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“The right to free speech is more important than the content of the speech” — Voltaire From all the present foundations of modern society, its most fundamental hallmark is the presence of free speech, and the subsequent right to wield it. From toppling oppressive regimes to starting or ending wars—the power of speech is unparalleled. But speech is more than simply a power to be tapped into. It represents the deep intricacies of a society—its values, its ideals and its principles, and its problems—its prejudice, its discrimination and its systemic inequalities. Other freedoms have limitations, for example, the freedom of assembly and associations can be suspended in times of crisis. Does that mean freedom of speech can have limitations on its use? If so, what limitations? Who decides or enforces them? First, I look at what speech can be harmful. The term “hate speech,” while lacking a universally accepted definition, generally refers to any offensive discourse which targets an individual or a group of individuals based on inherent characteristics such as race, religion, sex, gender, etc. Why is hate speech so specially defined? When hate speech is targeted toward a certain group/individual, there occur very tangible and observable effects on the group/individual. While this could occur to any hate speech recipient, these effects are most often only seen among marginalized groups. (TW) A most recent example is that of Andrew Tate, a professional kickboxer turned internet celebrity, who was recently banned from several social media platforms for violating their community guidelines. Tate has historically made overtly sexist and problematic remarks such as: Victim-blaming: saying #MeToo victims to “bear some responsibility” Promoting violence against women Claiming women have “no innate responsibility or honour” Claiming 40% of his reason to move to Romania was to do with more relaxed sexual assault laws In addition to above mentioned instances, Tate also has had a history of promoting hegemonic and toxic masculinity ideas and violence. Supporters of Andrew Tate often claim that his words are “humour”, or at the very least, are just words, and are hence protected by the freedom of speech offered around the world. In making these arguments, it is important to take note of the very real harm caused by problematic speech as highlighted above. Sexist humour can “directly harm women by eliciting depression, eating disorders, disruption of focused attention, appearance anxiety, and body shame.” It can also incite discrimination from others—in the Tate example, several reports of teachers noticing misogynistic behaviour from middle or high school students with direct references to Tate’s content have been made. This is not mere “offense”—women exposed to sexually objectifying media showed negative self-focus to an extent which disrupted attention and reduced performance on other cognitive tasks—which can be a differentiating factor between getting a certain job, degree or any other goal. An important item to note with the aforementioned research is the effect this has on men. Men that were exposed to media that was sexist or sexually objectifying toward men showed no such differences—thus establishing a relationship between the harm from discriminatory language and the distribution of privilege and power in society. Women are affected by such media not because they are in any way weaker than men (as some misogynistic arguments might make it seem), but because of historically prevalent and systemically abundant sexism against them in societies all over the world, which has not existed nearly as extensively against men. The point here is that speech is a force like any other. In the same way as striking someone causes harm and is therefore punishable, hate speech can cause measurable and observable harm to its recipients, and therefore should be punished. An important point to note lies in the situation that men in the above experiment were unaffected when exposed to sexist media—even though the idea for speech regulation lies on underlying harm, women should not be allowed to make sexist remarks against men either, in the same way, that assaulting someone who doesn’t feel hurt still counts as assault. But who should regulate this speech? A clear choice would be governments. A major problem, however, is the power and authority held by governments across the world. Take recent anti-monarchy protests in the UK, that led to arrests of dissenters. Governments have been taking a greater role in suppressing dissent, and if tasked with regulating free speech (as they currently do), the freedom to protest and express political dissent vanishes in an instant. Another choice, as occurred in the case of Andrew Tate, was mediums of information sharing, such as social media companies. Companies like TikTok, Meta and Google banned Tate not for any government laws he may or may not have broken, but for violating their community guidelines—something every user agrees to abide by. A potential problem in this regard would be in their reliance on private companies for advertising revenue, and from governments directly. These organizations have already been accused of being politically biased and swaying to appease private contributors. Further, even though he was banned, Tate amassed a massive following. His content has been viewed over 11 billion times on TikTok alone, and he was searched more times than Donald Trump. Would this incentivise other creators to create and spread such content? There exist problems with the current regulation of free speech and punishments of their violations—suppression, banning, criminal prosecution, etc.—but the most sustainable solution would be a collaborative one, including both the aforementioned stakeholders, along with the specific groups that were potentially harmed by the piece of speech. Finally, it is important to make note of the fact that restricting free speech is a temporary first step in promoting inclusivity and creating social equality. While speech must be restricted now, a permanent solution requires education, awareness and empathy.

Turkey faces an economic meltdown as a result of Erdogan’s dismal macro-economic competency. The annual inflation rate has soared to a 20-year high of 54.4% following a crash in value of the Lira last year and has been compounded by rising commodity prices. These issues are anticipated to only worsen in the face of Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine. Turkey’s inflation crisis is a direct consequence of Erdogan’s efforts to centralise power, and therefore this article will explore how Erdogan has brought the country to the brink of economic crisis as part of his own political project to dominate Turkish politics. Formerly an economic power on the fringe of Europe, Turkey is now enmeshed between the hyperinflation trends visible in Latin America and the cronyism of the Middle East. The central cause of this collapse has been Erdogan’s attempt to transform a modern globalised economy into an emirate-style state by imposing his personalised presidential authority on state institutions. In 2014, Turkey stood as the world’s 16th largest economy, possessing a GDP of approximately $1 trillion in 2013, with investment, entrepreneurship and growth booming. Since this peak of success, the government has faltered into economic-illiberalism and political regress, leading to the destruction of a positive investment environment and an economy that was quickly falling into pieces. According to the IMF in October 2021, Turkey’s economy now stands as the worlds 21st largest, with the nation being estimated to have lost approximately 25% of its GDP since 2013, in large part due to the shortfall in investor confidence. Turkey’s economic crisis has been produced by Erdogan, and hence the countries policy approach has been labelled as ‘Erdoganomics’. Turkey’s president believes in outlandish economic policies that suggest lowering inflation is possible through the central bank lowering the country’s interest rates. ‘Erdoganomics’ has resulted in unpredictable and fickle economic management combined with double-digit inflation, market volatility and currency depreciation. The doctrine of ‘Erdoganomics’ remains politically and economically untenable, however, with little to no positives. One of the many signs of the resulting internal turmoil was Turkish citizens' frantic rush to convert their savings into dollars. Flight from Turkish assets has not only happened in the realm of currency, however, leaving Turkey’s economic prospects bleak. Turkey’s economic meltdown is not a product of malicious economic policies from outside nations or conspiracies to bring about Erdogan’s downfall, which is the narrative that has been forced on the Turkish people by the government. Turkey has a severe governance problem. The crisis originates from 2017, when Erdogan attempted to dispose of the nation’s parliamentary democracy and gained a narrow victory in a referendum to form an unrivalled head of state. The move to a quasi-totalitarian presidential structure, with no genuine checks and balances has concentrated large power in Erdogan’s hands. This is harmful as Erdogan holds an ad hoc strategy towards governance and peculiar theories on the economy, which have had demonstrable impacts on living standards. Furthermore, Turkey has become a revolving-door democracy, where Erdogan controls who is appointed in the branches of government, the media and the central bank. Following the election of Erdogan in 2018, under the system mandated in the referendum, Erdogan has displayed a pattern of hiring those who share his unorthodox views. Initially, he made his son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, finance minister before shortly firing him. In March 2021, Erdogan sacked his third central bank governor in under two years, later replacing him with a loyalist newspaper columnist, who had no prior experience in finance. Erdoganomics have therefore been proven to be economically unsound, prioritising loyalty over competence and experience when it comes to officials, while its policies are out of touch with traditional macroeconomic indicators. In December 2021 Turkish citizens witnessed their currency lose 60 percent of its value against the US dollar after Erdogan pressured the central bank to lower interest rates for four consecutive months. Prices in supermarkets change daily, urban poverty is more publicly visible and queues for subsidised bread are growing constantly in Istanbul. This is numerically visible too, with food prices climbing by 64.5% last week, and the cost of transportation jumping by 75.8%. Turkey’s economy is heavily reliant on imports to produce goods, and the rise of the lira against the dollar directly affects the rise of consumer prices, particularly food and clothing. Foreign currency debt is also especially problematic for Turkey’s private sector as companies are able to profit from holding stock of products rather than actually selling them because of the volatile nature of the lira. This exacerbates levels of income and wealth inequality that are already prevalent Erdogan has survived attempts to stop his personal political project, yet Turkey has far from benefited from it. Recovery from a deep and prolonged economic crisis requires ulcmore than domestic direction. A sophisticated, globalised economy cannot be run if it is underpinned by conspiracy theories. For effective economic management to take place, expertise is required. Turkey’s system of centralised presidential ruling implemented by Erdogan has thrown competent economists into the shadows, and replaced them with bureaucrats who are yes-men for Erdogan’s path into economic destruction. The Turkish economy cannot wait until the 2023 elections – the nation desperately needs a return to conventional economic management and leadership.

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine are at their highest since 2014 with as many as 190,000 Russian troops currently deployed at the border, intensifying fears that a full-scale invasion of Ukraine could be imminent. NATO members – particularly the US and UK – have openly come out in support of Ukraine, indicating that they will not hesitate to impose severe sanctions on Russia if they choose to escalate the situation further. Should an invasion begin, the economic consequences will be grand, with NATO members being forced to make tough decisions on sanctions that could potentially also be detrimental to themselves. The real risk for the global economy is that, for the sanctions to be as severe as NATO has suggested, they would have major implications outside of the Russian economy and state. Although the sanctions are mostly so far indeterminate, the most severe penalties are likely to come in two forms. The first would be via a boycott of Russian natural gas, with an indefinite postponement of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that would have one day supplied gas to Europe. The second would be through the removal of Russia from the SWIFT messaging network that is used by over 11,000 banks across the world. For the Russian economy, these sanctions could be significant. Oil and gas comprise over 60% of the country’s exports and 30% of its gross domestic product (GDP), and preventing the use of its pipeline would make this project obsolete, leaving Russia with nothing to show for its major investment gamble. UK Defence secretary Ben Wallace described this move as “one of the few chips that can make a difference”. The consequences of the pipelines postponement would not be confined to Russia, as this comes at a time when Europe is already experiencing an acute energy crisis. The EU relies on Russia for 40% of its natural gas imports, something that was likely to increase if Nord Stream 2 went ahead. As well as this, Russia is currently the second-largest exporter of oil to the US. Boycotting Russian energy would therefore mean NATO – and especially Europe – may struggle to meet energy demands that would have been fulfilled by the pipeline. Russia may also impose countersanctions that reduce gas flows to Europe through the original Nord Stream pipeline. Both consequences could result in an energy shortage; higher gas prices could be here to stay. The second option is the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT system and is often referred to as the ‘nuclear option’, and would have by far the biggest economic consequence for the Russian economy, at least in the short term. The SWIFT system allows money to be wired across countries and is a cornerstone in the international payment system. Should Russia be cut off from this platform, it would be cut off from the global economy. This would have devastating short-term impacts until they were able to find a viable alternative. Although painful, the impact of this may not be quite as significant as the West envisions. Amid threats of being cut off from SWIFT in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea, Russia began developing its own financial messaging system that, according to the Security Council of Russia, will prevent ‘a catastrophe’ should the sanction be imposed. However, the true use of this service will be unknown unless the sanction is imposed. Exiling Russia from the SWIFT system would certainly have consequences for the West too. Europe and the US are amongst Russia’s biggest trading partners (1st and 5th respectively), so there is no doubt that European and US trade with Russia would suffer significantly until Russia found a suitable alternative. Furthermore, it reflects poorly on Europe to make the Belgian-based SWIFT a politicised, and indeed weaponised, institution rather than a financial tool. This may encourage other countries in tension with the West, such as China, to also explore new financial mechanisms. This leads us to question whether many European countries would be readily willing to impose a sanction with such unintended and rolling consequences. Alongside the aforementioned sanctions, the UK and US have also suggested levying sanctions on banks and individuals associated with the Kremlin in the form of either asset freezing or travel bans. Although possible, there is wide speculation that there would be significant bureaucratic opposition from the UK Treasury and the business department which have blocked similar attempts in the past. If this was imposed it would of course make life difficult for said individuals, but it is unfortunately the ordinary Russians who will suffer most. Their already lowered standard of living is expected to fall, while the growth rate (that shrunk from 2.3% to 0.3% in the years following the annexation of Crimea) is also predicted to decline further. Although significant attention is given to the impacts of an invasion and its subsequent sanctions on Russia and the West, the consequences for Ukraine must also be highlighted. The economy has been in limbo since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – tourist visits are half of what they used to be in years preceding 2014 and foreign investment has still not recovered either. No matter the scale of conflict, any significant military action by Russia is likely to further damage these sectors or delay their recovery process, putting Ukraine in a much more uncomfortable position than Russia or any Western country. Since the beginning of the year, the value of the Ukrainian Hryvnia has declined 4% against the dollar, making it one of the worst performing currencies in the world, and investors have already begun to freeze funding and suspend expansion plans until they better understand how this crisis will play out. As Ukraine alone does not hold the power to effectively combat a Russian invasion or impose any sanctions, retaliation is very much out of their hands. Despite the huge economic consequences that an invasion of Ukraine would have, the question remains: will the sanctions be enough to deter Russia from escalating the situation and invading? For now, it seems far from certain that they will be. Most experts suggest that Russia is willing to take extreme risks in order to reach its political goals and, with it unclear what sanctions the US and Europe would be comfortable imposing (given the impacts on themselves), it does not appear that the suggested sanctions would materialise as enough to deter an invasion. However, as the US and Europe solidify their response to the invasion and as sanctions become clearer, the situation is subject to significant change.

This article was written by contributor Harry Ward The dementia crisis is one close to my heart. As an Alzheimer’s Research UK (ARUK) Community Speaker with familial experience of Alzheimer’s, I can vouch for the charity’s fantastic work and the disease’s destructive effects. However, my personal story is just one of many. Around 900,000 people have dementia in the UK today, while 1 in 3 children born today will develop the disease. Given such high rates, the UK can now be said to be facing a dementia crisis. There is no ‘cure’ for this disease, yet it generates care costs upwards of £34.7bn a year, with that number expected to rise to over £94bn by 2040. Moreover, the disease is mounting ever increasing pressures on the NHS’s resources and a faltering social care system. The crisis, however, has been greatly exacerbated by Covid-19, whereby a quarter of people dying from covid also had dementia. Due to social restrictions fewer people have had access to their GP, meaning later diagnosis and longer waits for support. Furthermore, a third of dementia researchers have said that they could leave the profession as a result of the pandemic. While charities like ARUK and Alzheimer’s Society do superb work to help to solve the dementia crisis in the U, it will take government policy action to bring about conclusive positive change. This article considers two key policy areas: dementia research and adult social care. It explores past and current UK policy direction, before assessing what improvements must be made and recommends certain policies. Firstly, let’s consider dementia research. The UK prides itself on leading the way in this policy area. Then Prime Minister David Cameron published his ‘Challenge on Dementia’ in 2015, setting out government policy aims to be achieved by 2020. One such commitment was to spend £300m on dementia research over the 5 year period. This commitment was in-fact surpassed. Building on this success, the Conservative 2019 General Election manifesto included a promise to double dementia research funding over the next decade. This would result in an extra £800m for dementia research over the next 10 years. However, this promise has not been kept. There has been no further commitment or strategy for how the money will be invested. In fact, between 2018-19 and 2019-20, dementia research funding has fallen. So, where to go from here? Primarily, the manifesto promise needs to be upheld. Dementia is a crisis which can be solved, at least in part, by further research funding as we search for a cure to a disease that costs so many lives and so much money in the UK each year. Charities like ARUK and Alzheimer’s Society campaign relentlessly on this issue, and while charities can influence policymakers, their demands are currently falling on deaf ears. How do we fund this increase, especially given the cost of the pandemic? Any tax increase, on top of the current NI increase for health and social care, would be extremely unpopular currently due to the rising cost of living. Could reallocation of funding work? Labour have argued that they would ring fence 3% of GDP each year for science and research. A more proportioned policy response could be that suggested by Alzheimer’s Society, who urge the government to introduce a policy of spending 1% of the annual cost of dementia on research each year. This kind of policy would give dementia the attention it deserves. The cost is rising rapidly, as should the funding. Secondly, social care. Caring for those who already have dementia in a more sustainable and cost-effective, yet still high quality, way is key to reducing the burden on the NHS and helping those with the disease. In the past, the UK has failed to tackle the issue of an adult social care system. The current infrastructure is struggling under the weight of increasing demand. In 2019, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Dementia stressed the need for social care reform that recognises and reflects the needs of those with dementia as current support is inadequate and inaccessible. Plans for reform did come last year with the adult social care reform white paper. The planned reforms are extremely complex but are explained well by think tanks like the King’s Fund. How can social care policy be improved to help those currently living with dementia? One option is to increase social care funding by introducing a ‘Dementia Fund’ to fund community care. Such a Fund would make efficient use of NHS resources and would contribute to the Department of Health and Social Care and the NHS’s joint long-term vision of integrated health and social care moving forward. Another option would be to alter the 2021 social care reforms. The reforms set a care cost cap at £86,000 meaning no one would have to pay more than that out of their own pocket to fund their care. However, this cap is too high. The poorest might still struggle to pay £86,000 and could have to sell their home to fund such care costs. This defeats the main objective of the reforms. A final option would be to pay more attention to the paid and unpaid social care workforce. At the moment, paid social care vacancies are extremely high in England. Despite the money promised to solve the problem in the 2021 adult social care reforms, some suggest that this won’t be enough. The Government has recently relaxed immigration rules to try and fill the social care void. However, this is a very short term fix. Better policy choices would include establishing a professional body for social care workers in England to make sector more attractive via higher professionalism and management prospects. Furthermore, unpaid carers don’t get the recognition or support they deserve. This country needs a National Carer’s Strategy to ensure unpaid carers are supported. This could come from looking to other countries for policy ideas – for example, Austria offer rest bite holiday care programmes for carers while their loved ones are looked after by the state for a short period of time. Overall, there is no quick or easy fix to the UK dementia crisis. Solving the problem will take a variety of policy measures and increased funding to ensure that those who are currently living with, and those that will develop, dementia are supported adequately and sustainably. Dementia might never get the attention of diseases like cancer, however, with an ageing population, the numbers are only going to grow, along with the social and economic consequences of a frail health and social care system.

From the 1st of January Emmanuel Macron and his cabinet have embarked on an ambitious course for the European Council. They begin their tenure of the rotating presidency at a moment that could not have been more strenuous for Europe as a whole, and for the French electorate more specifically. As the continent grapples with an ongoing energy crisis, compounded by rising military tensions at its Eastern border and continued pressure on European healthcare systems, the French are once again faced with the imprévu. The biggest problem for their EU presidency, however, will come with the highly anticipated announcement of Macron’s candidature for another term at the Élysée. Leading up to the presidential elections in April, he and his team will have to balance the expectations of his electorate, deflect attacks from his domestic opponents and appease conflicts between the various EU member-states. The policy issue that will give Macron the hardest time in managing these three dimensions is the current flurry surrounding the EU’s climate policy, especially with regards to the Commission’s Fit for 55 package, and the debate around green taxonomy, both of which will be analysed in turn. The Fit for 55 package does not include new laws per se, but revisions to existing laws which were proposed in July and December last year, and have since been met with serious criticism, especially with regard to the EU Emissions Trading System (EUETS). While some green parties and grassroots activists denounce its lack of ambition, several Eastern European member-states dread the scope of the package, as the current energy crisis sits at the top of their domestic agendas, alongside concerns for those vulnerable to the social and financial costs of a green transition. The EU ETS is a market-driven mechanism that limits the absolute amount of greenhouse gasses that can be emitted by the entities covered in the scheme, requiring them to buy 'emission allowances' from national governments to cover their extra greenhouse gas output. The scheme currently spans several sectors from power and heat generation to energy intensive industrial sectors and aviation. The main point of contention lies with the proposed expansion to cover maritime and road transport as well as buildings, all in an attempt to cover the Commission’s new ambitious target of a 55% reduction in emissions by 2030. Unsurprisingly, the affected industries have reacted vehemently. A coalition of European aviation giants (including Lufthansa, Air France and KLM) decried the implementation of a kerosene tax and the lack of specificity regarding the environmental protection surcharge that would weaken their position vis-à-vis non-European partners, while the World Shipping Council opposed the latest draft by the European Parliament in which vessel operators are deemed ‘responsible entities’ and thus the main targets of EU ETS costs. Challenges to the French presidency, however, extend beyond industrial strongholds. Within the EU, opposition comes from the East, especially from Poland, where the Constitutional Tribunal has been used to legitimize the country’s opposition to the package. In the case of Poland, the fundamental issue relates to the country’s lack of energy market liberalization and the deliberate exclusion from the narrative of the leverage of national governments in spending the surplus of income from the ETS in softening any adverse effects on their citizens. Nonetheless, Poland has gained (partial) support from a series of EU members, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal and Spain, which is bound to cause heated conflict in the Council with ETS defenders like Germany. The Élysée itself is more reluctant to comply with the Commission’s plans to expand the EU ETS, fearing domestic backlash from small businesses and the broader population, the memory of the 2018 gilets jaunes protests deeply ingrained in the government’s energy policy. The current debacle over the Union’s taxonomy for sustainable activities has only complicated matters for the French presidency. The labeling system is aimed at incentivising investment into environmentally sustainable activities and preventing greenwashing. Earlier this year, the Commission considered expanding the green label to cover nuclear power and fossil gas, and has now decided to continue with the proposal, in spite of the backlash, and include them in the list of ‘transitional’ resources. The proposal will have to pass the European Parliament, where the odds seem stacked against it: a simple majority would be enough to table the proposal, and with many EP groups voicing their discontent - including the Socialists, and Democrats, the Greens, and the Left - a real challenge has arisen for the Commission, as well as for the French presidency. The stakes are high for Macron, for the French have a deep interest in seeing a green label on nuclear power plants. Not only does the industry account for the third largest share of the workforce, but also for 70% of French energy consumption, and has a fundamental role in the stability of the European energy market. While Macron’s 2017 presidential platform included a reduction of reliance on nuclear power to 50% by 2035, he has been equally vocal about his continued support for the industry and his plans to renew the fleet of 56 nuclear reactors via investments in small-scale modular reactors. Furthermore, his domestic opponents have also emphasized the centrality of nuclear power in their energy policies, including his two biggest contenders: Pécresse and Le Pen. While the European People’s Party has been somewhat split over the issue of taxonomy, the Renew Europe group (often the kingmakers of the EP) are bound to vote in support of the proposal, as Macron’s LREM is the biggest member party of the group. In either case, the electoral pressure might undermine Macron’s standing in the EU forum: even if he does succeed in molding the EU ETS and in revising EU taxonomy to cover nuclear energy, he risks doing so by twisting many arms in the Council, unless his position is delivered as available one for the future of the EU in its entirety. While the rotating presidency has always had unquestionable effects on the domestic standing of the incumbents, going against the tide in order to advance domestic agendas sets a dangerous precedent for future presidencies and undermines the legitimacy of the Council - and of the EU as a whole. This will only stoke the growing dissatisfaction with European policy-making, ceding political points to the eurosceptics. As suspicions over the instrumentalisation of the presidency grow, it will take genuine leadership to bring about lasting consensus in the Council and to appease any resulting frustration in the French domestic sphere.

This article has been written by contributor Sharanya Chakraborty The Covid 19 pandemic led to a halt in global migration flows by the end of July 2020. This has stranded nearly 3 million migrants miles away from their families. The restrictions that this pandemic has imposed upon them have been challenging for the migrants to survive. The migrants found little with which to survive. They walked on and on to return to their homes as no transport was organized by the government. This has been a pressing scenario throughout the world and has been continually reported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This migrant worker crisis has also strained the capacities of some countries to meet their own needs and left them in perilous limbo. Half of the stranded migrants have been stuck in the Middle East, with over 1 million of them stuck in Asia. At the beginning of March 2020, many workers born in the Persian Gulf, workers of foreign construction, and domestic services lost their jobs due to the pandemic and other related disruptions. Nearly 5 million workers from the former Soviet States, have languished often jobless in Russia. Their eyes are filled with a ray of hope to return to their countries of origin on government-chartered flights. The unemployed workers in Thailand returned to the nearby South Asian countries and the Afghan refugees of over 20,000 were forced back to Iran. This created major chaos at the border. Thousands of Venezuelan migrant workers made their way back to their own country on foot as opportunities dried up elsewhere. Many workers on their return to Venezuela faced a pushback from the government that termed them "biological weapons". Thousands of migrant workers all around the globe were in transit because of closed borders in the early days of the pandemic outbreak. Many were completely trapped in transit nations. Over 2000 Haitians were trapped in the Panamanian Jungle as their paths were blocked. Across Guatemala there were numerous migrant caravans that were ignored and disregarded as they traveled towards Mexico and the United States. Despite the lack of aid, thousands of people were halted in October due to virus concerns. In north Africa and the middle east the situation was more dire, with many migrants being expelled from Algeria, Yemen, and Libya. There were many instances of legitimate concerns that migrants would be carriers of new coronavirus strains. They raised the ethical quandaries about the responsibility of any country for the people to return to their areas with high Covid 19 pandemic prevalence. Many countries were not willing to accept the returning migrants, especially host countries like the United Arab Emirates. To further increase the complexities of this, in several instances some migrants refused offers of free return travel because they thought that it would undermine the costly and tiresome journeys which they had already invested in. Moving to a case study of India, millions of migrant workers have fled to urban cities and towns from rural areas in search of better opportunities. The sudden lockdown enforced by the Indian government was followed by a Janata curfew on March 22, 2020. The situation this created was chaotic for these vulnerable workers. All transport facilities were suspended, while shops and industrial units were closed alongside factories and workplaces. The majority of migrant workers were subjected to loss of income, food shortages, and a critically uncertain future. Suicides have, as a result, been well documented. As everything was very uncertain (no food, job, or notion of when this lockdown would end) many of the workers had to return to their villages. The crisis then only intensified. Due to their massive migration to rural areas, this created a health security challenge almost everywhere with an exceptional logistic nightmare. The only option left with them was to walk. These journeys were both hazardous and arduous, in this heat, they had to walk more than 1000 miles by foot without any food for continuous days. Fatalities were well documented in the bitter conditions and chaotic travel situations. Many migrant workers were arrested by the police and law enforcement officials as they were violating the lockdown. This plight was well documented on social media, with pictures of migrant workers in their vulnerability and extreme material deprivation. These illustrations raise the question on the ability for the state governments to organize arrangements and facilities for migrant workers. Stranded without food, without water, without any wages or shelter since the pandemic hit, the migrant workers crisis in India is just that, a crisis. In India state governments have tried to help migrant workers so that they could return to their homes safely. Efforts were made to arrange buses to take people back to their villages, but road travel has been similarly perilous. It is well known that car crashes are more likely to kill a person than getting infected by the coronavirus in India. The main concern is as the workers are returning from the cities to their villages, there is a greater risk of spreading coronavirus to their rural village from the urban cities as many will have traveled with it. Every day, thousands of people that are returning to the rural areas do not have the proper facility or infrastructure to put them in institutional quarantine. The rural areas do not have any Covid 19 facilities and thus prevention of the spread of coronavirus seems very difficult. Due to chronic funding in rural healthcare, the current rural infrastructure has been entirely inadequate, something that has been highlighted by the pandemic. Beyond the case of India, what has ultimately kept all the migrant workers united is rapid, unexpected, and unprecedented disruption.

Russian militarisation around Ukraine has provoked antagonism with the United States, signalling a return of the tense debacle between the two superpowers. Crucial bilateral talks held on January 10th highlighted the irreconcilable standpoints of Russia and the US over the future of NATO and the issue of military deployments across Eastern Europe. This impasse has heightened tensions, particularly in the wake of suspicions that Russia intends to invade Ukraine. Ukraine has been excluded from these negotiations, however, entrenching it in a position of acute insecurity. The ongoing security crisis was triggered when the Kremlin issued a string of demands that entailed - if the United States and its allies were to agree - the re-establishment of Russia’s historic sphere of influence and a return to Soviet-era border boundaries. It also seeks to halt all instances of Western military action and deployment in those previously Warsaw Pact but now NATO nations. Russia has also demanded the withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from Europe, which it deemed to have a threatening presence. The forms and exact locations of these weapons have, however, been static for decades, begging the question of why now? These demands have have been reinforced through the amassment of military forces around Ukraine’s eastern border and repeated threats to utilize unnamed forms of military means to safeguard what it deems its rightful security interests. The Biden administration has so far only responded with threats to impose financial and technological sanctions on the Kremlin if it chooses to act upon its threats, specifically in reference to Ukraine. The United States has so far not seen evidence credible enough to prove the claims on the shifting nuclear weapons or a potential asymmetric attack. Sergei A. Ryabkov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, who was present on behalf of the Russian delegation at the negotiations, strongly insisted that it was essential that Ukraine “never, never, ever” became a member of NATO. This stance conflicted with that of Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, who reasserted the US wouldn't adhere to such a demand and offered this assurance: “we will not allow anyone to slam closed NATO’s open door policy.” This heavily suggests that the US would defend Ukraine’s right to join NATO and has no tolerance for Russia’s desire to forcefully alter international borders. Yet, despite the frenzied meetings, the situation is far from settled. In spite of Russia mobilizing 100,000 troops (according to White House estimates) that now surround Ukraine on three fronts, Ryabkov continues to state that Russia possesses no intent to invade Ukraine. Moreover, he has warned that if the West fails to agree to Russia’s demands to decrease the presence of NATO in Eastern Europe, it would face a host of indeterminate ramifications that would jeopardize the “security of the whole European continent.” Ryabkov has employed ambiguous language, being both carefully appeasing and indirectly aggressive, resulting in American officials becoming deeply wary of a potential invasion. Little progress has been made through bilateral talks to deescalate the security crisis from brewing in Eastern Europe. As NATO and the Biden administration prepare for worst-case scenarios about how the next few months may evolve, they are increasingly concerned about President Putin’s steps which may be more extensive than mobilizing troops over Ukraine’s border. Putin seeks to expand Russia’s sphere of influence to Eastern Europe and acquire written assurances that NATO will not expand again. If Putin is prevented from achieving this ambition, his advisers have implied during the negotiation process, he would unilaterally prioritize the security interests of Russia, having profound implications on the United States and Europe. Furthermore, there were hints during the diplomatic grueling that nuclear weapons may be held in close proximity to the US, slashing alert times in the case of a nuclear strike. The ramifications of such a reality has close parallels with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. This could cause immense disruption, or simply be the bullying and rhetoric of a Kremlin campaign of fear and pressure. It could also be an attempt by Putin to reiterate that, despite the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’, Russia obtains the capability to cause geopolitical change. Putin’s discourse is plagued with the language of warnings and threats directed at the West, stating that if they threatened or opposed Russia’s diplomatic goals they will face unpredictable consequences through Russia’s response. This refers to the asymmetric warfare that Russia may pursue if its diplomatic rivals threaten what they see to be their vital security activities. The antagonism between the United States and Russia has been previously and historically resolved through talks and the two nations have never been at war over issues regarding borders and territory. This raises the question, are these negotiations merely “talks”? Ukraine has the threat of an invasion at its doorstep, a very real security dilemma. American, European and Russian diplomats quarrel, whilst Ukraine’s future is at stake. Diplomacy is critical to conflict solution, but it is gullible to suppose that Russia will negotiate in the best interests of Ukraine, or to assume that Russia wishes to obtain a purely diplomatic solution. Most recently, the US has accused Moscow of placing saboteurs in Eastern Ukraine to justify an invasion of Ukraine. This was the case in 2014, when Russia sent military forces in plain clothing into the Donbas region, raising questions over whether the patterns of 2014 will reoccur. Russia’s military is well positioned to seize eastern Ukraine, a particularly likely threat if Ukraine joins NATO and the West doesn’t fulfill the Kremlin's demands. Russia is at an impasse with the West, clearly uninterested in partaking in meaningful diplomacy as the United States prepares to back an insurgency against Russia. An absence of American concessions has meant a failure to defend Ukrainian individuality and freedom, and a collapse in talks for Russia as they assert their sentiments on NATO. The key question is whether the West can diffuse Russian tensions and halt their ability to invade Ukraine through appeasement and negotiation, or whether war will return to eastern Europe in the Ukraine.

This article was written by contributor Lily Meckel The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 is one of the most significant pieces of legislation in civil rights history and established equal voting rights, thereby banning racial discrimination in the voting process in the United States. In the last few years this act has come under attack. A 2013 Supreme Court ruling struck down sections of the legislation, making it harder to vote in some parts of the country. The John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act is a piece of legislation being put forward that is meant to restore some of the key aspects of the Voting Rights Act. Yet, up until this day, it still has not passed through Congress, allowing for manifold discriminatory policies to be implemented that range from strict voter ID laws to reducing polling places, which disproportionality affect people of colour, thereby suppressing the vote. This article will look into how voting rights have been violated and become a politically contentious issue in one of the oldest democracies in the world, and consequently what is at stake. The original Voting Rights Act, in its full form, emerged from the civil rights movement, which called for equal voting rights for everyone. Even though the 15th amendment, which was passed after the civil war, extended the right to vote to Black Americans, discriminatory processes in southern states, known as the Jim Crow laws, were used to prevent them from voting. These practices included poll taxes, grandfather clauses and literacy tests, which Black Americans often failed due to high illiteracy as a result of centuries of oppression under slavery. The civil rights movement called for an end to racial discrimination and segregation. President Lyndon B. Johnson was finally spurred to sign the Voting Rights Act into law in 1965 as a result of the actions of this movement, one of the most prominent being the Selma to Montgomery March. This was one of the many protests that arose during the civil rights movement, and saw nonviolent protesters march peacefully and be violently attacked by white state troopers on what is known as ‘Bloody Sunday’, an event garnering national attention and sympathies. The Voting Rights Act banned the use of discriminatory practices that had long been used in the South and required states with a history of voter discrimination laws to make their voting rules subject to federal preclearance. In other words, new voting rules needed approval from the federal government before implementation. The passing of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 has greatly increased voter turnout among Black Americans ever since. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, 2012 saw turnout among Black Americans equal or even surpass white voter turnout in some Southern states, a radical leap forward from pre-1965 elections This progress came to a halt with the 2013 Supreme Court case Shelby County v. Holder, in which the court ruled sections of the act unconstitutional or no longer viable. Section 4b, which sets out which jurisdictions are subject to Section 5’s federal pre-clearance requirement, was deemed unconstitutional, meaning these jurisdictions, mostly located in Southern states, do not have their voting rules federally approved. This court ruling has led to many Republican states implementing restrictive voting laws, citing fraud prevention, despite there being precious few cases of fraudulent voting, if any at all. The Brennan Center for Justice states that 19 states, at a minimum, implemented restrictive voting measures in 2021 and that one-third of such measures implemented in the last decade were enforced in 2021 alone. Some of these practices have included stricter ID laws requiring photo IDs to be shown when voting, which many Americans do not have access to. Additionally, in some states, the time frame to ask for as well as submit mail ballots has been greatly reduced, as have the number of mailboxes to submit ballots, requiring people to drive hours to reach a mailbox. A reduction of polling stations, voting timeframes, and other such restrictions have been passed in Republican-led states. These restrictive measures directly impacted the 2020 elections, where many relied on mailing in their ballots. In some states, such as Georgia, it is even prohibited to serve food and drink to voters waiting in line to cast their ballots, which often includes hours of standing at times under extreme weather conditions, showing the extent to which votes are being suppressed in the US. One of the few ways in which this ruling can be altered, and voting rights can be protected, is if Congress implements an amendment to the VRA, which would change the coverage formula that was previously deemed unconstitutional. This has been attempted on numerous occasions since 2013 but repeatedly failed to pass through Congress, largely as a result of polarised partisanship. While the Democrats are pushing for updates to the VRA, Republicans are fiercely blocking them. The most recent attempt to restore the VRA to its full extent was the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, named after the late US representative and civil rights pioneer John Lewis. This act includes a new formula of coverage and was passed in the House of Representatives in August of 2021. Despite this, it failed to pass in the Senate in November 2021 after a 50 to 49 vote failed to reach the 60 votes necessary to break the filibuster. Voting rights in the United States are under attack, and Congress's failure to act is leading to more and more states adopting restrictive voting measures that are racially discriminatory and suppressing the vote, affecting people of colour the most. This represents major backsliding from the US, regressing on hard gained progress and eroding democracy. The 2013 Supreme Court ruling reversed important voting protections, leading jurisdictions and states formerly covered under Section 4b to implement discriminatory policies. This shows how such a clause was vital for the preservation of equal voting rights in the US. The recent blow for the advancement of the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act shows a worrying pattern of Republican legislators undermining US democracy. It is vital that legislation including the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, as well as the Freedom to Vote Act, are passed to ensure elections take place freely and fairly and that democracy is preserved, with equal access to voting everywhere and for everyone.

This article has been written by contributor Carson Siu The One China policy has long been at the top of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) to-do list, with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping stating that it is the ‘unswerving historical tasks of the Chinese Communist Party and the common aspiration of all Chinese people’ during his speech on the party's 110th birthday. However, Taiwan’s position as an autonomous region still stands despite being challenged by the CCP for as long as it has existed. So, why is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) yet to reunify with Taiwan? To understand the complex situation that Taiwan finds itself in, it is key to first look at the history of the region itself. Known to have first been settled by Austronesian tribal people from modern-day southern China, it first appeared in Chinese records in AD239, in which the Chinese emperor sent expeditionaries to explore the island – something Beijing uses as its rightful claim to the territory. It then became part of China’s Qing dynasty from 1683 to 1895, when the region was then ceded to Japan following the First Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese empire held control over the island up until the end of WWII, when the Allies agreed with Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, that Taiwan was to be returned to China. However, within four years, Chiang had lost control of mainland China to the Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War, and fled to Taiwan along with the remnants of what is now known as the Kuomintang (KMT). Once there, his party dominated the political landscape, until increasing domestic backlash triggered a transition to a more democratic political environment. For many decades the CCP has attempted to persuade Taiwan to reunify through adopting the ‘One Country, Two systems’ approach. Established in the wake of the handover of Hong Kong and Macau back to the PRC, the system would potentially allow for Taiwan to enjoy a high degree of autonomy over its political, socio-economic, and legal arrangement, though it would come under the bracket of a unified China. To say that such an arrangement has been successful would be a gross overstatement. Although Macau has enjoyed a successful and peaceful period under the system, its neighbour Hong Kong has recently experienced over a year of violent protests in response to the now-withdrawn extradition bill. Having previously rejected the proposal of reunifying under the ‘One Country, Two System’ approach, Taiwan continues in its malaise. This is reflected through the increasingly pro-independence stance the population has adopted, with the more pro-Beijing KMT party left in the dust by the leading party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DDP’s leader and Taiwan’s current President, Tsai Ing-Wen, firmly stated the system poses ‘a serious challenge to regional stability and peace’ and that ‘the overwhelming consensus among Taiwan’s 23 million people is our rejection of ‘One Country, Two System’, regardless of party affiliation or political position’. Aside from facing rejection from Taiwan’s local population, China has also endured criticism on the world stage. Currently Taiwan is officially recognised by a mere 15 countries, such as Belize and Guatemala, with the United Nations and most countries recognising the CCP as the sole legal government of China, rather than the Republic of China in Taiwan, or Taipei as it is known in the international community. However, Taiwan has established unofficial diplomatic ties with 59 countries, including the UK and Germany. One key supporter of Taiwan is the U.S., and although they have not recognised Taiwan as its own sovereign state since 1979, has long held political affiliations with the self-governing island. Despite continued warnings from China that Taiwan is part of its internal affairs, the US continues to engage with Taiwan. President Biden recently invited Taiwan to the inaugural Democracy Summit. This is happening at a time of rapidly deteriorating U.S.-China relations during the Trump administration. Beijing and Washington are still engaged in a trade war and frequently clash over the coronavirus pandemic, human rights issues, and much more in the realm of Asia-Pacific Security. Thus, it is no surprise to see mounting pressure on the Biden administration to deepen diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The most recent materialisation of this has been Republican lawmakers pushing to pass legislation guaranteeing $2 Bn per year in assistance to help Taiwan’s defense. Behind the political front, China has quickly grown to be a military powerhouse. Through intensive modernisation programmes, China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has evolved to be the world’s largest and its recent hypersonic weapons test demonstrates its technological advancement. The rapid development of China’s military capability has led Taiwan's Defence Minister, Chiu Kou-cheng, to predict that the PRC will be able to mount a ‘full-scale’ invasion of Taiwan by the year 2025. In response, Taiwan has also continuously invested in its military capability. Aside from supporting Taiwan diplomatically, the U.S. has a deep military affiliation with the island, acting as their main military equipment supplier for many years as well as basing 39 U.S. military personnel on the island. Moreover, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently stated that they would ‘take action’ should China invade Taiwan, a position being adopted by other countries such as Japan and Australia. Faced with growing international support for maintaining the status quo and currently not capable of launching large-scale amphibious attacks, it is unlikely that China will launch an invasion on the island in the near future. It is against this backdrop, however, that Xi Jinping said ‘reunification through a peaceful manner is the most in line with the overall interest of the Chinese nation, including Taiwan[ese] compatriots’, a suspicious turnaround after years of touting military re-unification and vowing to ‘smash’ any attempts of formal independence. The complexity of reunifying Taiwan with China is further exacerbated by Taiwan’s monopoly over the semiconductor market. Dubbed the ‘Silicon Shield’, Taiwan’s role at the centre of the global semiconductor industry is mainly thanks to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). This megafirm has meant that the region is indispensable to both China and the US. The chips are the building block of modern digital economies, and any disruption to domestic production will undoubtedly result in billions lost. As TSMC’s chairman Mark Liu puts it: ‘…the world all needs Taiwan’s high-tech industry support. So, they will not let the war happen in this region because it goes against the interest of every country in the world.’ Taiwan has long been in the crosshairs of the CCP, though its position as a self-governing state continues to remain ambiguous. As Sino-American tensions have flared in recent times, Taiwan is increasingly emerging as the central flashpoint of the Great Powers' rivalry. Returning to Xi Jinping’s speech, his firm announcement that ‘the historical task of complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and will definitely be fulfilled’, leaves us with the million-dollar question: With so many opposing forces, will the Chinese Communist Party ever be able to reunify with Taiwan?

This article has been written by contributor James Baldwin Two years have passed since the resounding election victory of Boris Johnson and the Conservative Party, in which the party promised to ‘Get Brexit Done’ and ‘Unleash Britain’s Potential’, just two of the catchiest phrases from the divisive campaign. In the word count afforded, this report will assess ‘Johnsonism’ and the Prime Minister’s success so far, both against his own standards and against wider expectations. Despite Brexit dominating the public debate, Mr. Johnson, a mere three months after being awarded his 80-seat majority, was faced by the unprecedented Covid-19 pandemic, prompting his tenure to be faced overwhelmingly with this. Covid has been a prime example of this Government’s record, and has revealed the issues of government failure within the administration. When the British Government enacted a national lockdown in March 2019 in an attempt to quell a rise in infections, their response was notably slow, especially when compared to other nations. A level of understanding in response to the lack of decisiveness prior to the first lockdown is appropriate. But it is an indictment on the administration that the mistake was made thrice over. Prior to the November lockdown, there was advice from the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) and the opposition Labour Party to enter a ‘circuit-breaker’ lockdown. The government refused, before conceding two weeks later; resulting in gross levels of infections and deaths. The government repeated the error just a month and a half later, maintaining a complex, and ever changing, tiered system and dithering over whether to put the United Kingdom into a third lockdown. It eventually did so, two weeks after SAGE had informed Mr. Johnson that tougher restrictions would be necessary. Successes in fighting the pandemic have become more apparent, however. The UK’s fast vaccine roll-out at the start of 2021 was the envy of the international community, and may have helped the country resist a fourth wave of infections at current - removing the need for the imposition of any, nevermind tighter, restrictions. The continued success remains to be seen and is already under pressure from the announcement of 28th November in which the government has introduced some minor new restrictions. In any sense, the initial handling of the pandemic demonstrates clear failings. Covid-19 held Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union out of the headlines for months, an impressive feat after years of Brexit-centricity. Brexit has, however, still lurked in the background, and has without question been central to the government’s agenda. With ‘Get Brexit Done’ the administration's initial mantra, it must be noted that to a slight degree this was completed. The UK withdrew almost immediately after Mr. Johnson led his party to a majority in the 2019 general election. Yet, Brexit remains an ongoing issue for the Johnson administration. The deal forged with the EU has not yet proven to work to the UK’s advantage. Take Northern Ireland. Just months after signing the Northern Ireland Protocol - established in order for the UK to enact a ‘hard’ Brexit whilst complying with the Good Friday Agreement - the administration has now requested re-negotiation. Currently it has suggested that the UK may enact Article 16 of the protocol, suspending key parts of agreement. The peace process in Northern Ireland, as has been witnessed recently, is highly fragile and it will not take much to upset this. Ironically, economic benefits of Brexit have been seen in Northern Ireland, where certain businesses are taking advantage of the country’s unique status as a member of the UK and EU’s Customs Unions. Nonetheless, navigating the UK’s early post-Brexit days will continue to be a difficult task, not just for Mr. Johnson, but future administrations as well. The administration must compromise and work with the EU to find a secure settlement for both sides. Failing to do this so early on after negotiations does not reflect well on the Johnson administration. Finally, we move to the recent budget announcement. Rishi Sunak, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, presented a big-state conservatism in his Budgets which have redefined the political lines. High spending will remain a characteristic of the government, whilst tax receipts will rise to their highest since the 1950s. Mr. Johnson’s legacy appears to aim at not just a clean break from the EU, but in a clean break from the last decade of conservatism, where low taxes and low spending characterised what has become known as the austerity government. Spending is projected to increase in real terms across all departments. The NHS will see the biggest boost, having received a 40% increase from its levels in 2010 - more than any other department. However, the government also needs to address the crunch issues faced by the NHS, especially staff shortages. Education has also received a boost in spending. But, it will only hit 2010 spending levels by 2024-25 and has failed to specifically address how it will meet the fallout in education from the pandemic. Contradictions in tackling the climate emergency persist, despite strong and welcome rhetoric from the government. Amid a host of progressive policies surrounding green investment, Mr. Sunak announced a cut to Air Passenger Duty for domestic flights. Meanwhile, cutbacks were announced to the sustainable high-speed train service High Speed 2. The government, therefore, appears to be subsidising consumers to emit more Carbon Dioxide by flying across Britain as opposed to travelling by rail. This also derails attempts to level-up the North, which is worth an article in itself. Nonetheless, in tackling climate change, Mr. Johnson has taken a leading role worldwide, with the UK’s pledges being some of the world’s most progressive. The Johnson administration has had a rather eventful two years at the helm of British politics. Covid-19 will continue to challenge them between now and the next general election, as will Brexit. Recent and relative success in tackling the virus has bode well for the Government’s popularity. But the Prime Minister has not been associated with much success so far: Brexit is far from finalised; Covid-19 has assaulted public finance; and a cost of living crisis is on the horizon. A tough two years lie ahead, and any notion of unleashing Britain’s potential remains to be seen.

This article has been written by contributor James Beamish Earlier this month, the international community’s High Representative in Bosnia, Christian Schmidt, issued a stark warning; the Dayton Accords are at serious risk of collapse. Bosnia, a country delicately held together by the Dayton Accords ever since the Bosnian War of 1992-95, may well break apart, threatening to plunge the country once more into open war. Two questions must be asked about this: firstly, why has the situation deteriorated to this point? And secondly, can anything be done to restore the country’s stability? In order to grasp the current crisis in Bosnia we must understand the context in which it is taking place. Signed in 1995, the Dayton Accords was a treaty which ended the brutal Bosnian war, and outlined the new governmental structure which was to take the country forward. Bosnia was split into two entities, each consisting of the two largest ethnic groups who had engaged in bitter inter-ethnic conflict in the preceding war.The first of these is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, representing Bosniak Muslims as well as Catholic Croats, while the second is Republika Srpska, which comprises the Orthodox Serb population. Both regions have significant autonomy, though are united at the national level by a government equally conscious of providing for ethnic balance. The Presidency, a unique apparatus in the modern world, consists of three men- one Serb, one Bosniak, and one Croat. Here, The centrality of ethnicity to politics is vividly demonstrated by the fact that a declaration of one’s ethnic identity must be made in order to run for public office. Clearly, whilst the bitter ethnic fighting was brought to end, its legacy was enshrined within the country’s system of government. Rather than seeing politics as progressive way to solve collective action problems, this new system fell for Clausewitz's famous dictum and inversed it: politics is war by other means. Thus, as Julian Borger has written, Bosnia has been subjected to “purgatory: life in the absence of war, but never quite at peace”, for how can a true and collaborative peace be found in a political environment that institutionalizes the conception of the inherent differences between ethnicities. Out of this divisive political environment a figure has arisen who is determined to bring about the independence of Republika Srpska: Milorad Dodik. The Serb member of the tripartite Presidency, he has for over a decade, now, been pushing for greater Serb autonomy in Bosnia. Recently his threats have taken on a more concrete form, with legislation currently being proposed to the National Assembly of Republika Srpska which, in the words of Chrisitan Schmidt is “tantamount to secession without proclaiming it ''. Triggered, ostensibly at least, by the High Representative’s introduction of a law which would criminalize the denial of the Srebrenica Genocide- in which over 8,000 Bosniaks were slaughtered by Serbs- on October 20th, Dodik introduced the dull sounding ‘Law on Medical Equipment and Drugs. Its effects, however, are incendiary. A new medical agency would be established for Republika Srpska, completely replacing the federal agency founded in 2009, and thus emphatically undermining the national government’s role in the Serb territories. This is but one piece of an intended raft of legislation which would eject the Bosnian national government from the affairs of Republika Srpska. Withdrawal from the armed forces and from the judicial, tax, and policing systems would all-but bring about Serb independence from the rest of Bosnia and shatter the Dayton Accords’ plan for peace. Obviously, such a conclusion would be intolerable for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who are strong supporters of the Dayton Accords and wish to keep the country united, thus risking the re-emergence of armed conflict between two sides whose demands are wholly incompatible. The problem for the West is that it is not just a matter of simply upholding the Dayton Accords, for it is growing increasingly intolerable, both from the perspective of the Serb, and that of the ordinary Bosnian. The tripartite Presidency and its complex ethno-centric political system, even beyond the issues raised above regarding the entrenchment of ethnic identities, has also caused the Bosnian state to be remarkably ineffective. Described by some as “the world’s most complex system of government”, it has led to a lack of political accountability, obscene levels of corruption, and poor economic and governmental performance. Bosnia currently has an unemployment rate of 16% and a youth unemployment rate of 34%, It is no wonder, then, that 87% of Bosnians believe the country is going in the wrong direction, This has only further inflamed Serb separationist tendencies for, to quote Borger again, “the anger and despair fuels yet more nationalism, in part because the system is rigged that way. It is a self-sustaining machine for producing misery”. Such a point was not necessarily lost on the Americans, even whilst negotiating the Accords. Daniel Sewer, a US envoy at Dayton, described how “we thought it was just a house of cards about to come tumbling down”, whilst Nicholad Burns, another US diplomat at Dayton, describes the Accords as “an incomplete peace, but it is a peace”. The point here is that Dayton was never meant to be a permanent settlement, rather it was an expedient device used to stop the immediate bloodshed. Unfortunately, over time the Dayton Accords have become increasingly Reified. The Bosniaks support it as the only way to keep the country united, yet this has inhibited institutional reform, further fueling the rise of Serb nationalism who are dissatisfied at the results of a Bosnian administration incapable of reform. This in turn has further entrenched Bosniak attachment to the Dayton Accords as a mechanism to combat such nationalism. A vicious cycle has emerged, or, to put it more accurately, a new equilibrium has been reached. The Accords are now regarded by all involved to be the only way to keep the Bosnian state united, yet it is the Dayton Accords themselves which are the source of the modern Serbian secessionist movement that is fracturing that same state. Thus, any Western involvement must be predicated on the revisal of the terms of the Dayton Accords. However, due to the emergence of this new equilibrium, such revision may come too late. To abandon Dayton may well be to abandon Bosnia, and yet to uphold the Accords is to encourage the same fate. Unless an ersatz Metternich can be found amongst European or American diplomats, the situation in Bosnia seems destined to escalate towards either war, separation, or both.

On Wednesday 27th October, Oregon Senator and chair of the Senate Finance Committee Ron Wyden unveiled his plans for a new tax that targets the ultra-wealthy. This controversial plan was proposed as an alternate way of funding President Biden’s goliath $1.75 trillion ‘Build Back Better’ package. Dubbed the ‘Billionaire’s tax’, this plan would require individuals with an annual income of over $100 million, or those who hold over $1 billion in assets for three years, to pay a 23.8% capital gains tax on the appreciation of their publicly traded assets. If this were to be implemented, even though it would affect just 700 people, it is projected to raise between $200 billion and $250 billion before the spending plan finishes. Although this is the current rate of capital gains tax for those with this level of wealth, the marked difference is that this measure would tax assets every year, regardless of whether or not they were recently sold. Under current US law, a gain can only be taxed if it is ‘realised’ by the owner when they sell an asset. It is this mass of unutilised potential, namely the tax from unrealised gains, that has created so much controversy. Democrats suggest that the taxing of unrealised gains is a simple issue of fairness. For example, Amazon founder Jeff Bezos pays himself a salary of $81,840 a year – a minute fraction of his $193 billion net worth – whilst still owning and accruing on the majority of his wealth that is tied up in Amazon stock, which, therefore, goes untaxed. This is a common loophole used by billionaires in the US to minimise their tax and is the reason the 25 richest Americans pay, on average, 15.8% less than the typical US worker. This damning statistic has pushed President Biden to increase tax on the richest Americans as part of his mission to reduce inequality and improve infrastructure. There is, however, heavy debate over whether Wyden’s plan is the best way to implement this goal and, if it is, whether it’s even possible. Perhaps the biggest hurdle the Democrats must overcome to pass this bill is that of legality. Many have suggested that taxing such a small subset of people in this way is unconstitutional. It has been highlighted that it may violate Article 1 Section 9 of the constitution, which states income taxation is prohibited unless ‘in proportion to the census’. With this, the Supreme Court is likely to face a stream of cases in which they would need to decide whether taxing a group of just 700 is constitutionally acceptable, and then whether unrealised gains can be classified as income tax. If the Supreme Court was to rule on either of these issues then the bill would need to be heavily altered, if not abandoned in its entirety. Although Wyden argues the plan is indeed constitutional as it calls for “annually taxing income from capital gains” (part of the tax code), for the bill to succeed, it would need votes from every Democratic Senator and almost every Democrat in the House. So far, this seems unlikely. Joe Manchin, West Virginia Senator, has been one of the most vocal critics of the bill, suggesting that it unfairly targets people that “have contributed a lot to society” and “create lots of jobs and invest a lot of money”. Whilst Democrats on the Finance Committee expressed surprise at Manchin’s position, it is likely he is not alone, and the Democrats may struggle to pass this bill relying solely on partisan support. Perhaps less surprisingly, Republicans, and the billionaires the tax will affect, have also expressed their doubts. Elon Musk, who could owe as much as $50 billion under the new proposal, recently took a dig at the proposal on Twitter. In response to a user who suggested that, if the bill passed, it could open up the potential for tax hikes targeted at middle-class Americans, he agreed, stating: “Exactly. Eventually, they run out of other people’s money and then they come for you”. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell was also quick to oppose the idea. He described the tax as a “hairbrained scheme” designed to target those “who have invested wisely” and “compensate those who have invested poorly”. Although some may agree, Musk and McConnell fail to acknowledge the reason such a bill has been proposed; billionaires, even if they have invested wisely, are not paying their fair share of tax, whereas middle-class Americans are. If the proposal can be pushed through in the face of such opposition and legal hurdles, the impacts will be far reaching. With a projected revenue of $250 billion over 10 years, most of this money will likely go towards economic recovery in the post COVID-19 world and investing in Biden’s ‘Build Back Better’ plan. In this way, it seems the bill would be an effective form of relief for everyday Americans whose livelihoods and wellbeing were hit particularly during the pandemic. It would also be a significant step forward in ensuring America’s billionaires, who saw their net worth increase by $1trillion during the pandemic, finally pay their share. There is, however, notable scepticism over whether this tax could be genuinely effective, or whether billionaires would find further loopholes to taxation, greatly damaging the US economy as a consequence. Mitt Romney, Senator of Oregon, suggested that the bill had the potential to push innovation overseas and cause billionaires to pull their money from the stock market. Instead, they would then invest money into property or art rather than continuing to invest in projects that would create jobs and build the economy. In this way, the bill could have the opposite effect of its intended purpose, ensuring billionaires continue to be just as well off whilst jeopardising the stability and security of everyday Americans. Critically, however, all potential consequences, good or bad, are simply hypothetical unless the Democrats are able to push the bill over the line before the end of the session.