 1.4 million unfinished apartments, requesting deposits of over a third of the property price. However, when this failed to generate enough income, they turned on their own employees, pressuring them to loan the company money under the guise of a ‘high-interest investment scheme’. Those who failed to participate risked losing their bonuses. Fast forward to September 2021, the company stopped paying back the employees who opted into the scheme, meaning they now face a barrage from disgruntled employees, shareholders, and homebuyers, all of which are demanding their money back. This panic has seen Evergrande’s stock value steadily fall from $4 per share 12 months ago to just $0.30. As well as this, it has now missed two vital interest payments in the last month, totalling $131 million- just a small fraction of its total debt. If Evergrande cannot pay its debt by the end of the 30-day grace period and instead defaults, it could have disastrous consequences that ripple through not only China but the rest of the globe. The major worry for the Chinese government is the potential ricochet effect on its economic growth - 41% of China’s domestic banking assets were associated with the property sector by the end of 2020 and Evergrande still owes money to 170 domestic and 121 international firms. This crisis is likely to stain the Chinese economy as a far less attractive investment opportunity. Meanwhile, the 1.4 million pre-sold apartments are unlikely to be completed, leaving home buyers and unpaid suppliers in the dust. Furthermore, many of these companies are themselves on the verge of bankruptcy, with nothing but Evergrande’s empty promises in their coffers. Outside of China, there have been several comparisons to the fall of Lehman Brothers and its contribution to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. It has, therefore, called into question whether the collapse of Evergrande could have a similar effect if the Chinese government chooses not to bail it out. As the global economy tries to recover from the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, further pressure has been directed at the Chinese government to act. Although most analysts suggest that the debt is not far reaching enough to trigger a collapse of the global economy, it may affect developing economies such as India, resulting from the fact that China is a major importer of Indian metals and chemical products. This leaves Beijing with a dilemma: does it simply let Evergrande collapse and try to minimalize the consequences, or does it intervene? If so, what kind of message does this convey? This is a question upon which economic and political analysts seem to be divided. Economists suggest that the government will be forced to act, unwilling to let the property industry (accounting for 25% of its GDP) go bust. On the other hand, most political experts feel that the Government’s priorities are no longer simply growth oriented. The financial losses that have come from the government’s crackdowns on private tutoring and major technologies companies suggest that they care more for working towards the goal of “common prosperity” than for continuing rapid economic growth. If the same shift in attitude is applied to Evergrande it is unlikely the government will involve itself, thereby setting an example and showing itself to be hardline on reigning in debt. We are, however, unlikely to see any final decisions until later this year, when the rest of Evergrande’s repayment deadlines expire.

  • Green Fitness Challenge: Macron’s Bid for Two Successful Presidencies

    From the 1st of January Emmanuel Macron and his cabinet have embarked on an ambitious course for the European Council. They begin their tenure of the rotating presidency at a moment that could not have been more strenuous for Europe as a whole, and for the French electorate more specifically. As the continent grapples with an ongoing energy crisis, compounded by rising military tensions at its Eastern border and continued pressure on European healthcare systems, the French are once again faced with the imprévu. The biggest problem for their EU presidency, however, will come with the highly anticipated announcement of Macron’s candidature for another term at the Élysée. Leading up to the presidential elections in April, he and his team will have to balance the expectations of his electorate, deflect attacks from his domestic opponents and appease conflicts between the various EU member-states. The policy issue that will give Macron the hardest time in managing these three dimensions is the current flurry surrounding the EU’s climate policy, especially with regards to the Commission’s Fit for 55 package, and the debate around green taxonomy, both of which will be analysed in turn. The Fit for 55 package does not include new laws per se, but revisions to existing laws which were proposed in July and December last year, and have since been met with serious criticism, especially with regard to the EU Emissions Trading System (EUETS). While some green parties and grassroots activists denounce its lack of ambition, several Eastern European member-states dread the scope of the package, as the current energy crisis sits at the top of their domestic agendas, alongside concerns for those vulnerable to the social and financial costs of a green transition. The EU ETS is a market-driven mechanism that limits the absolute amount of greenhouse gasses that can be emitted by the entities covered in the scheme, requiring them to buy 'emission allowances' from national governments to cover their extra greenhouse gas output. The scheme currently spans several sectors from power and heat generation to energy intensive industrial sectors and aviation. The main point of contention lies with the proposed expansion to cover maritime and road transport as well as buildings, all in an attempt to cover the Commission’s new ambitious target of a 55% reduction in emissions by 2030. Unsurprisingly, the affected industries have reacted vehemently. A coalition of European aviation giants (including Lufthansa, Air France and KLM) decried the implementation of a kerosene tax and the lack of specificity regarding the environmental protection surcharge that would weaken their position vis-à-vis non-European partners, while the World Shipping Council opposed the latest draft by the European Parliament in which vessel operators are deemed ‘responsible entities’ and thus the main targets of EU ETS costs. Challenges to the French presidency, however, extend beyond industrial strongholds. Within the EU, opposition comes from the East, especially from Poland, where the Constitutional Tribunal has been used to legitimize the country’s opposition to the package. In the case of Poland, the fundamental issue relates to the country’s lack of energy market liberalization and the deliberate exclusion from the narrative of the leverage of national governments in spending the surplus of income from the ETS in softening any adverse effects on their citizens. Nonetheless, Poland has gained (partial) support from a series of EU members, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal and Spain, which is bound to cause heated conflict in the Council with ETS defenders like Germany. The Élysée itself is more reluctant to comply with the Commission’s plans to expand the EU ETS, fearing domestic backlash from small businesses and the broader population, the memory of the 2018 gilets jaunes protests deeply ingrained in the government’s energy policy. The current debacle over the Union’s taxonomy for sustainable activities has only complicated matters for the French presidency. The labeling system is aimed at incentivising investment into environmentally sustainable activities and preventing greenwashing. Earlier this year, the Commission considered expanding the green label to cover nuclear power and fossil gas, and has now decided to continue with the proposal, in spite of the backlash, and include them in the list of ‘transitional’ resources. The proposal will have to pass the European Parliament, where the odds seem stacked against it: a simple majority would be enough to table the proposal, and with many EP groups voicing their discontent - including the Socialists, and Democrats, the Greens, and the Left - a real challenge has arisen for the Commission, as well as for the French presidency. The stakes are high for Macron, for the French have a deep interest in seeing a green label on nuclear power plants. Not only does the industry account for the third largest share of the workforce, but also for 70% of French energy consumption, and has a fundamental role in the stability of the European energy market. While Macron’s 2017 presidential platform included a reduction of reliance on nuclear power to 50% by 2035, he has been equally vocal about his continued support for the industry and his plans to renew the fleet of 56 nuclear reactors via investments in small-scale modular reactors. Furthermore, his domestic opponents have also emphasized the centrality of nuclear power in their energy policies, including his two biggest contenders: Pécresse and Le Pen. While the European People’s Party has been somewhat split over the issue of taxonomy, the Renew Europe group (often the kingmakers of the EP) are bound to vote in support of the proposal, as Macron’s LREM is the biggest member party of the group. In either case, the electoral pressure might undermine Macron’s standing in the EU forum: even if he does succeed in molding the EU ETS and in revising EU taxonomy to cover nuclear energy, he risks doing so by twisting many arms in the Council, unless his position is delivered as available one for the future of the EU in its entirety. While the rotating presidency has always had unquestionable effects on the domestic standing of the incumbents, going against the tide in order to advance domestic agendas sets a dangerous precedent for future presidencies and undermines the legitimacy of the Council - and of the EU as a whole. This will only stoke the growing dissatisfaction with European policy-making, ceding political points to the eurosceptics. As suspicions over the instrumentalisation of the presidency grow, it will take genuine leadership to bring about lasting consensus in the Council and to appease any resulting frustration in the French domestic sphere.

  • Covid Plan B – What, Why and If?

    This article has been written by contributor Harry Ward Around this time last year England crashed into its second Covid-19 lockdown. At the time, the Government was criticised for a lack of planning, a lack of decisiveness and a lack of foresight. Now, one year on, England not only has a Plan A, but it also has a Plan B. Whether this indicates the government has learnt from its mistakes is still largely disputed. Currently, we are living in Plan A – that is, more or less, life as ‘normal’, with limited social distancing and regulations. What is Plan B? Why might we need it? What would its effects be socially, politically, and economically? These are the questions that this article will address. Plan B is the name given by the Government to a range of extra regulations that could be brought in to protect the NHS from overwhelming pressure this Autumn and Winter if Covid-19 cases were to once again to flare beyond control. Restrictions listed under Plan B include: · Communicating urgently the message that the public must behave more cautiously · Introducing mandatory Covid-19 passports · Reinstating mandatory face coverings · Advising people to work from home These measures have not been implemented yet, though doing so would align England with the measures already in place in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. What might trigger Plan B? The Government has said that it will monitor hospitalisations, deaths, cases, and the overall state of the NHS in deciding whether to trigger Plan B. The exact point for each of these factors is, however, unknown. Sajid Javid mentioned in a briefing at the end of October that these measures weren’t needed yet. However, the NHS Confederation disagreed on the same day, arguing that such a plan ought to be implemented immediately. It must, therefore, be questioned, which of the two is closer to the truth? The numbers are thought provoking. Covid-19 cases are actually on the way down as of November 7th, with the last 7 days producing roughly 10% fewer cases than the previous 7 days. However, this time last year cases stood at around 23,000 per day – enough to trigger a lockdown – yet considerably less than the 30,000+ per day recorded recently. What has changed is the widespread introduction of vaccines, which has resulted in a decrease in the crucial figures of deaths and hospitalisations. Therefore, whether Plan B is needed in the next few months will depend heavily on whether the vaccine continues to be effective in reducing hospitalisations and deaths. To ensure this efficacy, the successful rollout of booster jabs is crucial. This is certainly the Government’s line of attack, with Javid urging the public to get the booster jab in order to avoid Christmas restrictions. This suggests that there are still vital policy decisions to be made in order to establish how best to encourage the vaccine take-up and to combat vaccine hesitancy. Assuming a strong competency among policy planners, the Government may not even even have to consider implementing Plan B at all. Whether Plan B will be implemented or not remains to be seen – if there is anything the last 18 months have taught us, it is that you can’t predict the future. However, should the extra measures be implemented, what would the effects be? Would the positives outweigh the negatives? The science is clear, extra measures will reduce Covid cases, hospitalisations and deaths. This is in itself a good thing; fewer cases mean not only less suffering, but also less pressure on the NHS and less possibility that the virus could mutate and become immune to current vaccines. Despite this, extra measures always have spillover consequences. Firstly, economically, a Cabinet Office document suggests that Plan B would cost the UK up to £18 billion if in place until the end of March 2022. This would be a massive hit to an already recovering economy and is extremely politically unfavourable for a Conservative government entering a vital stage of its tenure. Rishi Sunak’s new budget aims to regain control of public spending once again and the way in which the Conservative government manages the economy post-pandemic is incredibly important for their attempted re-election. Secondly, mandatory covid passports for certain venues would exclude a considerable portion of the population, especially those of younger ages who have chosen not to (or who have not been able to) get vaccinated. This could potentially have negative impacts on the group’s mental health as many members remain socially locked down. Plan B might mean the reintroduction of bubbles in schools which have caused so much disruption to education in the past. Such an arrangement, however, would be slightly different this time around with whole classes not being sent home like last year. Regardless of how it would be implemented, it will undoubtably lead to further educational disturbances. In conclusion, Plan B could be the next, and entirely necessary, step in the fight to control Covid-19. Then again, it could not. The key consideration is whether current measures can keep numbers low enough that Boris Johnson and his team need not even consider Plan B. What we do know is that Covid-19’s immense impact on a variety of policy areas in the UK will continue for the foreseeable future.

  • One Britain, One Nation? : The British Government’s Effort To Write Its Own History

    On June 21 of this year, the UK Department of Education tweeted its support for the ‘One Britain, One Nation’ movement, proposing to make the day of June 25 one that celebrates the national values of “shared values of tolerance, kindness, pride, and respect”. This was met online with hostility, jubilation, controversy, and mockery. Some viewed it as a rightful reclaim of patriotism, while others saw a pathetic move to gain some political points among nationalists. In reality, this brief online debate acted as a microcosm, epitomising broader debates about educational policy and post-colonial consciousness, specifically in relation to Britain’s identity and how the government it seeking to shape it. How exactly its identity and history should be taught to future generations remains a contentious issue, wherein the consequences of mishandling such a task could result in the perpetuation of ignorance around race and colonialism. This issue has never been more pertinent than in recent years, with changing global views on race and racism and the resulting ‘culture wars’ which now characterise contemporary society. Education, being the tool that shapes the next generation, is a vital policy pillar in any country. Executed incorrectly, it can indoctrinate a generation, filling them with internal prejudices and biases that can linger for the remainder of their lives. While the UK has a robust and organised education system, it has come under criticism in recent years as the country, and indeed the world, has experienced a proliferation of the debate surrounding the European colonial era. The problematic legacy of the British Empire, in particular, has become a focal point of the conversation regarding the government’s educational policy, especially with regard to historiography. We must begin, therefore, with a look at the current national curriculum in place across Britain. Most secondary school children would be able to recite the names of all six wives of a king who died nearly 500 years ago, but know nothing about the Partition of India or the Mau Mau Uprising in Kenya. Both of these represent key events in both modern British and world history, and play a vital role in introducing students to the structure of modern day society. While the national curriculum does require “at least one study of a significant society or issue in world history”, this gives each school leeway to teach, or not teach, a more diverse curriculum . The lack of any specific reference to Britons of colour, or even an approach looking at the varied socio-economic development of Britain, is a sobering reality for historians. This had led to accusations that the government has purposefully excluded black British history, despite calls for a change in education policy going back more than two decades, most notably through the 1999 Macpherson Report in the aftermath of the brutal murder of Stephen Lawrence. The clear absence of black British history from the curriculum, and the exclusion of the harmful actions of the British Empire, reveal that the government’s education policy is fundamentally flawed, as it neglects several aspects of Britain’s history that are intrinsically valuable for understanding the fabric of modern society. This is a critical area of policy to falter in. There remains an ignorance to the true importance of education to society, whereby many societal problems could be eased, if not solved, through proper education. The current system, failing to educate on the role played by ethnic minorities in building the country, has neglected many. Most recently the windrush community, as essential workers that aided in rebuilding post-war Britain, were instead swept under the carpet, treated as illegal aliens and blamed for social issues. The effect on national consciousness and race relations has been wholly negative as a result of structural failings in the British curriculum that a). snub the contributions of non-white citizens and b). Ignore the harmful and sometimes devastating effects of the nation's colonial past around the world. The resulting effect has meant the creation of a national blindspot on important socio-historical issues. Change starts at home, and the only feasible way to fix society’s ignorance is to properly educate the younger generations. With an education policy stuck in a cage of selectivist patriotism, there will be no concrete change. In reaction to calls for a progressive education policy, the government has seemingly reaffirmed its belief in unflinching patriotism. This is not surprising as in recent years the Conservative Party has benefitted electorally among socially conservative voters for their traditionalist stance on the nation's history. This led to former Education Secretary Gavin Williamson stating in June of last year that “we should, as a nation, be proud of that history and teach our children about it”. This, however, presents a problem for the government’s argument. While boasting about the positive aspects of British history, they attempt to shield the public from the negative and more problematic. This poses the question: if you can’t be ashamed of your own history, then how can you be proud of it? One notion that is commonly used is that history remains firmly in the past, and since most Britons today don’t remember, let alone live through, the Empire they shouldn’t feel ashamed of its wrongdoing. Yet, paradoxically, while appealing to such a sentiment, the government simultaneously suggests the nation should be proud of similarly remote periods and events. The government must fully acknowledge Britain's past, opening up the deep scars that remain in society, if it wishes to champion its rosier moments. It is evident that the government’s educational policy surrounding its own history is ultimately flawed. The absence of key black British figures such as Walter Tull and Olaudah Equiano as well as a proper evaluation into the role of the British Empire beyond patriotism is worrying to the historian. The government clearly has an immense task ahead dealing with its colonial hangover, and it remains to be seen whether it will take on the task of changing national perception about race, or remain blissfully ignorant and allow systemic racism to reproduce itself through the education system. It is unclear whether it will confront its own history and make subsequent changes to education, or if this issue will continue for further generations.

  • Australia Wants Nuclear Submarines. Does It Need Them?

    AUKUS, the latest awkward acronym to grace the headlines, has seen no shortage of analysis. Announced on September 15th, the security pact between the US, UK, and Australia is, in principle, a broad commitment for the three nations to “significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.” Those capabilities are myriad, but one in particular has attracted significant attention: Canberra’s commitment to purchase nuclear-powered (not nuclear armed) submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). In announcing this commitment, the Australian government simultaneously ended a multi-billion-dollar program to purchase conventional, diesel-electric powered submarines from France. The sudden cancellation has raised much furor in Paris, with president Emmanuel Macron going so far as to recall the French ambassadors from Australia and the USA. Much has been said about the pact’s implications for Franco-American relations, Chinese defense planning, and even Iran’s nuclear ambitions (we’ll get back to that last one). But one question has been oddly absent from much of the discourse: why does the RAN actually want nuclear submarines? And is their acquisition a good idea? To understand the ruckus over AUKUS, we have to begin over a decade ago. In a 2009 white paper, the Australian Department of Defence posited that a force of twelve submarines would be necessary “to defend [Australia’s] approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia, if necessary), protect and support other [Australian Defence Force] assets, and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial.” That white paper, and the mission profiles it outlined, formed the basis of a 2015 procurement competition - which, notably, did not evaluate any nuclear-powered submarines. Indeed, the submarine that eventually won the competition was a variant of the French Barracuda-class submarine, modified to replace the nuclear reactor with conventional propulsion. The reasoning seemed obvious: Australia lacked a domestic nuclear industry, meaning its submarines would have to be built and maintained by a foreign nuclear power. This ran contrary to one of the secondary objectives of the submarine program; to revitalize the Australian shipbuilding industry. And yet, at some point in the past half-decade, Australia warmed up to the idea of operating nuclear submarines. There are, of course, clear benefits to them: nuclear submarines can sustain much higher speeds than their conventional counterparts, don’t have to operate near the surface to recharge their batteries (“snorting”), and the only limit to their operational range is the need to restock food for the crew. The operational implications are significant - a conventional submarine deploying from Perth would only be able to remain “on station” (ready to engage in combat) in the South China Sea for 11 days; a nuclear-powered submarine, by contrast, could remain on station for 77. This added capability allows the submarines to defend Australia from much further away, giving the RAN much greater operational flexibility to deter, disrupt, and destroy adversaries before they come within range of Australia itself. Nevertheless, all of the factors that pushed Australia away from nuclear propulsion in 2015 still exist in 2021. Under the terms of the AUKUS deal, the US will transfer information on naval reactors to Australia, but Australia still lacks the actual capability to construct or maintain those reactors. As such, it is very likely that the new submarines will not, in fact, be assembled in Australia, but instead in the United States - where they will also be forced to travel for emergency maintenance. As former Prime Minister of Australia, Malcolm Turnbull, put it: “if you can’t maintain your own ships, you are not in full control of them.” This greatly reduces Australia’s military independence and increases their reliance on American military platforms, putting greater pressure on Canberra to subordinate itself to Washington’s Pacific strategy. Worse still, while the entire fleet of French- built conventional submarines were expected to be in service by 2035, the new nuclear submarines are projected to only begin hitting the water by the end of the 2030s, forcing Australia to enact a costly life-extension program to keep its aging Collins-class submarines in service. Moreover, the implications of Australia’s purchase of nuclear submarines extend far beyond the Pacific. Australia is designated as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) under the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This obliges it to accept safeguards (and International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of those safeguards) to prevent nuclear materials from being diverted from civil purposes towards nuclear weapons. Therein lies the crunch: naval reactors manufactured by the US and UK are fueled by Highly Enriched Uranium, which is essential for producing nuclear fission weapons. Under normal circumstances, any HEU stored in a NNWS is subject to safeguards and inspections. However, there exists a legal loophole: any state is allowed to withdraw nuclear material, including HEU, from safeguards, so long as it is used for a “non-proscribed military activity” - that is to say, anything that isn’t a nuclear bomb. While this means Australia possessing nuclear submarines wouldn’t breach the NPT directly, it would break convention. Currently, only countries recognized as Nuclear Weapons States by the NPT operate nuclear submarines. Some analysts fear that ending this convention could embolden some states, namely Iran, to secretly produce nuclear weapons with HEU ostensibly withdrawn to support naval reactor projects. In summary, Australia’s decision to switch from procuring conventional to nuclear submarines was potentially a huge mistake. First, while nuclear submarines will provide Australia with improved operational independence and more effective defense-in-depth, they will undermine its strategic independence, as Australia will become reliant on foreign partners to operate its submarines. Secondly, the switch to nuclear will economically hurt Australia by denying it the revitalization of a domestic shipbuilding industry, as well as forcing it to spend money on a life-extension program for its current submarine fleet. Finally, by becoming the first NNWS to operate nuclear submarines, Australia will break a key international norm. This opens up the route for other NNWS such as Iran to follow suit, contributing towards worsening nuclear proliferation and de-grading global security.

  • The Police, Crime, Sentencing And Courts Bill Is Looking To Restrict Your Rights

    The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill was first announced in March 2021, and yet has already reached the Committee stage of the House of Lords, having been rushed through the Commons at near record speed. The government’s Home Secretary, Priti Patel, felt motivated to pursue the Bill following the protests which took place throughout the summer’s lockdown, with specific focus on Black Lives Matter and Extinction Rebellion. The Bill is truly an all-encompassing leviathan, ranging from police powers, sexual offence law, protesting rights and reckless driving, to property eviction, chosen gender on a criminal record, child exploitation, prisoner resettlement and pet theft. Beyond being a prehistoric approach to legislating on issues such as crime, the haste with which it has been pushed through the commons is of great concern. This article will focus on Chapter Three: ‘Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices’, which expands police powers into the remit of searching electronic devices, having untold implications in numerous contexts. This chapter comes as the first real attempt to legislate some form of cyber rights into a statutory framework, following an ambiguous surge of arguments against online ‘anonymity’. This included the pitiful attempt of using the murder of Sir David Amess to push for this cyber agenda, despite it being a totally unrelated matter. The Chapter highlights that ‘an authorised person’ may collect data from a specified device to ‘prevent, detect, investigate or prosecute crime’. On 27th October, Lord Paddick highlighted that the amendments extended the powers of who an ‘authorised person’ can be in specific contexts. If a device is used by an individual with lacking mental capacity, amendments suggest that a social worker can authorise for a device to be accessed for information. The definition even stretches to ‘any responsible person who is aged 18 or over’. Sections 36 to 42 highlight powers that have already been in place. Privacy International has already made the case that ‘police are using highly intrusive technology to extract and store data from individual’s phones, on a questionable legal basis’. The concern over this particular chapter is that it is in fact regressive to the functioning of law and order upon application. Dame Vera Baird, the Victims Commissioner, has repeatedly reiterated the notion that rape and sexual assault survivors are not necessarily comfortable with handing over their devices, especially for information to potentially be used against them at trial. This impasse, namely the refusal to hand over private data to the authorities, has meant that 42.8% of victims ended up withdrawing claims as a result of ‘evidential difficulties’, while 21% of cases had concerns about digital downloads and access to medical records. While it is both progressive and critical that the Lords have agreed to implement a new provision making it illegal for the police to place ‘undue pressure’ on a victim, they are yet to address the fact that it doesn't do anything to help victims feel reassured that the content on their phone will be safe from from scrutiny or legal persecution The Code of Practice for the Bill is useful for providing further explanation about interpretation for future readers, as it highlights expectations around necessity, proportionality and reasonable belief. Lord Rosser titled the data extraction as ‘digital strip searches’, requesting that the bill only searches through information that is relevant to ‘a reasonable line of enquiry’. He goes on to say ‘surely being under any pressure in the context that we are talking about [rape survival] is undue’. The opposition (Labour) raised this point within the Commons at almost every debate, though it was actively ignored alongside many other criticisms. In the Lords, while Labour asked for limits against unjustified police demands for person information held by third parties (i.e. medical and social services records), and against ‘extreme and indiscriminate data collection’ (something originally protected against when the U.K. was in the EU [Privacy International, C-623/17]), the conservative Lords instead asserted that alleged victims would be ‘fully informed of the reasons that the information has been sought and how the information will be used’. This, again, fails to address the fundamental privacy concern about searches being indiscriminate. An amendment of particular importance to protesting rights was brought forward by Lord Moylan, entitled ‘Retention by the police of personal data relating to non-criminal conduct perceived to be motivated by hostility’. This provision is especially confusing, because it refers to non-crime hate incidents, enabling data to be collected and saved on personal records, despite the individual not having committed a crime. Baroness Chakrabarti raised a point about whether the ‘so-called soft information or police intelligence that never matures into a charge should sit unregulated, off the statute book, as a matter of police discretion and administration’. This amendment muddies the waters of legal certainty, placing a permanent mark of suspected future criminality on someone's personal record, which can often follow them for years. Across the debates there was much mockery of ‘woke’ culture, but a failure to genuinely address the importance of having a right to protest and raise valid concerns around social justice. If we are to associate Lord Moylan’s provision with increased powers for the police and the home secretary, as appointed in chapter three (part four), it appears as though even if protestors within a public assembly don’t commit a crime, their presence can be recorded as a form of ‘non-crime hate’, on the mere matter of expressed hostility. The terminology appointed is intentionally ambiguous, and leaves much to the imagination as to what could potentially come of it. Fundamentally, the PCSC bill will fundamentally stifle public assembly and protest, but it is the state that will either expand or restrict the statutory grounds for crime and punishment in relation to this, and other elements of public order and surveillance. If the Bill succeeds, the courts will also interpret the legislation and provide judgements they deem to be ethically sound whilst also satisfying the original legislator. Ultimately, the Bill is a detrimental piece of drafting, impacting basic human dignity and widening powers of the state in excess of standards seen before in the Western world. The Conservative government has long aspired to abolish the Human Rights Act 1998, but once this Bill passes, they will have stomped our national legal ethos deep beneath the soil.

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