Search

This article has been written by contributor Harry Ward Around this time last year England crashed into its second Covid-19 lockdown. At the time, the Government was criticised for a lack of planning, a lack of decisiveness and a lack of foresight. Now, one year on, England not only has a Plan A, but it also has a Plan B. Whether this indicates the government has learnt from its mistakes is still largely disputed. Currently, we are living in Plan A – that is, more or less, life as ‘normal’, with limited social distancing and regulations. What is Plan B? Why might we need it? What would its effects be socially, politically, and economically? These are the questions that this article will address. Plan B is the name given by the Government to a range of extra regulations that could be brought in to protect the NHS from overwhelming pressure this Autumn and Winter if Covid-19 cases were to once again to flare beyond control. Restrictions listed under Plan B include: · Communicating urgently the message that the public must behave more cautiously · Introducing mandatory Covid-19 passports · Reinstating mandatory face coverings · Advising people to work from home These measures have not been implemented yet, though doing so would align England with the measures already in place in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. What might trigger Plan B? The Government has said that it will monitor hospitalisations, deaths, cases, and the overall state of the NHS in deciding whether to trigger Plan B. The exact point for each of these factors is, however, unknown. Sajid Javid mentioned in a briefing at the end of October that these measures weren’t needed yet. However, the NHS Confederation disagreed on the same day, arguing that such a plan ought to be implemented immediately. It must, therefore, be questioned, which of the two is closer to the truth? The numbers are thought provoking. Covid-19 cases are actually on the way down as of November 7th, with the last 7 days producing roughly 10% fewer cases than the previous 7 days. However, this time last year cases stood at around 23,000 per day – enough to trigger a lockdown – yet considerably less than the 30,000+ per day recorded recently. What has changed is the widespread introduction of vaccines, which has resulted in a decrease in the crucial figures of deaths and hospitalisations. Therefore, whether Plan B is needed in the next few months will depend heavily on whether the vaccine continues to be effective in reducing hospitalisations and deaths. To ensure this efficacy, the successful rollout of booster jabs is crucial. This is certainly the Government’s line of attack, with Javid urging the public to get the booster jab in order to avoid Christmas restrictions. This suggests that there are still vital policy decisions to be made in order to establish how best to encourage the vaccine take-up and to combat vaccine hesitancy. Assuming a strong competency among policy planners, the Government may not even even have to consider implementing Plan B at all. Whether Plan B will be implemented or not remains to be seen – if there is anything the last 18 months have taught us, it is that you can’t predict the future. However, should the extra measures be implemented, what would the effects be? Would the positives outweigh the negatives? The science is clear, extra measures will reduce Covid cases, hospitalisations and deaths. This is in itself a good thing; fewer cases mean not only less suffering, but also less pressure on the NHS and less possibility that the virus could mutate and become immune to current vaccines. Despite this, extra measures always have spillover consequences. Firstly, economically, a Cabinet Office document suggests that Plan B would cost the UK up to £18 billion if in place until the end of March 2022. This would be a massive hit to an already recovering economy and is extremely politically unfavourable for a Conservative government entering a vital stage of its tenure. Rishi Sunak’s new budget aims to regain control of public spending once again and the way in which the Conservative government manages the economy post-pandemic is incredibly important for their attempted re-election. Secondly, mandatory covid passports for certain venues would exclude a considerable portion of the population, especially those of younger ages who have chosen not to (or who have not been able to) get vaccinated. This could potentially have negative impacts on the group’s mental health as many members remain socially locked down. Plan B might mean the reintroduction of bubbles in schools which have caused so much disruption to education in the past. Such an arrangement, however, would be slightly different this time around with whole classes not being sent home like last year. Regardless of how it would be implemented, it will undoubtably lead to further educational disturbances. In conclusion, Plan B could be the next, and entirely necessary, step in the fight to control Covid-19. Then again, it could not. The key consideration is whether current measures can keep numbers low enough that Boris Johnson and his team need not even consider Plan B. What we do know is that Covid-19’s immense impact on a variety of policy areas in the UK will continue for the foreseeable future.

Halfway through the Slovenian presidency of the European Council, EU Member States met with their counterparts from the Western Balkans in Brdo pri Kranju for the gift that keeps on giving: talks of EU enlargement. While the list of Members has not been extended in almost a decade, the discussion over the accession of the former Yugoslav countries into the Union remains one of the most pressing issues for the Commission. It’s importance is recognised by Brussels, as it has heavily invested in the region with a series of programs aimed at stabilizing the emerging democracies, laying the groundwork for their eventual accession. Despite this, the prominent figures of the Union have been more restrained in recent years in the use of the words ‘accession’ and ‘enlargement’, begging the question of whether enlargement is grinding to a halt, and if so, why? Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and North Macedonia were all granted candidate status almost a decade ago, with Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina still awaiting approval from the EU Council. Both have adopted and enforced the ‘Stabilization and Association Agreement’ (SAA), but only the latter has received an Avis from the Commission, an in-depth analysis of the country laying out its pre-negotiation priorities. The efforts of consolidating regional stability through a series of accords - between Albania and Serbia with Kosovo - were accompanied by a complete overhaul of the extant enlargement framework - the ‘Stabilization and Association Process’ (SAP), in use since 1999 - after the negative experience of the 2007 accessions. The key component of the framework is the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), through which more than 24 billion euros have been funneled into the region. In spite of a continued show of commitment to the alignment of former Yugoslavia to the EU ethos of ‘reform and prosper’, one cannot help but notice the absence of the same enthusiasm at the Slovenian summit – the word ‘enlargement’ appears only once in the summit’s final declaration. The high spirits of Western Balkan leaders were painted on a background of low expectations and frustration, especially on the part of the North Macedonian and Albanian delegations, following Bulgaria’s continued opposition to the latter’s accession. The incrementalist nature of the enlargement process can be traced back to the Commission’s decision to restructure the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. The continued expansion of the EU’s legal body has posed increased political and bureaucratic difficulties for EU institutions, and the ugly memories of post-2007 enlargement prompted negotiators to begin talks by focusing on Justice and Home Affairs which have previously been the most difficult issues in early integration. Hungary and Poland’s recent debacle with Brussels over the rule of law is sure to preclude any move to more benign accession requirements. In addition, the incentives for Member States are also diminishing. Continued regional instability alongside the shift of the Union’s strategic focus to the Middle East, North Africa, the ‘buffer states’ between the EU and Russia and the cyber rivalry with China have limited the geopolitical benefits of enlargement. These are all symptoms of a general ‘EU fatigue’, clearly expressed in the agenda of the Commission under Jean-Claude Juncker, which failed to mention any enlargement plans. However, this fatigue has spilled over into the Western Balkans itself, where the prevailing attitude is ‘a mix of resigned and fatalistic Euro-realism and growing Euroscepticism’. This issue is especially acute in Serbia, where sympathy towards the EU scores the lowest among its population, not least because of the enduring trauma of the NATO bombing campaign of 1999. While support has slowly risen - from 36% in 2014 to 54% in 2021 - contentious issues such as the recognition of Kosovo and its linkage to EU accession still stand in the way of broad support. Serbia also lies at the root of many of the problems facing EU enlargement. While already undergoing negotiations, the country has made little progress towards full membership. Most importantly, Serbian officials have adopted policies and appropriated a rhetoric of a ‘Serb world’, startlingly similar to the discourse that brought the Yugoslav republic to its knees. Tensions with Kosovo have spiked yet again in September after the Serbian government deployed armored vehicles, jets and helicopters at the border, allegedly in support of Serbian protesters, angered by the introduction of new border regulations. The conflict continued well into October, when protesters once again clashed with the police. East of Serbia, where the Dayton Accords have been crucial in stifling ethnic tensions for the past quarter of a century, social cohesion is under threat as the president of Republika Srpska, one of the two entities making up Bosnia & Herzegovina and containing an overwhelmingly Serb majority, has recently announced its intention of withdrawing the state from national institutions such as the tax authority, medicines agency and the armed forces. Meanwhile in Montenegro, ethnic divisions have arisen once again with the election of the new metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. The common denominator in all of these conflicts is the Serbian government, whose influence has been more or less covert, but sanctioned by the populist appeal to a Greater Serbia, incorporated in the discourse of the governing Progressive Party. While there is presently no immediate risk of military conflict, the situation has greatly destabilized the region, undermining the prospect of progress towards fulfilling the accession criteria. What is especially concerning is the fact that the problem is not contained within a single candidate member, but is affecting every nation, including those closest to EU membership. Presented here is a unique opportunity for the EU to shift from a reactive role to a proactive stance by shaping the future of its community. While the Union and its Allies have always been one step behind in everything Balkan this does not mean that they are confined to passivity. On the contrary, twenty years of heavy investment and support from both the EU and NATO have undoubtedly restructured the dynamics in the Western Balkans, opening up the region for the West to mould former Yugoslavia in its own image. While it is still disputed as to whether the EU has successfully integrated Central and Eastern Europe into its community, the alternative of leaving the Balkans in the ‘waiting room’ opens up a host of issues for regression, disintegration and eurosceptic efforts to degrade broader EU borders and stability.

The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill was first announced in March 2021, and yet has already reached the Committee stage of the House of Lords, having been rushed through the Commons at near record speed. The government’s Home Secretary, Priti Patel, felt motivated to pursue the Bill following the protests which took place throughout the summer’s lockdown, with specific focus on Black Lives Matter and Extinction Rebellion. The Bill is truly an all-encompassing leviathan, ranging from police powers, sexual offence law, protesting rights and reckless driving, to property eviction, chosen gender on a criminal record, child exploitation, prisoner resettlement and pet theft. Beyond being a prehistoric approach to legislating on issues such as crime, the haste with which it has been pushed through the commons is of great concern. This article will focus on Chapter Three: ‘Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices’, which expands police powers into the remit of searching electronic devices, having untold implications in numerous contexts. This chapter comes as the first real attempt to legislate some form of cyber rights into a statutory framework, following an ambiguous surge of arguments against online ‘anonymity’. This included the pitiful attempt of using the murder of Sir David Amess to push for this cyber agenda, despite it being a totally unrelated matter. The Chapter highlights that ‘an authorised person’ may collect data from a specified device to ‘prevent, detect, investigate or prosecute crime’. On 27th October, Lord Paddick highlighted that the amendments extended the powers of who an ‘authorised person’ can be in specific contexts. If a device is used by an individual with lacking mental capacity, amendments suggest that a social worker can authorise for a device to be accessed for information. The definition even stretches to ‘any responsible person who is aged 18 or over’. Sections 36 to 42 highlight powers that have already been in place. Privacy International has already made the case that ‘police are using highly intrusive technology to extract and store data from individual’s phones, on a questionable legal basis’. The concern over this particular chapter is that it is in fact regressive to the functioning of law and order upon application. Dame Vera Baird, the Victims Commissioner, has repeatedly reiterated the notion that rape and sexual assault survivors are not necessarily comfortable with handing over their devices, especially for information to potentially be used against them at trial. This impasse, namely the refusal to hand over private data to the authorities, has meant that 42.8% of victims ended up withdrawing claims as a result of ‘evidential difficulties’, while 21% of cases had concerns about digital downloads and access to medical records. While it is both progressive and critical that the Lords have agreed to implement a new provision making it illegal for the police to place ‘undue pressure’ on a victim, they are yet to address the fact that it doesn't do anything to help victims feel reassured that the content on their phone will be safe from from scrutiny or legal persecution The Code of Practice for the Bill is useful for providing further explanation about interpretation for future readers, as it highlights expectations around necessity, proportionality and reasonable belief. Lord Rosser titled the data extraction as ‘digital strip searches’, requesting that the bill only searches through information that is relevant to ‘a reasonable line of enquiry’. He goes on to say ‘surely being under any pressure in the context that we are talking about [rape survival] is undue’. The opposition (Labour) raised this point within the Commons at almost every debate, though it was actively ignored alongside many other criticisms. In the Lords, while Labour asked for limits against unjustified police demands for person information held by third parties (i.e. medical and social services records), and against ‘extreme and indiscriminate data collection’ (something originally protected against when the U.K. was in the EU [Privacy International, C-623/17]), the conservative Lords instead asserted that alleged victims would be ‘fully informed of the reasons that the information has been sought and how the information will be used’. This, again, fails to address the fundamental privacy concern about searches being indiscriminate. An amendment of particular importance to protesting rights was brought forward by Lord Moylan, entitled ‘Retention by the police of personal data relating to non-criminal conduct perceived to be motivated by hostility’. This provision is especially confusing, because it refers to non-crime hate incidents, enabling data to be collected and saved on personal records, despite the individual not having committed a crime. Baroness Chakrabarti raised a point about whether the ‘so-called soft information or police intelligence that never matures into a charge should sit unregulated, off the statute book, as a matter of police discretion and administration’. This amendment muddies the waters of legal certainty, placing a permanent mark of suspected future criminality on someone's personal record, which can often follow them for years. Across the debates there was much mockery of ‘woke’ culture, but a failure to genuinely address the importance of having a right to protest and raise valid concerns around social justice. If we are to associate Lord Moylan’s provision with increased powers for the police and the home secretary, as appointed in chapter three (part four), it appears as though even if protestors within a public assembly don’t commit a crime, their presence can be recorded as a form of ‘non-crime hate’, on the mere matter of expressed hostility. The terminology appointed is intentionally ambiguous, and leaves much to the imagination as to what could potentially come of it. Fundamentally, the PCSC bill will fundamentally stifle public assembly and protest, but it is the state that will either expand or restrict the statutory grounds for crime and punishment in relation to this, and other elements of public order and surveillance. If the Bill succeeds, the courts will also interpret the legislation and provide judgements they deem to be ethically sound whilst also satisfying the original legislator. Ultimately, the Bill is a detrimental piece of drafting, impacting basic human dignity and widening powers of the state in excess of standards seen before in the Western world. The Conservative government has long aspired to abolish the Human Rights Act 1998, but once this Bill passes, they will have stomped our national legal ethos deep beneath the soil.

Living through the Covid-19 outbreak we are all acutely aware of the fears associated with it. However, this pandemic catalysed a different fear for many teenage girls in rural India. According to Unicef, 650 million females are married before their 18th birthday around the world and more than 40% are from South Asian countries. Just five states, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, out of India’s 28, are home to over half of all child brides in India. The legal minimum age for marriage is 18 for females and 21 for males in India. However, accounting for a third of the global total, there are approximately 1.5 million child marriages in the country each year. Whatever the law may state, it does not reflect the reality. Praised for its close knit and supporting culture, marriage is a fundamental tenet in Indian families and is one to be admired. However, it is the same sense of solidarity and accountability for each member of the family that can lead to child marriage. Held as a common belief in India, it is considered a parental duty to find their daughter a suitor in adequate time, taking into consideration her fertile lifespan. This consideration does not, however, bring into account the socioeconomic dilemmas saturating Indian villages, which, to the demise of many young girls, accelerates their propulsion into the marital sphere. For example, poor sanitation and preventable diseases account for approximately 2.4 million deaths every year, meaning that even parents often succumb to diseases such as tuberculosis. This generates a chain reaction of financial insecurities and incessant poverty for family members left behind. So, in a twisted attempt to save their children from being orphaned, parents hurry to marry their offspring in a way that fulfils their ‘duty’ as a parent. What is less understood is that in an attempt to save their daughter from financial perils they are subjecting her to a lifetime of profound personal struggles and severely diminished human rights. According to UNICEF, girls married before the age of 15 are more likely to die of complications during pregnancy and childbirth, as well as 50% more likely to have experienced physical or sexual violence from an intimate partner - suggesting that this safe haven isn’t safe after all. This problem has been exacerbated by concerns over public safety. With the return of young men back to the small towns during lockdown, parents have been left feeling concerned about the vulnerability of their daughter’s physical safety. Police officials shuffle through roughly 30,000 rape cases a year - not including those that go unreported. In these anxiety ridden situations, child marriages are viewed by parents as an opportunity to gift their children access to greater physical wellbeing. Marrying a teenager to a man potentially twice her age does not seem immoral if it protects her from the violence of other men in the community, despite the possibility that she is still likely to experience domestic abuse within her marriage. It is important to reflect on the harrowing choice that some families in India are faced with; the potential abuse of one man over the abuse of many men. Citizens in first world countries perceive these instances of underage marriages unutterable and unscrupulous, but what our privileged upbringings deny us is the capability to process that this alternative appears much better than a lifetime of abuse, starvation and economic doom. Indian parents do not agree to manifest their daughters as child brides because they want to, but because they feel they have no other option. The complications of underage marriage are preferable to the barbarism of social injustice that is otherwise written in the stars for poverty-stricken women. On the back of this, the Covid-19 pandemic has prompted a surge in the number of illegal child marriages. Being home to the second highest number of cases, India’s early but destructive lockdown resulted in a catastrophic effect on the economy and the livelihood of its citizens, leaving almost 100 million unemployed. With the virus penetrating the already malnourished Indian slums, many families have lost stable incomes, pushing them further into a blackhole of poverty. Schools, which have played a crucial role in keeping girls safe, were forced to shut, swelling the parental burden. For example, the mid day meal scheme permitted students from lower income backgrounds to receive one meal a day at school. However, during lockdown this forced already struggling families to scramble to provide their children with an additional meal. Due to the fact that cultural norms assign lower value to women, Indian nationals perceive no other alternative than to marry their daughter off, regardless of being beneath the legal age. This is done in an endeavour to receive a dowry which would alleviate additional financial stresses’. In this way, child marriages, an expression of gender inequality, thrived during the pandemic by further devaluing and dehumanising young girls as a commodified and transferable good, capable of generating economic returns. This is reinforced by the fact that weddings are viewed as elaborate and expensive affairs, celebrating the couple's religion and culture. With Covid restrictions limiting the size of weddings, parents who received marriage proposals were keen to accept and conduct them undercover. According to the assistant commissioner for Women and Child Welfare in the state of Maharashtra, "It was easier, cheaper and they could get away with inviting very few people." Wedding a younger girl is considered financially efficient as her wrists are smaller, her ankles are smaller and her body is tinier, meaning it costs less to buy jewellery and marital gowns - an essential for Indian brides. Child marriages are presented in media as a social norm, deeply ingrained into a society constructed on institutional discrimination and gender inequality, highlighting the minimal worth granted to females. However, the future is lined with hope. According to the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 every district should have a child protection officer to enforce the legal marriage age for men and women. This is positively compounded by the Rajasthani government recently appointing greater police officials in the 33 districts within its state to keep in check child marriages. Potentially, the synergy and continued collaboration between the government and social agencies will lead to more impactful shift to overcome child marriage; an institution which currently stand as a hurdle to the rights of women. One of the most significant developments has been from UNICEF who have begun their gradual shift from small level interventions to large scale district models. These projects, working on teenage empowerment, build on existing government programmes and send a message across the country: Child marriages end childhood.

For Mali, the last decade has been a turbulent one. In 2012, members of the Tuareg ethnic group in the north of the country began a war for the independence of a region known as Azawad; this quickly ballooned into a multi-factional civil war between the government, Tuareg rebels, and Islamist groups aligned with Al Qaeda and Daesh. Further complicating the situation is the French military mission, codenamed Operation Barkhane, that has conducted counterinsurgency operations on behalf of the government since 2013. While that operation is slated to end next year, French troops will remain in the region through the EU’s international task force, Takuba. One more actor, the Wagner Group, may yet enter the fray, threatening Malian stability, Tuareg human rights, and even French aspirations. Though the Tuareg rebels and government signed a peace agreement in 2015, largely ending hostilities between the two parties, the Islamist insurgency has endured, even spreading into the broader Sahel region. Worsening matters, the country underwent two separate coups - one in 2020 and another this year. The nationwide conflict shows little sign of abating, and Bamako’s international partners are increasingly uncomfortable conducting joint operations with the Junta, leaving hopes of stability even lower. The debacle has already begun. After the most recent coup, France briefly suspended military cooperation with the Malian military. While the cooperation was resumed just a month later, Paris had sent its message, and the Junta had been threatened. Bamako (Mali's capital) it seems, has found a solution: soliciting the services of the Wagner Group. Describing the Wagner Group is like ripping a page out of a James Bond script; a Russian para-military organisation, established by a neo-Nazi veteran of the Syrian civil war, controlled by Dmitry Prigozhin, an oligarch affectionally referred to as “Putin’s chef”. While they are officially both private and independent, they maintain a close relationship with the Russian state, with their operators receiving both top-of-the-line-equipment and military honours from the government. While its most publicised operations have been in Ukraine and Syria, Wagner involving itself in Mali would hardly be unprecedented. Recent years have seen its operators deployed in Libya, Mozambique, and the Central African Republic, among others. Underlying these deployments is a clear pattern: Wagner operators are brought in to help a leader (or aspiring leader, in the case of Libya) maintain power and resist threats posed by insurgent groups. In return, they secure preferential access to mines and other natural resources, which are then exploited by other companies owned by Prigozhin. The Russian government secures a more subtle benefit by bringing another country out of the Western sphere of influence and into its own. All the while, Wagner itself conducts its trade with little regard for civilian life or humanitarian law; in the Central African Republic, for instance, UN experts have accused Wagner of “mass summary executions, arbitrary detentions, and torture during interrogations.” This is, disturbingly, a key selling point. Unlike France, neither Prigozhin nor the Russian state will hold the Malian military to humanitarian standards or lodge complaints about atrocities perpetrated. The Junta, for its part, is understandably tight-lipped about the potential deal. "These are rumours. Officials don't comment on rumours," said spokesman Baba Cisse when pushed on the subject. Yet it is unlikely that the deliberate ambiguity is motivated by an official commitment to facts; the implicit threat of including Russia in the Sahel security equation gives the junta some leverage over its Western partners, especially France. Paris now appears to find itself in a bind; either it maintains a military operation to prop up a dictatorship, seemingly in perpetuity, or it accepts Russia creeping into what it perceives as its own sphere of influence. Within Mali itself, public opinion on a deal with Wagner is divided. Many are disgruntled with Operation Barkhane, and French presence more generally, and welcome Russia as a “more neutral” security partner. The sentiment is understandable - France has been accused of perpetuating the conflict for its own economic and political ends, while Russia is perceived as being disinterested enough to avoid manoeuvring for personal gain. Despite this, the Coordination of the Movements of the Azawad (CMA), a coalition of primarily Tuareg rebel groups that made peace with the government in 2015, is deeply opposed to the deal. Citing the atrocities committed by the Wagner Group in other countries, the CMA warned that any government deal with “mercenaries” would threaten the 2015 peace agreement. Were the Azawad conflict to reignite as a result, we might expect the Junta, aided by its new Russian allies, to treat the Tuaregs with even greater brutality than the previous government did. While the current security arrangement in Mali is deeply flawed, the presence of the Wagner Group would be far from helpful. At best, counterinsurgency operations will intensify in their ruthlessness, and the Junta will entrench itself deeper under the protection of foreign fighters; at worst, a new Tuareg rebellion could ignite, further dividing the country and perpetuating the civil war

Not the Uighurs, the Rohingyas. Another one of Asia’s forgotten ethnoreligious groups, living perilously under state persecution. The Rohingya Muslims inhabit Myanmar and number somewhere between 1.5 to 2 million members. Just 600,000 Rohingyas still inhabit Myanmar, with over a million now living as refugees across Bangladesh, India and beyond. The human rights crisis that has been raging on for over 5 years, and perhaps much longer, lies within a few central issues. The first of these is the ethnoreligious identity that has come to isolate them wherever they go. Ethnoreligious categorisation is a key aspect of the Southeast Asian (SEA) socio-political makeup, with the Malaysian constitution even specifying that a Malay person must profess the Muslim faith. This spawns our second issue; that the perpetuation of ethnoreligious violence is exacerbated by fractured governance. Looking through the lens of government response to, and treatment of, minority ethnoreligious groups, this article seeks to analyse the impact on the communities’ human rights over the past 5 years. The first part of this article will, therefore, examine the actions of the Myanmar government, analysing where the current refugee crisis has arisen from, and where it has left the Rohingyas. Under the 1982 Myanmar Nationality Law, the community has been denied citizenship, while their socio-economic reality has been compared, by Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu, to apartheid. Myanmar is almost 90% Buddhist, but further than this, the Muslim minority group is also ethnically separate from the majority of the population. This has materialised in curbs on freedom of movement, access to healthcare, education and civil service jobs and beyond. The most recent, and perhaps most catastrophic, event came in 2017 following a military coup. Ethno-religious differences, exacerbated by British and Japanese colonialism, have meant the Burmese and Rohingya ‘nations’ of Myanmar have developed as separate entities. Political digression and the establishment of the Military Junta has lit the spark, turning discrimination and persecution into outright crisis. The Rohingyas were quickly identified by the Junta, and its popular mass of support, as enemies of the Myanmar state. In the chaos of transitional power and authoritarian government persecution rapidly developed into suspected genocide, with clear efforts to ethnically cleanse Myanmar of the Rohingyas. The installation of such a popular backed, yet Military dominated, governments has had grave impacts on the deterioration of the rights of the Rohingyas. The state has been linked to the direct death of over 25,000 Rohingyas, and the displacement of more than 700,000 people. Reports have since emerged detailing the scorching of villages to the ground accompanied by rape and massacre. Following this, more than three-quarters of a million Rohingyas fled for their lives westward, where their plight has only continued. Bangladesh is now home to over 1.3 million Rohingyas, 626,500 of which live inside just one camp named the Kutupalong-Balukhali Expansion Site. The government of Bangladesh has expressed the need to shelter and provide for the refugees, but has as of yet stalled in providing a long term solution.The essentials of food, water and shelter are currently being met, but the situation rests upon a knife-edge, with manifold threats facing the community. Covid-19 has reared its head in the east-Bangladeshi camps, threatening much of the temperamental stability that the limited government response has provided for. The refugee camps are also not yet safe from ongoing violence and political struggle. Just a week ago, on 22nd October 2021, 7 were killed in an Islamic Seminary by a terrorist group believed to also be responsible for the death of the refugee communities’ leader Mohibullah. The death of one of the group’s fiercest advocates and greatest leaders at the hands of terrorists has created a ‘climate of fear’, with many critics drawing on the failure of Bangladeshi security forces to protect the already at-risk camps. The response from the Bangladeshi government was initially positive, but after almost 5 years of ongoing refugee crises, the South Asian country is looking for an end to the chaos. A World Bank grant of $350million has been arranged with Bangladesh to support shelter and aid projects for what is the world’s largest forced exodus. Regardless, it appears Bangladesh is unlikely to offer long-term help. The first program organised by Bangladesh was the development of vaccination and health centers in the camps, but this has been launched as a short-term measure. Long-term plans, which are of great importance to the survival of the Rohingya people, are less positive. The relocation of 20,000 refugees to the island of Bhasan Char, which has been described as ‘an island jail in the middle of the sea’ reflects the impatience and exasperation that refugees are now being met with in Bangladesh. While ethno-religious conflicts lie at the root of the wider issue, it is government failure that is currently depriving Rohingyas from their basic human rights. Finally, the Bangladeshi government has also sought to negotiate with Myanmar for the repatriation of the over 1 million people that now live in refugee camps. Such a move would place the Rohingya people once again in grave danger, under threat of ethnoreligious persecution, if not exposed to outright ethnic cleansing. The predicament for those who escaped as far as India has been even worse. North-eastern India is predominantly Hindu and following years of Modi-led Hindu-nationalist policy, the situation for Muslims has only declined. The Indian Supreme Court has, as a result, ruled that the Rohingya Muslims are a threat to national security, meaning those who have not been deported have faced violence and discrimination. The Rohingya community has been existentially threatened by the government action of three nations: most crucially its own, Myanmar. Calls for self-determination inside the Myanmar state of Rakhine have fallen upon deaf ears. The Military Junta in control still very much stresses the alienness of the Rohingyas, reflecting once again the ethnoreligious identitarian politics that shape the region. The Rohingya people are one of the largest refugee groups in the world and sit trapped between three governments that have failed to protect them.

On June 21 of this year, the UK Department of Education tweeted its support for the ‘One Britain, One Nation’ movement, proposing to make the day of June 25 one that celebrates the national values of “shared values of tolerance, kindness, pride, and respect”. This was met online with hostility, jubilation, controversy, and mockery. Some viewed it as a rightful reclaim of patriotism, while others saw a pathetic move to gain some political points among nationalists. In reality, this brief online debate acted as a microcosm, epitomising broader debates about educational policy and post-colonial consciousness, specifically in relation to Britain’s identity and how the government it seeking to shape it. How exactly its identity and history should be taught to future generations remains a contentious issue, wherein the consequences of mishandling such a task could result in the perpetuation of ignorance around race and colonialism. This issue has never been more pertinent than in recent years, with changing global views on race and racism and the resulting ‘culture wars’ which now characterise contemporary society. Education, being the tool that shapes the next generation, is a vital policy pillar in any country. Executed incorrectly, it can indoctrinate a generation, filling them with internal prejudices and biases that can linger for the remainder of their lives. While the UK has a robust and organised education system, it has come under criticism in recent years as the country, and indeed the world, has experienced a proliferation of the debate surrounding the European colonial era. The problematic legacy of the British Empire, in particular, has become a focal point of the conversation regarding the government’s educational policy, especially with regard to historiography. We must begin, therefore, with a look at the current national curriculum in place across Britain. Most secondary school children would be able to recite the names of all six wives of a king who died nearly 500 years ago, but know nothing about the Partition of India or the Mau Mau Uprising in Kenya. Both of these represent key events in both modern British and world history, and play a vital role in introducing students to the structure of modern day society. While the national curriculum does require “at least one study of a significant society or issue in world history”, this gives each school leeway to teach, or not teach, a more diverse curriculum . The lack of any specific reference to Britons of colour, or even an approach looking at the varied socio-economic development of Britain, is a sobering reality for historians. This had led to accusations that the government has purposefully excluded black British history, despite calls for a change in education policy going back more than two decades, most notably through the 1999 Macpherson Report in the aftermath of the brutal murder of Stephen Lawrence. The clear absence of black British history from the curriculum, and the exclusion of the harmful actions of the British Empire, reveal that the government’s education policy is fundamentally flawed, as it neglects several aspects of Britain’s history that are intrinsically valuable for understanding the fabric of modern society. This is a critical area of policy to falter in. There remains an ignorance to the true importance of education to society, whereby many societal problems could be eased, if not solved, through proper education. The current system, failing to educate on the role played by ethnic minorities in building the country, has neglected many. Most recently the windrush community, as essential workers that aided in rebuilding post-war Britain, were instead swept under the carpet, treated as illegal aliens and blamed for social issues. The effect on national consciousness and race relations has been wholly negative as a result of structural failings in the British curriculum that a). snub the contributions of non-white citizens and b). Ignore the harmful and sometimes devastating effects of the nation's colonial past around the world. The resulting effect has meant the creation of a national blindspot on important socio-historical issues. Change starts at home, and the only feasible way to fix society’s ignorance is to properly educate the younger generations. With an education policy stuck in a cage of selectivist patriotism, there will be no concrete change. In reaction to calls for a progressive education policy, the government has seemingly reaffirmed its belief in unflinching patriotism. This is not surprising as in recent years the Conservative Party has benefitted electorally among socially conservative voters for their traditionalist stance on the nation's history. This led to former Education Secretary Gavin Williamson stating in June of last year that “we should, as a nation, be proud of that history and teach our children about it”. This, however, presents a problem for the government’s argument. While boasting about the positive aspects of British history, they attempt to shield the public from the negative and more problematic. This poses the question: if you can’t be ashamed of your own history, then how can you be proud of it? One notion that is commonly used is that history remains firmly in the past, and since most Britons today don’t remember, let alone live through, the Empire they shouldn’t feel ashamed of its wrongdoing. Yet, paradoxically, while appealing to such a sentiment, the government simultaneously suggests the nation should be proud of similarly remote periods and events. The government must fully acknowledge Britain's past, opening up the deep scars that remain in society, if it wishes to champion its rosier moments. It is evident that the government’s educational policy surrounding its own history is ultimately flawed. The absence of key black British figures such as Walter Tull and Olaudah Equiano as well as a proper evaluation into the role of the British Empire beyond patriotism is worrying to the historian. The government clearly has an immense task ahead dealing with its colonial hangover, and it remains to be seen whether it will take on the task of changing national perception about race, or remain blissfully ignorant and allow systemic racism to reproduce itself through the education system. It is unclear whether it will confront its own history and make subsequent changes to education, or if this issue will continue for further generations.

Above expectation inflation, astronomical energy prices and shortages across the board have aroused a profound sense of uncertainty and unease in the UK. As we enter the winter, a post-pandemic economic squeak, rather than bang, has commentators harkening back to the Winter of Discontent. Upon scrutiny, the historical parallels aren't quite there, but the zeitgeist of the late 70s captures the general sense of the now evident economic malaise. The Winter of Discontent was a period during the winter of 1978/79 marked by a historically cold winter, widespread economic turmoil and political discontent under James Callaghan's Labour government. At the time, trade unions represented a powerful political force and wielded enormous power through their ability to strike. At the peak of the movement, 70,000 workers in London alone went on strike. But what immortalised the period was the site of piled up bodies in January 1979, following a gravedigger and crematorium worker strike. The morbid site seized headlines and captured the national imagination. Underpinning this economic crisis was the spectre of stagflation; which some economists and commentators are now claiming has resurfaced. Stagflation is defined as a period of persistent inflation and economic stagnation. A quick primer on these two concepts, the former refers to a rise in the general price level of goods and services in an economy whilst the latter is marked by little or no economic growth. At the heart of the issue is a paradox. Inflation can be a sign of economic growth and many central banks across advanced economies target inflation. But, during the stagflation crisis of the 1970s and our current moment, rising inflation can be identified in tandem with subdued levels of economic activity. The crucial distinction between the two periods lies in the source of inflationary pressure. Inflation ran amok during the 1970s due to strong trade unions and oil embargoes. The Thatcher government dealt with the former through structural overhaul in the labour market, and it is important to realise that the latter arose from a myriad of complex geo-political issues that ultimately proved temporary. As we explore the reasons for the current bout of inflation, the link being made between the winter of 1978/79 and the current stagflationary crisis become more clear. We must bear in mind that it may similarly be resulting from a mix of transiencial and structural problems. The first issue under scrutiny is supply-chains, and no longer are they merely a dry topic in week 8 of International Trade. Following Brexit, they have become a focal point of mainstream news. The poster child of globalisation, supply chains have ushered in an era of unparalleled convenience for consumers across the Global North. Yet, many international supply chains crumbled in the face COVID-19, as the post-lockdown surge of demand fell unequally. Unravelling this further, pent-up demand can be traced back to stringent public-health measures put in place which dampened consumer spending but also inordinately directed it towards consumer goods. This collided with COVID related disruptions to new staff training and the "Pingdemic" – where contract tracing notifications forced workers to self-isolate. These factors and their overall effect on inflation might have been minimised had the furlough scheme not been so successful in propping up consumer spending through income replacement. With constant drives to increase vaccinations domestically and a renewed effort to increase global vaccine equity, there is hope that global supply chains become stronger, but the end remains far from sight. Compounding pandemic-related supply-side issues is Brexit. Regrettably, the post Brexit labour shortages were not predicted by or factored into government planning or economic forecasting. Of course, it is worth noting that a shortage of lorry drivers and hauliers was an issue before Brexit. Though now, with even further reduced numbers and increased demand for their services, HGV drivers have been able to leverage their demand to secure higher wages. The hike in consumer prices caused by higher transportation costs has caused alarm for some, while others stress the importance for HGV drivers to be paid more in recognition of their essential role. Efforts are being made by the government to secure more drivers through offers of temporary visas, but numbers remain disappointingly low. As with the winter of 1978/79, structural changes to the labour market are required if current conditions are to be overcome. Topping it off, a perfect storm of issues is causing UK energy prices to soar. Gas prices have gone up 250% since January with 13 energy suppliers having gone bust within the last two months - 2.4 million households have been affected by this crisis. The causes are manifold; a colder than anticipated 2020 winter, supply disruptions in Russian oil and gas, fractured Anglo-French transport links, poor conditions for wind farms in the UK and rising demand in Asia for cleaner sources of energy byereing. Given the multiplicity of causes from around the globe, it is difficult to describe this as a transitory issue and may instead represent a major structural stall in the British energy sector. The energy crisis is therefore one of the diverging points from the Winter of Discontent, wherein the energy crisis was temporary. So, is it the same? There are certainly echoes of the past as wages and energy prices rise, albeit in specific sectors and in different ways. Fundamentally, the inflation of today is described as transitory. As vaccine distribution increases worldwide, building resilience to the virus in the human parts of the supply chain, and as backlogs are cleared at international ports, the economy can move closer back to equilibrium. It is important however, especially with regard to the energy crisis, that issues are properly evaluated in the context of being temporary or structural. The fear of inflation is expected to clear, and economic growth is expected to resume. But, when the finer details are scrutinised, such a development is far from certain. Instead, it seems the economic mood is ripe for a Winter of Discontent; plagued by stagflation.

Joe Biden’s climate agenda will be put to the test as a critical UN climate change conference draws near. The US is lagging behind in its responsibility to show it is serious about enacting climate legislation and integrating clean energy investment into the financial system, finally beginning the green overhaul. Over four years of US absence from global climate negotiations regarding the reduction of emissions have left a large void in the international community's initiative and credibility. The eventual direction that Biden’s ambitious climate promises will take is tied in a large reform bill stalled in Congress; trapped as Democratic moderates and progressives brawl over the best course of action. These disagreements come at a pivotal time in the climate emergency. This reform bill could be Biden’s last hope of achieving meaningful climate action as both the crisis and his position in congress worsen. The world is closely watching the United States on whether it will deliver on its promise of slashing emissions in half by 2030 as John Kerry prepares to meet global leaders at COP26 in November. If the US is to re-orientate their energy policy towards renewables and lead the world into the green era, they must be seen as actionable and worthy of regaining their credibility Dubbed “The Build Back Better Bill '' as the main thrust of a major expansion to public spending, the section on climate reform seeks to energise the transition from fossil fuels and slowing rates of global warming. The bill includes measures to incentivise use of electric cars, financial penalties for companies for not increasing renewable energy supplies and funding for forest management and wildfire protection. The political turmoil surrounding climate reform begs the question of where the US public stands. Even prior to recent destructive weather patterns, Americans have long insisted that the federal government hasn’t done enough, with polls implying public opinion has shifted in a progressive direction. On the whole, a majority of Americans are calling for green action. Monmouth University’s recent survey stated that 60 percent of adults saw climate change as a “very” or “extremely” important matter for the federal government to deal with. In addition, a study from the Pew Research Center concluded that 60 percent of American adults were concerned about the personal consequences of climate change. Biden has boldly promised that the US would reduce its carbon emissions to half of their 2005 levels by the end of this decade. However, little action has been taken to delay the disaster from worsening. If the United States wants to actively provide global leadership, the time is now to set new economic and environmental precedents, using its soft power to lead the international community onwards . The United States is currently the second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases and has been the main actor at global climate discussions. Additionally, its relationship with China, the largest country by emissions, means the responsibility to play a decisive role in setting the international response falls squarely on the US’s shoulders. As heated disagreements drag on in Congress, Gina McCarthy, a government climate adviser, is insistent that the Biden administration can meet decarbonisation targets even if Congress fails to legislate along their recommended lines. While Americans want the government to make a stand against climate change, a Congressional gridlock is, for now, stalling any progress. President Biden’s Democrats, who continue to work on passing an omnibus budget in Congress, are crucially at odds with each other over spending limits. Estimates from politicians have put the final figure in the range of $1.5 trillion to $3.5 trillion. Biden, meanwhile, has stated the expenditure is likely to be at approximately $2 trillion. Such a claim is disappointing for progressives, as their proposals will inevitably be watered down in the process. Having to compromise threatens not only the USA's chances of halting climate change, but makes them look weak and faulting among their international peers, severely diminishing their credibility as climate leader. Climate change has failed to garner a level of consensus that binds together progressives and centrists in the Democratic party. The progressives see the reconciliation bill to be the federal government’s only hope at confronting the swiftly deteriorating climate crisis. New York Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez articulated that climate emergency provisions aren’t a thing that Congress can simply “kick down the line”. Alternatively, Joe Manchin, a centrist US Senator of West Virginia, has obstructed a part of the new bill and has expressed his opposition towards the switch to clean energy. Since the bill already faces staunch opposition from Republicans, Democrats are pushing to legislate through a budgetary procedure known as reconciliation, using exclusively Democratic support. However, this crucially means that support is necessary from every Democratic senator. As it stands, Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema have refused to back it without major reductions to the bill’s budget. The longer this bill is held back, the more likely it is to be stripped down, or worse, collapse. As the world faces an increased irregularity in its weather patterns, the risk to economy, development and human life is growing sharply. The US has had its share of such extreme weather, and between wildfires, blizzards and heatwaves has begun to warm to the notion that climate change will have major impacts at home. The relevant question remains, however, will the US translate this new understanding into international action. The implications of US absenteeism from an international climate response would be immense. The unique role that the US plays in the international system is one of implicit both de-facto leadership, its influence in international organisations and through its trade and economic policy give it opportunities to enforce climate reform internationally in a way no other actor could. Leadership in climate reform also requires the resources to work with the most and least developed nations, and expertise to address the challenges that both types of economies present. In order for America to display global leadership, however, they must finalise their green response. It also must pursue its green foreign policy through harnessing the power of the IMF, World Bank and other multilateral institutions through propelling green private investment and when offering structural adjustment packages. The US can, and must, take on the responsibility to lead swift and radical changes that are not only reliable, but structured around long term reform. As it stands, US domestic politics is sabotaging reform policy at a national and international level. The US has contributed greatly to emissions and environmental degradation, and unless it acts responsible to slow these effects, it will discover the economic disaster climate change promises.

The Evergrande Group, China’s leading real estate developer, has found itself with debt totalling over $300 billion, while it has over 800 unfinished housing projects and unhappy shareholders. After missing its most recent deadline on September 29th of a $46 million interest payment the chances of the property giant meeting its next deadline on 18th October are slim. Such a default would not only throw the Asian financial market, but also the Chinese government into turmoil. To understand how Evergrande has spiralled so far into debt, we need to look back to 1996 when Xu Jiayin, once China’s richest man, founded Evergrande at a time of mass urbanisation in China, helping spark a boom in property prices. In the early 2000s, China began to privatise state-owned enterprises, allowing wealthy entrepreneurs to join the Communist Party of China. Consequently, Xu increased his proximity to power as he became a member of China’s ‘People’s Political Consultative Conference’ – an integral part of the Government that advises on foreign relations. With such a strong political-economic backing, it gave investors the assurance to loan tens of billions to Evergrande. Evergrande’s business model works by selling apartments before they are completed to ensure a continuous flow of cash. The company has since become increasingly reliant on loans from state banks, whilst the nexus between the Chinese government and Evergrande has meant that the state has become more dependent on the property giant’s ongoing success. As a result, Evergrande’s downfall, and the government’s response, will not only significantly impact China, but will demonstrate whether the Chinese government is moving away from solely prioritising economic advancement. As Evergrande accrued more and more debt, the Chinese government became increasingly concerned about their borrowing, as well as the trend it set within the market. Their borrowing rates were so high that the Chinese government feared it could jeopardise the sustainability of the entire retail estate market, a major part of the economy. Alongside this, the Government has since begun to feel that their investments could be channelled into more productive industries; Evergrande’s strategy of aggressively buying up land to drive up house prices has made property unaffordable for millions. As a result, the Chinese government decided it had to interfere, regardless of the potential consequences on the property sector. This interference came in the form of the ‘three red lines’ for home developers, introduced in August 2020. This laid out a strategy to limit property developers’ debt according to three standards- the ratio of net debt to equity, liabilities to assets and cash to short term borrowings. This means the more a firm owe, the less they can borrow. Unsurprisingly, this came as a significant blow for Evergrande. The world’s most indebted developer went on to breach all three of the ‘red lines’ and was subsequently banned by regulators from any further borrowing. To overcome this, Evergrande pre-sold more than 1.4 million unfinished apartments, requesting deposits of over a third of the property price. However, when this failed to generate enough income, they turned on their own employees, pressuring them to loan the company money under the guise of a ‘high-interest investment scheme’. Those who failed to participate risked losing their bonuses. Fast forward to September 2021, the company stopped paying back the employees who opted into the scheme, meaning they now face a barrage from disgruntled employees, shareholders, and homebuyers, all of which are demanding their money back. This panic has seen Evergrande’s stock value steadily fall from $4 per share 12 months ago to just $0.30. As well as this, it has now missed two vital interest payments in the last month, totalling $131 million- just a small fraction of its total debt. If Evergrande cannot pay its debt by the end of the 30-day grace period and instead defaults, it could have disastrous consequences that ripple through not only China but the rest of the globe. The major worry for the Chinese government is the potential ricochet effect on its economic growth - 41% of China’s domestic banking assets were associated with the property sector by the end of 2020 and Evergrande still owes money to 170 domestic and 121 international firms. This crisis is likely to stain the Chinese economy as a far less attractive investment opportunity. Meanwhile, the 1.4 million pre-sold apartments are unlikely to be completed, leaving home buyers and unpaid suppliers in the dust. Furthermore, many of these companies are themselves on the verge of bankruptcy, with nothing but Evergrande’s empty promises in their coffers. Outside of China, there have been several comparisons to the fall of Lehman Brothers and its contribution to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. It has, therefore, called into question whether the collapse of Evergrande could have a similar effect if the Chinese government chooses not to bail it out. As the global economy tries to recover from the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, further pressure has been directed at the Chinese government to act. Although most analysts suggest that the debt is not far reaching enough to trigger a collapse of the global economy, it may affect developing economies such as India, resulting from the fact that China is a major importer of Indian metals and chemical products. This leaves Beijing with a dilemma: does it simply let Evergrande collapse and try to minimalize the consequences, or does it intervene? If so, what kind of message does this convey? This is a question upon which economic and political analysts seem to be divided. Economists suggest that the government will be forced to act, unwilling to let the property industry (accounting for 25% of its GDP) go bust. On the other hand, most political experts feel that the Government’s priorities are no longer simply growth oriented. The financial losses that have come from the government’s crackdowns on private tutoring and major technologies companies suggest that they care more for working towards the goal of “common prosperity” than for continuing rapid economic growth. If the same shift in attitude is applied to Evergrande it is unlikely the government will involve itself, thereby setting an example and showing itself to be hardline on reigning in debt. We are, however, unlikely to see any final decisions until later this year, when the rest of Evergrande’s repayment deadlines expire.

On September 7, El Salvador became the first country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender. From now on, citizens can buy groceries or pay for public utilities using the cryptocurrency. A new digital wallet called “Chivo” has been introduced by the government to facilitate such transactions. While Bitcoin enthusiasts are heralding the start of a new era, many ordinary Salvadorans are less optimistic. The latest currency reform is the brainchild of president Nayib Bukele. An extravagant figure, Bukele has recently called himself “the coolest dictator in the world”. The ambitious plan was announced by the president himself at a pro-crypto conference in Florida. Mr. Bukele assured the audience of tech-savvy entrepreneurs that adopting Bitcoin “will generate jobs and help provide financial inclusion to thousands outside the formal economy”. His claims may have some merit. At the moment, more than two thirds of Salvadorans do not have a bank account. The new Chivo Wallet can function as a convenient, app-based alternative and may thus increase citizens’ access to financial services. Indeed, the platform has already managed to attract more registered users than any private bank in El Salvador. The country also has a large diaspora population, most of which is concentrated in the US. Chivo is likely to make life easier for these expatriates by lowering the transaction costs of remittances which account for more than 20 per cent of El Salvador’s GDP. Nevertheless, the biggest benefit of this reform may well lie in its unprecedented magnitude. This is the first time that blockchain technology has been used on a nation-wide scale. Bitcoin currently receives large institutional support, which means that El Salvador has the potential of becoming a regionally-significant sandbox for financial innovation. The unique regulatory environment is likely to attract the attention of fintech companies, blockchain startups and digital nomads. In fact, the government has already confirmed that Bitcoin investors will be exempt from the capital gains tax. The adoption of Bitcoin may thus place El Salvador at the forefront of the emerging ‘crypto economy’ and attract foreign investment which is currently badly needed to alleviate the economy’s structural challenges. When examining the rationale for the recent reform it is also important to keep in mind that up until early September the sole circulating currency in El Salvador was the US dollar. The country underwent a process of dollarization back in 2001 in an attempt to tame inflation. However, the adoption of the dollar has also meant that El Salvador had to surrender much of its monetary sovereignty. Bitcoin, on the other hand, can be described as a decentralized financial system that functions independently from any central authority. Its adoption may well give Salvadoran policy-makers increased monetary maneuverability by lessening the influence of the US Federal Reserve that is currently pursuing a strategy of unprecedented monetary expansion. President Bukele’s recent spat with the Biden administration only reinforces the suspicion that the adoption of Bitcoin is part of a broader strategy to increase financial autonomy from the US. Such a challenge to American monetary dominance has not gone unnoticed, however. The IMF, which is currently in negotiations with El Salvador over a $1bn loan deal, has denounced the move, while the international credit rating agency Moody’s has recently downgraded the country’s rating. El Salvador already suffers from a huge fiscal deficit, and the latest developments will only place additional strain on its public finances. The negatives, however, are far more than just international disapproval. The decentralized nature of Bitcoin means it is inherently entwined with major volatility. Both rapid and huge swings in the cryptocurrency’s value are common occurrences and leave investors, and users, highly vulnerable. Even on the day of Bitcoin’s adoption in El Salvador, the cryptocurrency’s value decreased by more than 10 per cent. Such volatility can erode citizens’ savings and make both business and international trade logistics increasingly difficult. The implementation of far-reaching financial innovation also requires significant institutional resilience and strong public support. Unfortunately, the latter is also lacking; almost 70 per cent of citizens disapprove of the recent changes. The day of Bitcoin’s adoption was marked by unprecedented anti-Bukele protests, although the president remains just as determined to implement his vision. Another issue is the lack of technological readiness; less than a third of Salvadorians have access to the internet and the Chivo Wallet itself has been plagued by irregularities and glitches. These factors are likely to inhibit the success of Bitcoin’s adoption across El Salvador, and can pose significant security risks, including the possibility that users might be locked out of their digital wallets due to forgotten passwords. A much greater hazard, however, exists in the fact that the country suffers from a high level of gang violence and hosts an extensive drug trafficking network. The anonymity provided by Bitcoin’s blockchain technology is likely to be exploited by organized crime groups, severely complicating the fight against corruption in El Salvador and the wider Central American region. Many developing countries are in fact closely following El Salvador’s experiment. If President Bukele’s strategy pays off by successfully attracting foreign capital and improving financial inclusivity, it could have sweeping effects on financial legislation across the global south. Unfortunately, the internal turmoil and international criticism that Bitcoin has brought upon El Salvador is less than reassuring. Thus, while the benefits of Bitcoin still belong to the realm of potentialities, the negatives of the reform have been very real and immediate.

AUKUS, the latest awkward acronym to grace the headlines, has seen no shortage of analysis. Announced on September 15th, the security pact between the US, UK, and Australia is, in principle, a broad commitment for the three nations to “significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.” Those capabilities are myriad, but one in particular has attracted significant attention: Canberra’s commitment to purchase nuclear-powered (not nuclear armed) submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). In announcing this commitment, the Australian government simultaneously ended a multi-billion-dollar program to purchase conventional, diesel-electric powered submarines from France. The sudden cancellation has raised much furor in Paris, with president Emmanuel Macron going so far as to recall the French ambassadors from Australia and the USA. Much has been said about the pact’s implications for Franco-American relations, Chinese defense planning, and even Iran’s nuclear ambitions (we’ll get back to that last one). But one question has been oddly absent from much of the discourse: why does the RAN actually want nuclear submarines? And is their acquisition a good idea? To understand the ruckus over AUKUS, we have to begin over a decade ago. In a 2009 white paper, the Australian Department of Defence posited that a force of twelve submarines would be necessary “to defend [Australia’s] approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia, if necessary), protect and support other [Australian Defence Force] assets, and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial.” That white paper, and the mission profiles it outlined, formed the basis of a 2015 procurement competition - which, notably, did not evaluate any nuclear-powered submarines. Indeed, the submarine that eventually won the competition was a variant of the French Barracuda-class submarine, modified to replace the nuclear reactor with conventional propulsion. The reasoning seemed obvious: Australia lacked a domestic nuclear industry, meaning its submarines would have to be built and maintained by a foreign nuclear power. This ran contrary to one of the secondary objectives of the submarine program; to revitalize the Australian shipbuilding industry. And yet, at some point in the past half-decade, Australia warmed up to the idea of operating nuclear submarines. There are, of course, clear benefits to them: nuclear submarines can sustain much higher speeds than their conventional counterparts, don’t have to operate near the surface to recharge their batteries (“snorting”), and the only limit to their operational range is the need to restock food for the crew. The operational implications are significant - a conventional submarine deploying from Perth would only be able to remain “on station” (ready to engage in combat) in the South China Sea for 11 days; a nuclear-powered submarine, by contrast, could remain on station for 77. This added capability allows the submarines to defend Australia from much further away, giving the RAN much greater operational flexibility to deter, disrupt, and destroy adversaries before they come within range of Australia itself. Nevertheless, all of the factors that pushed Australia away from nuclear propulsion in 2015 still exist in 2021. Under the terms of the AUKUS deal, the US will transfer information on naval reactors to Australia, but Australia still lacks the actual capability to construct or maintain those reactors. As such, it is very likely that the new submarines will not, in fact, be assembled in Australia, but instead in the United States - where they will also be forced to travel for emergency maintenance. As former Prime Minister of Australia, Malcolm Turnbull, put it: “if you can’t maintain your own ships, you are not in full control of them.” This greatly reduces Australia’s military independence and increases their reliance on American military platforms, putting greater pressure on Canberra to subordinate itself to Washington’s Pacific strategy. Worse still, while the entire fleet of French- built conventional submarines were expected to be in service by 2035, the new nuclear submarines are projected to only begin hitting the water by the end of the 2030s, forcing Australia to enact a costly life-extension program to keep its aging Collins-class submarines in service. Moreover, the implications of Australia’s purchase of nuclear submarines extend far beyond the Pacific. Australia is designated as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) under the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This obliges it to accept safeguards (and International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of those safeguards) to prevent nuclear materials from being diverted from civil purposes towards nuclear weapons. Therein lies the crunch: naval reactors manufactured by the US and UK are fueled by Highly Enriched Uranium, which is essential for producing nuclear fission weapons. Under normal circumstances, any HEU stored in a NNWS is subject to safeguards and inspections. However, there exists a legal loophole: any state is allowed to withdraw nuclear material, including HEU, from safeguards, so long as it is used for a “non-proscribed military activity” - that is to say, anything that isn’t a nuclear bomb. While this means Australia possessing nuclear submarines wouldn’t breach the NPT directly, it would break convention. Currently, only countries recognized as Nuclear Weapons States by the NPT operate nuclear submarines. Some analysts fear that ending this convention could embolden some states, namely Iran, to secretly produce nuclear weapons with HEU ostensibly withdrawn to support naval reactor projects. In summary, Australia’s decision to switch from procuring conventional to nuclear submarines was potentially a huge mistake. First, while nuclear submarines will provide Australia with improved operational independence and more effective defense-in-depth, they will undermine its strategic independence, as Australia will become reliant on foreign partners to operate its submarines. Secondly, the switch to nuclear will economically hurt Australia by denying it the revitalization of a domestic shipbuilding industry, as well as forcing it to spend money on a life-extension program for its current submarine fleet. Finally, by becoming the first NNWS to operate nuclear submarines, Australia will break a key international norm. This opens up the route for other NNWS such as Iran to follow suit, contributing towards worsening nuclear proliferation and de-grading global security.