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In November 2020, the UK brought forward its ban on petrol and diesel cars from 2040 to 2030, with some hybrids being allowed into 2035. This announcement comes just a few months after the Johnson administration unveiled their new green ‘industrial revolution’ and 12 months before the UK hosts the COP26 climate conference. The new target of 2030 is one of the most radical electric vehicle policy targets in the world. While clearly ambitious, this policy is backed by the fact that electric car prices are decreasing across the board in response to major investment and the market share is set to continue increasing. However, the ambitions of the green-minded are riddled with technological, environmental and ethical issues that pose major structural issues to the UK’s, and indeed the world’s, aims at quelling the climate crisis. It was revealed in November 2020 that the UK & the 17 largest EU economies bought over a million hybrid/electric cars with around half of these being full electric cars. This is a huge increase in sales and has greatly been impacted by EU and UK state action to fine companies that don’t decrease their fleets’ emissions. While the past year’s numbers may predict a positive future for electric cars, the current economic climate - under the strain of Brexit - looks to stunt Britain’s electric shift. Currently, the UK’s future trade arrangement with the EU will result in large import tariffs on cars as Europe seeks to insulate its own industry from outside competition. As it stands, many British-made cars use Japanese and third party made parts which don’t qualify for tariff exemptions under the current ‘locally-made’ rules. This will push up the costs of electric cars for British consumers who buy the vast majority of their cars from Europe, while simultaneously sabotaging sales by British based car firms that export 4/5 units to the EU. Another disputed issue is the approach governments take towards the move to electric cars. The Volvo chief executive has recently expressed discontent with the general attitude of many governments as ineffective. The UK’s hard ban on petrol and diesel was therefore welcomed by Volvo, believing a new industry can’t be built on subsidies and fines but major legislation. Despite legislation being identified by many as the key factor to change, this poses its own issues. Governments cannot act far out of the interests of those who elected them and so for the foreseeable future if consumers cannot be encouraged to commit to electric cars the operation is under major threat. For example, the lack of changing points has always been an issue of contention. In response to this the Government has announced £500m towards charging infrastructure to increase consumer confidence. While this is a positive and essential step there is no time frame on this investment and even if it’s swift, it’ll still take years for consumer behaviour to be impacted. Following on from this, the pandemic also massively impacts consumer choices. In January 2020 as much as 16% of consumers wanted to buy an all-electric car, yet this figure fell to 4% in November as a result of falling incomes. Price is the most important factor for the majority of UK consumers when it comes to cars, and with electric cars still more expensive it further complicates the route to Johnson's green revolution. Even if consumers do make the switch, are there any substantial environmental benefits? Likely not. One of the major benefits of electric cars is of course the fact that they produce no greenhouse gases when being used. While in the long run this is undoubtedly better than non-electric cars, during the much more complex and demanding manufacturing process the cars must drive on average 50,000 miles to offset emissions. Most importantly is the production of the batteries which is not only costly but very harmful to the environment. Environmental problems expand to the precious metal procurement of the essential battery materials of cobalt and lithium, both of which are mined arduously. Lithium mining requires huge amounts of water which in the Americas, Australia and Africa can be problematic. Further still, contamination of entire plains and water sources has been known to occur during this process. If the UK can remove itself from the blame for this environmental damage done in electric car supply chains, then it still has to grapple with major ethical issues. Cobalt has come to be known as the blood diamond of the electric car industry, being tied to many cases of child labour and appalling mining conditions. Standing over all of this is the dilemma of how the electricity that powers the car is made. If the UK cannot shift its electricity production to nuclear or renewable sources, then the issue of emissions is simply moved from cars to fossil fuel factories. The future of the UK’s shift to electric is facing a leviathan of opposition. Even as demand for electric cars rebounds it will only lead to far higher demand for electricity to be produced which in itself faces a marathon before it can call itself legitimately climate-friendly. 2030 is perhaps a naïve target, but it may perhaps inadvertently still be the best target. With such a strong line by the government consumers and producers will be heavily incentivised to invest in electric cars and new cleaner technology in mining and battery production. The quest for a truly green economy may remain on the horizon, but it’s not yet out of sight.

The news of success in both Pfizer, Moderna and Oxford’s Covid-19 drug trials has been welcomed by people across the globe, with Governments placing orders of millions in preparation for the biggest vaccination drive in modern history. In anticipation of this drive however, governments now face the profoundly difficult task of convincing those opposed to vaccinations that they are safe to receive. More broadly, they must tackle the Covid ‘infodemic’. Over the course of the pandemic, social media sites have been active outlets for conspiracy theorists, with their claims ranging from the virus being spread by 5G, to face-masks being implanted with tracking chips. As ludicrous as these ideas may sound, vaccine misinformation has tangible and potentially deadly consequences. In August 2020, Ipsos-MORI reported that only 53% of the population would be certain or very likely to get a vaccine against coronavirus. The same study found that 27% of those who claim to get the majority of information on COVID-19 from WhatsApp said they were unlikely or definitely wouldn’t get a vaccine. In 2019, the United Kingdom lost its Measles eradication status, with Dr Kate O’Brien, of the World Health Organisation’s immunisation department attributing this to increased misinformation regarding vaccinations. Moreover, this certainly isn’t just a problem specific to the UK - a 2019 world survey found that 22% of western Europeans believe vaccines to be unsafe. In May 2020, The World Health Assembly passed a resolution - WHA73.1 - which recognised tackling covid misinformation as a crucial component to tackling the pandemic. The UK currently does not have any legislation that regulates the validity of news posted on online platforms, even though several pieces of legislation have been proposed (most recently by the Labour Party). Earlier this month, Facebook, Twitter and Google agreed with the UK Government to the principle that social media giants ‘should not profit from or promote COVID-19 anti-vaccine disinformation’ and committed to responding ‘flagged content more swiftly, and to work with authorities to promote scientifically accurate messages’. However, emphasis on profit, alongside an absence of legislative authority, does bring into doubt whether such an agreement carries enough weight to disrupt vaccine misinformation. Equally, placing the fate of public health in the hands of private corporations with a history of political interference is a dubious decision. Meanwhile, even if the promotion of misinformation by paid interest groups were to be prevented, this does nothing to stop the circulation of conspiracy theories by groups or individuals. Selective exposure theories suggest that individuals tend to prefer information that reinforces their existing views. Hence, proponents of such views are unlikely to be deterred. Censorship laws are certainly not the answer; free speech is intrinsic to the health of liberal democracies. Rather, we must look critically at our entire political and civic cultures. Scholars and commentators often refer to our current era as one of ‘Post-Truth Politics’ - an epoch in which ‘objective facts’ have been publicly buried. Openness and transparency within government and politics have been replaced by deception, misinformation and anti-rational sentiments. In the era of ‘Fake News’, conspiracy theory and populism, the validity of statements is unimportant. Rather, power is won on the basis of who can arouse the most emotive and anti-rational sentiment with their dangerous discourses. ‘Post Truths’ do not merely manifest through online and social media. They infect the very heart of the political process, with election campaigns not won on the basis of ‘basic democratic norms of open and plural communication among citizens’, but ‘political mendacity, nonsense, buffoonery and silence’. Consequently, the effort to discourage misinformation and so called ‘alternative truths’ in post-truth democracies is an incredibly difficult task. So how are we to prevent misinformation? One essential recommendation is a government advertising campaign to accompany the vaccine rollout. Such a campaign must make clear the tangible and dangerous link between misinformation, fake news and public health outcomes. Whilst making clear that vaccinations are not to be made compulsory, governments must articulate just how important it is for their citizens to acquire herd immunity. Just as the ‘Stay Safe, Stay Home’ slogan has become etched into the collective mind of the British Public, vaccinations must be given the PR treatment and marketed to a hesitant electorate. Moreover, greater attention must be paid to understand why certain individuals may be opposed or hesitant to take vaccinations. Rather than dismissing ‘anti-vaxxers’ as ‘nuts’, Government researchers must seek to understand the exact concerns that individuals have over taking vaccinations. Hesitation towards vaccinations is a spectrum, right from opposition to hesitancy and to apathy, so no one rhetoric can provide the answer to dispelling myths. Hence, public health agencies must work to communicate transparently exactly how the vaccine works, what the dangers are and dispel the myths currently circulating. Finally, in the long term, as we take lessons from Covid, we must act preemptively in educating our young people how to use social media critically and effectively. Schools must work to provide their leavers with media literacy and critical thinking skills, so that they may scrutinise unreliable sources and differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate information. As a young person born into the social media age, I can say with confidence that children are woefully underprepared to deal with the difficulties and complexities that social media poses. Just as we are taught to protect ourselves against online predators, by scrutinising unfamiliar profiles and keeping our accounts private, young people must be taught to scrutinise the information they are unwillingly exposed to and question whether it comes from a reliable source. However, as important as these interventions are, if vaccine misinformation is just one symptom of a political culture of mistrust and opacity, the time for damage control is likely far gone.

Ethiopia is in crisis. And that means the Horn of Africa is in crisis. While the world was looking on nervously at the US election, violence between the Ethiopian army and forces in the northern region of Tigray, escalated. So how did this conflict start and what can be done about it? Ethiopia is a deeply multi-ethnic society, with over 80 different ethnic groups. This has caused some problems in how to represent everybody in government. The Ethiopian government had been running as a coalition of ethnically-based parties until 2019. This was when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed merged the parties together into one single party, called the Prosperity Party, which currently rules the country. This angered the leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), who refused to join the party. The TPLF had been the major player in Ethiopian politics and is anxious to maintain its power, rather than join the Prosperity Party. The conflict became deadly serious after Abiy Ahmed ordered a full-scale military response, alleging that Tigrayan forces had attacked a military camp. Allegations have been made on both sides, but it’s impossible to verify these claims, as there’s a communications blackout imposed by the Ethiopian government on the region. What is clear, however, is that hundreds have died, and thousands have fled into neighbouring country Sudan. This conflict could potentially destabilise the Horn of Africa. Eritrea could also descend into war, given its enmity with the TPLF and its support for Abiy. It could also lead to fighting in eastern Sudan, between forces sympathetic to each side. Also, a lot of Ethiopian forces are fighting the al-Shabab jihadists in Somalia and could be brought back home, further weakening Somalia. So it’s not just Ethiopia that will be affected by a civil war. This threatens the lives of millions. The obvious solution to the conflict is dialogue between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF. But that will be near impossible if this conflict is left to Ethiopia to deal with on its own. Ahmed has already rejected peace talks, while the Ethiopian parliament has proposed labeling the TPLF as a terrorist organisation. The truth is that both sides are to blame for this conflict and international pressure is needed to bring the two sides to negotiate. While the TPLF has been known to exercise violence, the government has also responded in a tit-for-tat fashion, with ground offensives, air strikes and the communications blackout. This has alienated civilians; reports of unlawful detentions and civilian massacres have drawn the neighbouring Amhara region into the conflict. There’s a real chance of fighting spreading to the other regions of Ethiopia as well. Neither side can ‘win’ from here. As I mentioned before, international pressure is needed. This can include the African Union, the UN, the US and China for example. All of these entities have interests in the Horn of Africa. So what should a settlement between the two sides include? Firstly, the fighting must stop from both sides. The transition to peace in the long-term must include a significant demilitarisation of the Tigray region, particularly of the TPLF. They have some of the best armed forces in Ethiopia, which poses a threat to long-term stability. At the same time, the government must agree to independent oversight of the situation to avert future conflicts. This means no communications blackouts and careful supervision from aid organisations and the UN. The second issue is very problematic: solving Ethiopia’s federal system. It’s a system that clearly has its faults. Every party in the coalition had equal power, despite controlling areas of different amounts of the population. This allowed the TPLF to exert power much beyond the size of the Tigrayan population: this is obviously unfair. A system where parties are formed based on ethnic divides is always likely to fuel populist messages, where one party suggests that another is threatening their culture (as the TPLF have claimed Abiy Ahmed is doing). However, Abiy’s solution of merging together the regional parties has left many people feeling disillusioned, as they feel that their ethnicity isn’t fairly represented in the government. The problem is that any change to the current system will create winners and losers, as some groups benefit from the current arrangement and others want to change it. What will be needed is a scaling down of expectations on both sides. The TPLF can’t expect to be dominant in Ethiopian politics as it once was, given that it only contains a small part of the population. At the same time, Abiy Ahmed can’t expect to successfully push through reforms unilaterally. Regional parties that don’t want to join his Prosperity Party shouldn’t be met with clampdown and arrests. We can’t look away from Ethiopia. It’s a humanitarian crisis that will have a hugely damaging impact on Africa. If the international order doesn’t intervene, fighting will simply continue until they run out of financial resources. This is a situation that is spiralling out of control by the day; it desperately requires immediate intervention. The key thing is, no one wins in this war. So when both sides finally agree to negotiate, the focus should be on establishing long-term peace, not fulfilling political agendas. Image Source: Office of the Prime Minister, Ethiopia

For those with a casual or professional interest in North Korea, the “Party Foundation Day”, celebrated on October 10th every year, is a day of special importance. Commemorating the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the occasion is most notably marked by a grandiose parade of the Korean People’s Army. These parades are a rare opportunity for international analysts to get a glimpse at new military capabilities developed by the Democratic People’s Republic. Inevitably, the star of the show is the Strategic Rocket Force, responsible for operating the DPRK’s growing arsenal of nuclear missiles. And this year, they had a big surprise for Korea-watchers: a brand-new, never-before-seen missile on an enormous wheeled transport. Details are understandably scant, but from visual observation alone, experts have been able to deduce certain key facts: most pertinently, the missile, which some analysts have preliminarily dubbed the Hwasong-16, is the largest road-mobile missile in the world, and undoubtedly an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). This is notable: the majority of the world’s ICBMs are based in fixed, fortified missile silos hidden far from population centers. North Korean nuclear weapons are, as a rule, designed to be transported by special trucks called Transporter-Erector Launchers (TELs). TELs move the missiles into firing positions, prepare them for launch, and then drive away to be reloaded with a new missile so they can repeat the process. This makes it significantly harder for the US and South Korea to track and destroy the missiles in a potential conflict, though Michael Elleman, Senior Fellow for Missile Defense at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, notes that its size will almost certainly make it less mobile and slower to set up than its peers. North Korea already possesses ICBMs in the form of the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15, the latter of which is thought to be capable of striking the entire continental United States. The new missile, however, is much larger than its predecessor, indicating one of two possibilities: it is either designed to reach a longer range than the Hwasong-15, or it is armed with a significantly heavier payload. Both of these possibilities have their own separate implications for the possible nature of the missile. The first, and most straightforward, possibility is that the missile has a single warhead heavier (and presumably more powerful) than the Hwasong-15. Various analysts have gone further, however, and opined that the new missile may be equipped with Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRVs) - that is to say, multiple nuclear warheads that can be deployed from a single missile body. This allows for one missile to not only deal considerably more damage to a target, but also to defeat missile defence systems such as the US’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense. GMD, based in Alaska, is designed to fire interceptor missiles at any ICBMs heading for the United States; however, each interceptor has a very low expected probability of successfully destroying an incoming warhead, and given that four interceptors are fired per incoming warhead, it is possible for a small number of MRV-equipped missiles to overwhelm GMD. Another theory as to the nature of the new missile is somewhat more esoteric: Dr. Joshua Pollack, Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, speculates that the new missile could be a revival of a 1960s Soviet concept known as the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). During the Cold War, the US expected any Soviet nuclear missiles to cross the Arctic, as this would put them on the shortest flight path; as such, their missile defences were focused northwards. To counter this, FOBS would be an ICBM sent at very low altitude (just barely above the atmosphere but below the altitude reached by regular ICBMs) across the Antarctic to strike the US from the south, its blind spot. If this new missile is, indeed, a FOBS, the US is left with a strategic dilemma: either to create an expensive missile defence network in the southern USA, or to leave its flank exposed. Even the idea that North Korea might possess a FOBS will doubtless lead to much nervousness within the Pentagon. In any case, until the DPRK tests it, it is impossible to know for sure whether the missile is a FOBS or MRV-equipped. The former would be technologically simpler to accomplish, whereas the latter presents greater options in the long run; MRVs are just one step down from Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles, MIRVs, which are the standard payload for modern ICBMs. There is only one thing that’s certain about this new weapon: it is the final nail in the coffin of Donald Trump’s attempt at making peace on the Korean Peninsula. When he sat down with Kim Jong Un in Singapore in 2018, there was legitimate hope among arms control activists that this would be the first step on the path to reducing the scale of North Korea’s nuclear program. Fast forward two years, and all the hopes of the Singapore Summit have been dashed. Kim Jong Un is no closer to willingly giving up his nuclear arsenal - and on October 10th, he made that a point of national pride. Whatever the actual capabilities of the mystery missile, it is an appropriately large monument to a disappointing failure; one that no amount of missile defence systems can fix.

With the return of university students to campuses across the country, the topic of students’ mental health has once again made headline news. Whilst the pandemic has undoubtedly put a considerable strain on our mental health, with anecdotal accounts suggesting loneliness and anxiety is skyrocketing, the crisis predates the Covid-19 era by years. So, we must ask, when will the calls of students for improved mental health provisions be answered? And what form should policy interventions in mental health funding and training take? Whilst Government voices have been keen to push that the British public ‘are all in this together’, with the intent of rousing self discipline and morale, the assertion that we have all been equally affected by this epidemic is frankly bogus. One study of over 17,000 UK adults found that young people’s mental health had declined the worst of all groups as a result of the pandemic. Whilst lockdown and social distancing measures have been harmful for all ages and occupations, young people remain the group who are most dependent on their associations and relationships outside of the household, leading to a sharp rise in reported mental health problems. The likelihood that an individual will develop mental health problems is dependent on a whole range of social, environmental and biological factors, however, it is certain that the extremities of stress and loneliness that students have faced have contributed to their wellbeing. So, we must ask to what extent are universities responsible for the mental health of their students, particularly when said universities are at least partially responsible for the circumstances that students now find themselves in? Under the neo-liberalisation of education, the student is transformed into the customer, taking out a loan to purchase a university degree. But what exactly does this exchange cover? With universities increasingly treated by the state as businesses, they are left alone to configure their own mental health policies and approaches. Thus, this model depends upon universities being trustworthy enough to act in the interests of their students, by contributing the necessary funds to ensure the wellbeing of every student. But with universities failing to provide budgets that would allow every student to access mental health provisions in favour of profit, we must ask should universities merely have the responsibility to provide teaching and education resources? Or should they be forced by the government to extend their services beyond pedagogy, to student welfare and health? The short answer: absolutely. Government intervention in university mental health policy is essential to protect the welfare of students from being exploited by their institutions. For economic reasons alone, the funds poured into university campuses through tuition fees, accommodation fees and local businesses by university students absolutely warrant sufficient welfare provision in return. In terms of services provided by higher-education institutions, the introduction of mandatory mental-health spending quotas would go a long way to ensure that students do not have to sacrifice their right to access mental-health provisions for course or university preferences. For example, a FOI request by The Tab in 2016 found that whilst universities such as Oxford, Cambridge and Exeter, spent £48.25, £40.48 and £38.62, per student per year on counselling services, the University of Central Lancaster spent only £4.64 per student, with the University of Warwick spending as little as £11.92. This is not to suggest that throwing money at mental health services is the cure-all for mental health crises. It is imperative that funding is spent in the right ways. Whilst mental health awareness campaigns are essential to educating those of the prevalence of the issue, funding must be made available for those students facing immediate mental health crisis. There is no one-size-fits-all counselling method that can improve the outcomes of students; mental health issues are diverse and immensely complex, necessitating a range of considered interventions and referrals. Hence, institutions must have the capacities to deal and deal well with such complex circumstances, with assessments and services being provided by highly trained and specialised individuals. Equally, all members of staff should be adequately trained on mental health policy and awareness, to allow for as many early interventions as possible. And even more importantly, universities must provide funding towards research, so that the counselling programmes and interventions that work best for students can be identified, to improve the likelihood of successful treatment. One essential recommendation to the government is that students are allowed to register with GP practices at both their home and university addresses. This way, students don’t find themselves severed from mental health services once the University term is over. Perhaps most imperative is the role of universities in mental health journeys, should not merely be to get students off their books; counselling should lay for foundations for long term mental wellbeing. Universities should be and could be spaces in which teenagers are nurtured into healthy, happy and well-adjusted adults. Success cannot crudely be determined by graduate employment statistics; if universities cannot provide an environment from which mental wellbeing can be improved and maintained, they are failing institutions. Further, one must consider if the student experience scores according to which universities are ranked reflect the mental health services they provide or if they choose to omit it. If the former were to be true, it wouldn’t be irrational to speculate that some ‘prestigious’ UK institutions may fare far worse in university league tables.

In the dying days of the USSR, two breakaway nations of the caucuses, Armenia and Azerbaijan, went to war for two years over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. The enclave’s majority population is ethnic Armenians and with the wars ceasefire in 1994 the province became a de-facto part of Armenia. The region has never been exactly stable; what has now erupted is an iteration of the same conflict that claimed 30,000 people in the 90s. Shelling has ensued from both sides and although both nations deny involvement, thousands of people have died through direct and indirect fighting in the last month. Both nations have restricted journalistic access and so the majority of reporting has been based on information churned out by the Azeri and Armenian defence departments. A key point of interest has been the plethora of rumours that have contributed to a constant war of narratives. It must also be noted that Turkey has entered the fray, backing Azerbaijan’s claims and dubbing them as their ‘Turkish Brothers’. This was a polarising move from Erdogan’s administration, shaking the status quo that saw Russia as the traditional regional arbiter. A visceral social media war of information has accompanied the intense shell fire, triggering intrigue as to what the motives and intentions of the Azeri are. Navigating through truth and rumour is difficult in the modern world, and this case is no different. Armenia’s president has also been extremely vocal, providing a weighty narrative to an already complex conflict, especially regarding Turkey. During the first weeks of October there emerged extensive rumours about Turkish-backed extremist fighters from Syria starting to arrive in Azerbaijan. Turkey has not yet openly backed the Azeri militarily, yet many are taking Ankara’s ‘full’ backing of Azerbaijan's cause as confirmation of their covert involvement. With Turkey (at least diplomatically) involved it has triggered a new narrative, one centred around the 20th century Armenian genocide, an event that killed 1.5 million ethnic Armenian’s. Turkey still denies that such an event occurred, which only deepens the chasm between the two nations. The Armenian president has used social media to develop the genocide into a current phenomenon. A piece of music written by a genocide era composer was used to back up a propaganda video of a bombed-out village, during which one interview saw a woman quote her fear of Azeri led ethnic cleansing if they won. The fears and tensions around the issue of ethnic cleansing flared when a video of 2 Armenian POWs being shot dead emerged. The provenance of the video is disputed but several human rights watch dogs confirmed its reliability. The political climate is such that the videos genuineness unfortunately no longer matters, tensions are fuelled regardless. The act of Azeri, and most likely Turkish, forces fighting to re-claim the N-K enclave is therefore seen by Armenians as an attempt to carve out, reclaim and ethnically cleanse the area. This rhetoric is the reason that peace will be so hard fought. Indeed, since the fighting began there has been three ceasefires on the 12th, 18th and 26th of October, all of which collapsed inside 24 hours. This is hardly surprising when the political climate in Armenia has been stoked by panicked reports of war crimes, invasion, Turkish reinforcements and ethnic cleansing on the horizon. The efforts of Russia, France and the USA to broker peace has understandably been fruitless in the face of the frenzied information wars. While Azeri designs, with Turkish backing, has reinvigorated efforts to take back the N-K enclave from Armenian control it is Armenia who is increasing the chance of an all-out war. The frantic torrent of reporting that has come out of Armenia’s government has created a dangerously extorted view of the conflict. Without discrediting the fears of the Armenian’s, which are based on historical events, the wall of propaganda and fear-mongering is making the chance of peace seemingly impossible. The escalation is also in part attributable to Turkey’s distortion of the balance of power that has existed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia, since the 90s, has been the regional mediator of this conflict, and typically supported Armenian claims. As Turkey has now backed the Azeri government’s claim the chances of conflict has risen exponentially. With the support of a major regional power they now have the confidence to reassert their claim. This has been drawn upon by the Armenian president who argued Turkey was trying to ‘create a Syria in the Caucuses’. Behind this accusation the link to Syria is a painful reminder of how the conflict is only speeding up, growing and diversifying. Russia and Turkey now stand on opposite sides of an armed conflict for the third time in a decade. Armenia and Azerbaijan currently stand mired in stalemate. With many images, videos and reports already having been disproved (one actually being video game footage) it bodes badly for the ever-growing narratives of distrust and war crimes. The N-K enclave is worryingly on track to become more and more entrenched in a warring mentality, lost in aggravating asymmetric information.

Healthcare in the United States is one of the many topics that Republicans and Democrats diverge on greatly, and it highlights the fundamental differences in economic and social approaches of the two parties. This split has been increasingly significant since the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA, or Obamacare) was put in place, and a major part of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential platform was its repeal. This became even more important in 2017 after he failed to repeal it, and caused Republicans to lose control of the House in 2018. With the ACA now due to be debated in the Supreme Court in early November, it is undeniable that healthcare remains a crucial theme for the election. This is especially key in the midst of the pandemic (which is spiking to levels higher than ever in the US, just as huge rallies are held over key battleground states) with Trump’s record of dealing with the pandemic being heavily criticised. Despite the current situation, Trump continues to stand by the commitment to take it away. This could be devastating, as during the pandemic, an estimated 27 million people have lost their insurance coverage as they were fired from jobs which provided them. On the other hand, Democrats have passed many healthcare bills to increase provision among the vulnerable, and Biden plans to continue this legacy if he is elected. Trump’s sanity has been questioned before, but during the pandemic he has gone to new heights with suggestions of injecting disinfectant as a way of treating the virus, and has been slow to respond to increases in infection rates with restrictions. This has led to reductions in approval ratings, and has again shown his blatant disregard for truth and a lack of awareness for his actions. In the final presidential debate, Biden talked about building on the ACA to make more substantial, affordable healthcare available to more people. He proposes offering a public health insurance option, which would increase competition with private insurers, and therefore should reduce costs. The main argument against expanding public healthcare interventions is financing, and ensuring the budget is balanced. However, there will be healthcare cost savings if people get problems checked out early instead of waiting until they’re debilitating because they don’t have insurance - making preventative care the norm would be hugely beneficial on all fronts. Better health would also lead to less days off from work, never mind the improved quality of life, which would be dramatic for those with long term conditions who have been paying thousands for medicines. Trump is not forthcoming on what his alternative to the Affordable Care Act would be if he overturned it. In the final presidential debate on the 22nd, while arguing that ‘[Biden] did not do anything’ during his time in government, he failed to explain what protection there would be for the 20 million Americans who currently get their insurance through ACA, if it is repealed. The popularity of ACA is because of how it protects people with pre-existing health conditions, and while Trump has stated that he has a great alternative, he has failed to make one public. Pundits are uncertain as to Trumps’ viable alternative, and this could be the cause of Biden’s current substantial lead. Conversely, several Democrats have advocated getting rid of private healthcare altogether and going to a pure public system, which would be costly. A huge proportion of the US economy rests with healthcare insurers, and thus any transition to reduce their prevalence would necessarily be a gradual and carefully designed process. The election will be of paramount importance for the future of US healthcare. If Biden wins, we can expect to see expanding the existing protections for citizens greatly. There are members of his camp who have a vision to provide free healthcare to all citizens in a UK-style system. In comparison, Trump will press forwards with his previous attempts (which did not result in the change he wanted) to revoke much of the social protections that are in place now. With his approval ratings dropping over the course of the pandemic, could this be the turning point Democrats need to get back in office? The debate is interesting but goes back to a fundamental question of the ideal extent of government intervention. Over the past few decades, politics in the US has shifted increasingly leftwards, which may surprise readers. And generally, the government has just increased in size. It is a tragedy that so many people in one of the richest countries in the world cannot afford to keep themselves protected from accidents and illness. For a country with a huge fiscal capacity, and large defence spending, it is more of a question of prioritisation of government funds, rather than capability. I think the pandemic has exposed serious issues with the healthcare system in the USA and where it’s failing, and a plan like Biden’s will help to make the system more robust to shocks like these in the future. In a few hours time, we will know the trajectory of (at least) the next 4 years of American healthcare, which will no doubt have a prolonged legacy.

With over 40 million cases and 1 million deaths worldwide, COVID-19 is the biggest global challenge in most of our lifetimes. And yet, Western countries have been acting nationalistically. The world’s wealthiest nations (representing just 13% of the world’s population) have bought up 51% of potential vaccine stocks. To tackle this, India and South Africa have proposed a temporary relaxing of patent and intellectual property rules (IPRs) on vital medicines. This would allow countries to reproduce a successful vaccine without paying huge licensing fees and waiting for patent clearance. However, this request has been rejected by the US, EU, Canada, the UK and Switzerland, among other Western nations. So why has the West does this? Many of these countries are at an advanced stage of developing a vaccine, having invested a lot of money in research. If IPRs are relaxed, these countries may not be able to sell their vaccine patents to cover their costs. However, there are dangers to maintaining this stance. Even if a vaccine reaches the final stages of research, the chance of it working is still only 20%. Countries choosing to ‘go it alone’ are running the risk of their vaccine not working and lacking any alternatives. The UK’s approach to counter this has been to buy dosages of six different vaccines (a highly expensive strategy), hoping that one of them works. But there is a more reliable alternative to this. The global initiative COVAX is led by a number of world organisations, including the World Health Organisation (WHO), looking to find vaccines and produce 2 billion dosages by the end of 2021. Importantly, they aim to sell potential vaccines at a low cost, supporting poorer countries too. Over 150 countries are part of this scheme, but the actions of the world’s rich countries (buying up the potential vaccine stock for themselves and rejecting the relaxation of IPRs) are undermining these global efforts. COVAX would work much better when coupled with the suspension of IPRs, as it would grant the world freer access to multiple vaccines and allow for much greater collaboration. Worryingly, however, the USA isn’t even part of COVAX, meaning that neither would they be able to access COVAX-supported vaccines, nor would the world be able to access American vaccines at a fair price. The USA’s absence from COVAX has proved to be highly damaging, reducing funding for it and limiting its effectiveness. Moreover, not only are western governments at fault, western companies have also harmed our chances of a global vaccine. Many world pharmaceutical companies (known as Big Pharma) are using this pandemic to profiteer at the expense of poorer countries. The American company Moderna, one of the leading vaccine candidates, is an example. Despite receiving $2.48 billion in public money, the company has sold all of their supply to rich nations, to make a profit. They charged $35 per dose for foreign countries, pricing out those in poverty. The unfair actions of Big Pharma further highlight the need for the India-South Africa proposal. By enacting this proposal, countries can use freely available information to reproduce successful vaccines at much lower prices than those being offered by exploitative pharmaceutical firms. Wealthy countries argue that Big Pharma companies need patents in order to guarantee high prices to cover their research costs. But this argument ignores the vast amounts of public money that these companies have received to develop vaccines. Charging high prices in addition to receiving subsidies is extortionate and unfair on the poor. Yet, there is hope for a global solution. A few pharmaceutical companies have bucked this trend, promising lower prices for lower-income countries. Novavax, for example, has struck a deal with India, allowing doses to be made and sold to lower-income countries at lower prices. The actions of a few companies won’t be enough, but combined with the COVAX initiative and the India-South Africa proposal, we can hope for more global collaboration. What is clear though, is that the relaxation of IPRs can play a crucial role in saving lives across the world by ensuring quicker vaccine development and wider access. If this proposal isn’t accepted, we risk a repeat of the HIV crisis, where western countries refused to relax IPRs for a number of years. When South Africa tried to access cheaper alternatives to patented HIV treatments, they were sued by 39 pharmaceutical companies. As a result, many people in low and middle-income countries couldn’t afford drug treatments at the height of the HIV epidemic, leading to millions of avoidable deaths. In fact, the prices of HIV/AIDS treatments remains an issue today, with middle-income countries (who still have many people in poverty) often excluded from patent relaxation measures. This means Russia, for example, had to pay 10 times more than lower-income countries for the same treatments. It’s no surprise then, to see that there were 690,000 AIDS-related deaths last year, many of them in such middle-income countries. We’ve seen the damage that was done in the HIV crisis. We cannot continue to make the same mistakes. It’s time for change. The West must stop prioritising profiteering and nationalism, and instead cooperate to solve this crisis. That starts with supporting the India-South Africa proposal.

In late August, Britain was rocked by the most sensational education scandal in recent memory, with the A-Level and GCSE exam results crisis exposing rife class-based educational inequalities. As the uproar slowly begins to dissipate, we must now turn our attention towards the long-term impact of COVID-19 on the lockdown generation. More specifically, one must consider how interventions can be made to prevent the under attainment of British pupils most at risk. I will be examining the circumstances faced by underprivileged Black-Caribbean pupils in Britain and identify the policy interventions required to prevent further entrenchment of educational inequalities. Even prior to the Coronavirus pandemic, the attainment gaps at key performance indicators between Black-Caribbean pupils and their peers warrant nothing less than outrage. In 2019, the average Black-Caribbean student scored 31% less of a grade than the national average. However, challenges faced by young Black people in education are far beyond poor attainment. In 2019, over 25% of all Black-Caribbean students in state-funded secondary schools were eligible for Free School Meals (FSM) - a conventional indicator of disadvantage. For Black-Caribbean students receiving FSM this rose to 54% of a grade, meaning these pupils were achieving over half a grade less. Also, their education is unevenly characterised by high levels of expulsion. Black students are disproportionately exiled from mainstream education, through exclusions and being sent to Pupil Referral units/Alternate Provision. The IRR have raised concerns over this ‘criminalisation’ of Black working-class pupils as part of a ‘two tier system’ that threatens to ‘remove a section of the urban multiracial working class which poses a threat to incoming gentrifying students’. Hence, not only are Black-Carribbean students more likely to be achieving less than their white counterparts, but their odds of attaining well are slashed by their race and socio-economic status. These students are now facing the additional and potentially devastating impact of lockdown. According to the Sutton Trust, during lockdown, middle class pupils (30%) were almost twice as likely as working class pupils (16%) to be attending online classes everyday. We can assume therefore, that Black-Caribbean students were likely to have unfairly burdened by class-based barriers to accessing online education. With Black-Caribbean students disproportionately falling within these underprivileged categories, urgent intervention from the Department for Education is needed. Whilst a £350 million National Tutoring Programme has been introduced, research for the Sutton Trust suggests that the programme - aimed to account for the lost teaching time for the most disadvantaged pupils - will not be sufficient in helping those worse affected by school closures. Moreover, even if the Tutoring Programme were able to make up for schooling missed during lockdown, such a programme does not provide the targeted intervention required to resolve years of entrenched racial attainment gaps. It is of utmost importance that both long-term and short-term policies are introduced, directly aimed at pupils who are predicted to have the worst educational odds. The Government should commit to providing additional Pupil Premiums that are strategically allocated in to a fund for improving the position of Black-Caribbean students. To put it frankly, funding for Black-Caribbean students must not just be available in the short term, as a band-aid for the impact of lockdown. Rather, it should be a springboard to provide the right conditions for disadvantaged youth to prosper. Such a fund could cover the costs of extra small group tuition, to allow students to catch up on lost teaching and help to level the playing-field with their non-Black-Carribbean counterparts in the long term. Moreover, funding for laptops to facilitate working from home could be allocated, to prevent the impact of further lockdown and restrictions, whilst allowing poor Black-Carribbean to reap the same benefits of online learning resources, as their middle-class peers. This funding should be distributed at a local level, under the guidance of Black-Caribbean community members. For obvious reasons, the ability of government officials in Whitehall and beyond to adequately conceive the specific challenges and barriers faced by Black youth is minimal, hence, it is important that this funding is placed in the hands of those with lived experience. The intervention(s) must also be supplemented by an inquiry into the underachievement and criminalisation of Black youth in the education system, as a means of understanding the driving factors. In today's neoliberal climate however, will such policy interventions be introduced? Most likely not. Consecutive governments under Blair, Cameron and Johnson have placed outright emphasis on disciplining disruptive pupils, with the expansion of alternative education provisions for excluded pupils being prioritised over understanding why Black-Caribbean students are more likely to underachieve. In the cases of the black and white working classes, cultures are routinely pathologized, with attitudes and behaviours being the main focus of analysis. In Black-Caribbean students, their ‘troubled’ families and anti-social behaviour are often blamed for poor attainment, rather than the structural inequalities that produce their disadvantage. If we are to begin to resolve this crisis, we must not fall foul to the individualistic notion that struggling pupils are to blame for the hardships they face. Instead, we must hold the institutions and structures to account that allow race and class differences to manifest into inequalities and threaten the livelihoods of promising and equally deserving young people. cover image credits: ©Kyle VanEtten - No Shortcuts Photography

When Prime Minister Abe Shinzo announced his surprise resignation on August 28th, shockwaves were felt throughout the entire Japanese political establishment. By the time the dust settled, and Suga Yoshihide had become the new Prime Minister on September 16th, observers were anxious to know - which of his predecessor’s many controversial policies would he keep? Perhaps nowhere is this anxiety more apparent than in Japan’s defence sector. Not since 1945 has the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) had so staunch a champion as Abe, who has always had a grand vision of building a strengthened and “normalised” Japan. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, first promulgated in 1947, states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war” and that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” For some six decades, successive Japanese governments have understood this as authorising only a strictly defensive military, and though the capabilities and strength of the JSDF inevitably grew throughout its lifespan, that ultimately defensive nature remained an inviolate shibboleth. Enter Abe. Since 2006 (with a pause in 2007 to 2012, between his first and second terms) he has steadily worked to expand the scope of the JSDF’s activities. In 2006, the Japan Defence Agency was promoted to becoming the new cabinet-level Ministry of Defence; in 2007, Abe oversaw an amendment of the Self Defence Forces Act which formally authorised operations abroad; most notably, in 2015, he successfully pushed through legislation to authorise the JSDF to operate in collective self defence with regional allies such as the USA and Australia even if Japan itself isn’t directly threatened. The impact on the military has been more than just legislative. The JSDF has taken its opportunity to expand its arsenal, perhaps most infamously in the form of the Izumo-class “helicopter destroyers” - which are, in practice, light aircraft carriers. Despite the JSDF’s insistence that these ships are purely for defensive purposes, the acquisition of a predominantly offensive platform would have been unthinkable before Abe’s time. Further questions have been raised regarding the Air Self-Defence Force’s intended acquisition of F-35B fighters, which are some of the only fighter aircraft capable of being operated from the Izumo. It can be safely assumed that the JSDF is preparing itself for a future in which it will finally be allowed to perform expeditionary operations without restriction. So with Abe gone, now what? At first glance, and if Suga’s own statements are to be believed, it seems little will change. The Defence Ministry has sought a budget of 5.4 trillion Yen (£39.7 billion) for the 2021 fiscal year, continuing its seven-year trend of receiving record-breaking budgets. It is also going forward with a program, started under Abe, to procure long range cruise missiles for the Air Self-Defence Force’s growing F-35 fleet. However, despite Suga’s promises of continuity, it is all but certain that the JSDF will lose at least some of the wind Abe put in its sails. Suga, though a close ideological ally of his predecessor, lacks the same personal drive to rearm the military and assert the nation abroad, preferring instead to grapple with domestic issues; moreover, he is inheriting a country in the midst of a pandemic and resultant economic catastrophe. While Japanese public opinion has long been divided on the idea of expanding the JSDF’s operations, all but the most ardent supporters of rearmament will likely prefer Suga to prioritise matters at home before looking abroad. As such, while it is likely Suga will continue to support the JSDF, this will inevitably take a backseat to more pressing domestic affairs. Jeffrey Hornung, an analyst with the RAND Corporation, speculates that Suga may find it convenient to focus on initiatives started by Abe, such as revisions to the government’s National Security Strategy. By doing so, Suga would be able to claim to be upholding Abe’s vision while retaining political capital to act more independently in domains he finds more relevant. The long-term future of the JSDF thus rests on how much of an interest Suga begins to take in defence once Abe’s heirloom policies begin to run dry. Michael Auslin, a distinguished research fellow at the Hoover Institution, takes the view that the behaviour of Japan’s strategic rivals will play a key role in Suga’s own direction. If China and North Korea come forward and try to work with Suga, they may find him less assertive than Abe; if they make no attempt to ease relations or try to exploit Abe’s departure with increased aggression, they may instead force Suga into following his predecessor’s hardline approach. For the immediate future, continuity does in fact seem to be the order of the day. Barring major provocations from regional adversaries, Suga is unlikely to act on defence with anything approaching the same vigour as Abe; having had its fourteen years in the sun, only time will tell how long the JSDF must endure the shade.

‘Coronavirus has provided a stark reminder of what happens when humanity’s relationship with nature breaks down.’ - Justin Addison, Second Secretary at the UK Delegation to the OSCE, 3rd June 2020 Covid-19 has been the biggest blow to our society in generations. The economic and social costs of this pandemic are immeasurable and will be long-lasting, with Rishi Sunak stating that the economy will undergo a ‘permanent adjustment’. But as we start to move from panic mode to recovery mode, we have an opportunity to redirect global economic activity towards averting the climate crisis we currently face. The actions taken now, including the huge business bailouts from the exchequer, will determine the future of our economy, and as such, our environment. With climate change having risen up on political agendas, several countries have announced that instead of focusing on bailing out high-carbon industries, they will look at how to prioritise sustainability in their recoveries. Both France and Scotland quickly announced huge investments in ‘green covid recoveries’, and the UK Government has also pledged to turn this into an opportunity to create green jobs and transform the economy towards a more sustainable future. ‘The government will build back better, build back greener, build back faster.’ - Boris Johnson, UK Prime Minister, 30th June 2020 But what does Boris’ ‘clean, green recovery’ actually mean? UK business leaders have particularly emphasised the need to focus economic support in industries which are environmentally-friendly, and making loans conditional on business plans being in line with climate goals. They have called for increased research funding for sustainable buildings, clean and domestic energy production and electric vehicles. In the proposed policies, the Government has pledged millions to four key areas of the economy: transport, infrastructure, innovation and planning system reform. The UK was the first major economy to commit to net zero emissions by 2050 in law. While these are commendable policies which show a real commitment to reaching a future where the country is more environmentally friendly, there are further steps required in reaching our carbon targets and ensuring the rest of the world also emphasises climate-aware policies on their agendas. The UK’s green plan arguably doesn’t deliver the best value for money, when considering long-term climate change solutions. Moreover, it is a symptom of states and institutions across the world ignoring the problem of excessive emissions in favour of creating temporary ways of capturing carbon, using an ‘accounting trick’ which avoids legally binding international carbon emission targets. For example, the target to plant 75,000 acres of trees in Britain every year by 2025 and the pledging of £100 million for researching Direct Air Capture technology indicates a strategy of focusing on creating carbon sinks to offset increasing over-pollution and over consumption. This has been criticised as a way of avoiding the long-term underlying need to reduce energy consumption in the first place, given that the capacity for forests to absorb carbon emissions decreases over time. The work is also not finished once the trees have been planted; protecting ecosystems to ensure long-term healthy forests is a costly and necessary process which hasn’t been accounted for in the government target. At this crucial time in the economy, long-term solutions to reduce our underlying carbon production, like continuing to develop the technology for reliable renewable energy sources and green transportation alternatives, cannot be ignored in favour of short-term vanity projects to artificially lower carbon emissions. Covid-19 and climate change are undoubtedly the biggest international issues in decades, and yet Trumpism and Brexit are symptoms of general increases in populism and falling political support for internationalism. The global community must work together to ensure climate accountability and share technology and resources, for a painless transition to a low-carbon world. It is true that before the word became so hyperconnected, a pandemic would not have spread so quickly. But, while physical isolationism is the short-term solution to covid-19, we must ensure this does not lead to long-term reduction in global interconnectedness, which can lead to great innovation and progress. Covid-19 and climate change must be faced by an international community which is ready for forward-looking cooperation. Covid has shown us the urgency of information sharing when investigating the epidemiology and spread of the disease, and we have much to gain from applying this lesson to the problem of climate change by sharing technological developments that can help countries reach their Nationally Determined Contributions. The under-emphasised resource in this discussion is each other, and countries must fight against the recent trend of foreign policy becoming more inwards-focused, in order for us to recover from covid-19 with long-term ambitions to make the world a safer and greener place.

In 1962, China and India went to war over a territorial dispute along the border of India’s north-west region of Ladakh and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region. Following a Chinese victory, what’s now known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was enacted as a loose indicator to separate Indian and Chinese controlled territory. Despite being a flashpoint for the two nations, several bilateral agreements in the early 90s spelled potential for peaceful coexistence. Since May 2020 we have seen this progress completely reversed, as the border saw the first shots fired in over a decade; the worst brawl in over 40 years. Since these summertime sparks, both India and China have continued to militarise and build in the disputed zone. Chinese foreign policy and growing Indian nationalism are clashing along the LAC. While many people may see this as just another border conflict, I would implore them to look deeper into the context of the LAC crisis. Since the 60s the tension surrounding the LAC has generally waned, helped by agreements in the 90s that banned weapons, and attempted to formalise a border. However, it is entirely unsurprising that tensions are now rising. With the world tied down by coronavirus, there is much less focus from developed countries on what seems to be just another border clash between developing nations. This view could not be further from the truth. With the pandemic acting as a smokescreen, calculated foreign policy moves from China have gone relatively unnoticed. Over the last decade, Chinese expansionism can be noticed all over Asia. Most obvious is the building of artificial islands in the South China Sea to further their claim to the entirety of this major economic zone. Their actions have even extended to the use of military vessels to bully merchant, fishing, and even foreign naval ships out of international waters. Coupled with last year’s renewed pressure on Taiwan and Hong Kong, it is hard to consider China in any other light but the aggressor. The case to blame China is also, more importantly, based on the events of the summer along the LAC. On June 16th the largest brawl in decades broke out and left 20 Indians and an unnamed number of Chinese soldiers dead. Indian defence analyst, Ajai Shukla, places the battle1.5km into Indian territory, asserting that Chinese border forces were to blame. What’s more, Shukla also stated that satellite imagery shows Chinese structures on the sight of the brawl. This tactic of edging is very common among all the cases of Chinese expansionism in Asia. By building bridges, roads, and structures deeper and deeper into the disputed zone it allows them to push Indian forces back, leading to a de facto increase in Chinese territory. Whilst India has built in the LAC zone, it hasn’t been to edge forward; it has been to solidify their pre-agreed territory. What must be understood about the LAC is that one side is actively pursuing expansionist policies, most of which have been deemed illegal by the international community (or in the case of South China Sea by the Hague courts). During the summer, India banned 118 Chinese apps in retaliation to the June 16th brawl, something that many Indians took further by organising major boycotts of Chinese goods. The LAC border crisis has been stoked by the Modi administration and is now becoming a nationalist issue that the population deeply supports. Though Indian aggression is not to blame, there is a possibility that future conflict could be fuelled by growing Indian nationalism. This response from India arguably is much more worrying than if it was more docile, as has been the case in the South China Sea. A defensive Indian government along with the backing of its people could take this from a being a border dispute to a possible powder-keg between two nuclear-armed nations. Though war between major powers is very unlikely in the post-world-war period, we must hope this isn’t an Asian Cold War’s version of the Cuban missile crisis. Focusing on more recent events, the first shots in decades were fired on September 15th. Although the US election and Brexit are extremely important this fact should have punctured deeper into our media that it did. This is a massive escalation towards genuine conflict and war. It is unknown who fired the first shot, yet both nations reached out to begin bilateral talks within a week. On the surface, this is a positive development and makes the summer brawls seem unimportant. Unfortunately, the bilateral talks are just another ploy to make sure foreign nations don’t get too involved. Several Indian officers told the press that, as talks began on September 22nd, India began moving troops into the LAC region – in response to a large mobilisation of Chinese soldiers, vehicles, and heavy equipment. Though militarised borders, patrol brawls, and artillery firing are not a new occurrence (the Korean DMZ and the Armenian-Azerbaijani border are currently very similar) the context and policy choices of these Asian nuclear giants is a uniquely worryingly prospect on the post-corona horizon. The cover image was originally posted to Flickr by narendramodiofficial