For those with a casual or professional interest in North Korea, the “Party Foundation Day”, celebrated on October 10th every year, is a day of special importance. Commemorating the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the occasion is most notably marked by a grandiose parade of the Korean People’s Army. These parades are a rare opportunity for international analysts to get a glimpse at new military capabilities developed by the Democratic People’s Republic. Inevitably, the star of the show is the Strategic Rocket Force, responsible for operating the DPRK’s growing arsenal of nuclear missiles. And this year, they had a big surprise for Korea-watchers: a brand-new, never-before-seen missile on an enormous wheeled transport. Details are understandably scant, but from visual observation alone, experts have been able to deduce certain key facts: most pertinently, the missile, which some analysts have preliminarily dubbed the Hwasong-16, is the largest road-mobile missile in the world, and undoubtedly an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). This is notable: the majority of the world’s ICBMs are based in fixed, fortified missile silos hidden far from population centers. North Korean nuclear weapons are, as a rule, designed to be transported by special trucks called Transporter-Erector Launchers (TELs). TELs move the missiles into firing positions, prepare them for launch, and then drive away to be reloaded with a new missile so they can repeat the process. This makes it significantly harder for the US and South Korea to track and destroy the missiles in a potential conflict, though Michael Elleman, Senior Fellow for Missile Defense at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, notes that its size will almost certainly make it less mobile and slower to set up than its peers. North Korea already possesses ICBMs in the form of the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15, the latter of which is thought to be capable of striking the entire continental United States. The new missile, however, is much larger than its predecessor, indicating one of two possibilities: it is either designed to reach a longer range than the Hwasong-15, or it is armed with a significantly heavier payload. Both of these possibilities have their own separate implications for the possible nature of the missile. The first, and most straightforward, possibility is that the missile has a single warhead heavier (and presumably more powerful) than the Hwasong-15. Various analysts have gone further, however, and opined that the new missile may be equipped with Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRVs) - that is to say, multiple nuclear warheads that can be deployed from a single missile body. This allows for one missile to not only deal considerably more damage to a target, but also to defeat missile defence systems such as the US’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense. GMD, based in Alaska, is designed to fire interceptor missiles at any ICBMs heading for the United States; however, each interceptor has a very low expected probability of successfully destroying an incoming warhead, and given that four interceptors are fired per incoming warhead, it is possible for a small number of MRV-equipped missiles to overwhelm GMD. Another theory as to the nature of the new missile is somewhat more esoteric: Dr. Joshua Pollack, Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, speculates that the new missile could be a revival of a 1960s Soviet concept known as the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). During the Cold War, the US expected any Soviet nuclear missiles to cross the Arctic, as this would put them on the shortest flight path; as such, their missile defences were focused northwards. To counter this, FOBS would be an ICBM sent at very low altitude (just barely above the atmosphere but below the altitude reached by regular ICBMs) across the Antarctic to strike the US from the south, its blind spot. If this new missile is, indeed, a FOBS, the US is left with a strategic dilemma: either to create an expensive missile defence network in the southern USA, or to leave its flank exposed. Even the idea that North Korea might possess a FOBS will doubtless lead to much nervousness within the Pentagon. In any case, until the DPRK tests it, it is impossible to know for sure whether the missile is a FOBS or MRV-equipped. The former would be technologically simpler to accomplish, whereas the latter presents greater options in the long run; MRVs are just one step down from Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles, MIRVs, which are the standard payload for modern ICBMs. There is only one thing that’s certain about this new weapon: it is the final nail in the coffin of Donald Trump’s attempt at making peace on the Korean Peninsula. When he sat down with Kim Jong Un in Singapore in 2018, there was legitimate hope among arms control activists that this would be the first step on the path to reducing the scale of North Korea’s nuclear program. Fast forward two years, and all the hopes of the Singapore Summit have been dashed. Kim Jong Un is no closer to willingly giving up his nuclear arsenal - and on October 10th, he made that a point of national pride. Whatever the actual capabilities of the mystery missile, it is an appropriately large monument to a disappointing failure; one that no amount of missile defence systems can fix.

In an age of digitalisation, technology multinationals aren’t paying fair taxes. In fact, companies such as Apple and Amazon consistently avoid European taxes. Alarm bells were ringing when it was found that Amazon paid just $2.2m in corporation tax in the UK despite having $11.4bn in revenue in 2018. Now more than ever, these technology-based firms have been the winners, which means that many people are eager to see them contribute their fair share. To counter multinationals’ tax avoidance, countries are bringing in a ‘Digital Tax’. This means big technology companies are taxed a percentage of their revenue. France has recently started collecting its new digital tax, and it’s faced a lot of pushback from the USA and digital companies. Austria, Hungary and India already have a digital tax, while Canada has announced one. So what will be the future of the digital tax? It’s important to recognise that we’re very close to worldwide consensus that technology multinationals aren’t paying fair taxes. Thus, the OECD has been coordinating negotiations between 137 countries on implementing a global Digital Tax. But there’s one big reason why it hasn’t gotten very far: the USA. Most of the companies who would face the Digital Tax are American companies, so they’ve been procrastinating in these negotiations. It was America’s reluctance to proceed with the global tax that led France to implement a unilateral tax. So essentially, these unilaterally-imposed taxes are stopgap measures until total consensus is reached. The countries view it as a strategy (or more cynically, a threat) to bring America to the negotiating table. There’s one big problem that confronts us straight away. All these countries are bringing in their own digital taxes, at different tax rates and different definitions of which companies fall under the Digital Tax. Austria, for example, is just taxing online advertising revenues, whereas India is taxing entire online platforms and their facilitators. The tax rates vary as well, ranging from 2% in the UK to 7.5% in Turkey. Due to this, companies will likely face double taxation (where tax is paid twice on the same income). This causes confusion, both for companies who operate across the world and for the countries negotiating the OECD-backed Digital Tax. The varying definitions of digital taxes across these unilateral measures has led to three competing proposals given to the OECD, as to which elements of digital companies should be taxed. India’s digital tax forms part of a ‘significant economic presence’ proposal, which would tax a much wider part of the online market than the other two proposals. In contrast, the “user participation” proposal only taxes revenue derived from user engagement with online platforms. The OECD has acknowledged that these political differences have slowed negotiations. Its original target was to implement a solution by 2020, but this has been pushed back to only ‘working towards an agreement by mid-2021’. But even though negotiations have been hampered by differing unilateral taxes, they’ll still be key in forcing the USA to buy into negotiations. The current unilateral system means American companies will face double taxation and pay different tax rates across the world, which will raise their administrative costs as well as leading to greater tax liabilities. Therefore, it’d only be in American interests to find a global solution, which would ease these pressures on American businesses. Essentially, the world has no choice but to implement unilateral taxes in order to force American cooperation. Until the worldwide tax is established, there’s a destabilising effect that unilateral ones have on OECD negotiations: dealing with trade wars. Countries imposing a digital tax often face anger from the USA which, under Donald Trump, meant trade tariffs. America has responded to the French digital tax by announcing a new round of tariffs on France, which has drawn out the USA-EU trade war. Even President-elect Biden may be reluctant to pursue the digital tax, given his extensive connections with Silicon Valley. Donors to the 2020 Democratic campaign included Reid Hoffman (Microsoft board member and LinkedIn co-founder) and Brad Smith (President of Microsoft) for example. Indeed, it’s been noted that Silicon Valley has shown a strong preference to Biden in the recent election. With populism holding immense power across the world, politicians will be eager to use digital taxes as an extension of anti-globalisation and anti-American rhetoric; it could quickly become a new, popular form of protectionism. Thus, it’s crucial that countries quickly establish which parts of online businesses are taxable, and at which tax rate they should do this. Otherwise, we risk a perpetuation of trade wars at a time when the fragile global economy really doesn’t need them. The OECD has warned that failing to reach an agreement could lead to trade wars that would wipe over 1% from global GDP annually. Thus, Biden has to prioritise creating an effective global solution rather than his Silicon Valley connections. So are these unilaterally-imposed digital taxes justified? On balance, I’d say they are; economies are struggling now, technology multinationals are profiting, America has been slow to accept the need for a digital tax. If the USA acts constructively in negotiations, a global decision will be easier to reach.So even though it’s clear that we need to move on from these unilateral digital taxes quickly, they mark an important step in creating a quicker global solution, while creating a temporary solution for countries struggling economically.

Ethiopia is in crisis. And that means the Horn of Africa is in crisis. While the world was looking on nervously at the US election, violence between the Ethiopian army and forces in the northern region of Tigray, escalated. So how did this conflict start and what can be done about it? Ethiopia is a deeply multi-ethnic society, with over 80 different ethnic groups. This has caused some problems in how to represent everybody in government. The Ethiopian government had been running as a coalition of ethnically-based parties until 2019. This was when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed merged the parties together into one single party, called the Prosperity Party, which currently rules the country. This angered the leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), who refused to join the party. The TPLF had been the major player in Ethiopian politics and is anxious to maintain its power, rather than join the Prosperity Party. The conflict became deadly serious after Abiy Ahmed ordered a full-scale military response, alleging that Tigrayan forces had attacked a military camp. Allegations have been made on both sides, but it’s impossible to verify these claims, as there’s a communications blackout imposed by the Ethiopian government on the region. What is clear, however, is that hundreds have died, and thousands have fled into neighbouring country Sudan. This conflict could potentially destabilise the Horn of Africa. Eritrea could also descend into war, given its enmity with the TPLF and its support for Abiy. It could also lead to fighting in eastern Sudan, between forces sympathetic to each side. Also, a lot of Ethiopian forces are fighting the al-Shabab jihadists in Somalia and could be brought back home, further weakening Somalia. So it’s not just Ethiopia that will be affected by a civil war. This threatens the lives of millions. The obvious solution to the conflict is dialogue between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF. But that will be near impossible if this conflict is left to Ethiopia to deal with on its own. Ahmed has already rejected peace talks, while the Ethiopian parliament has proposed labeling the TPLF as a terrorist organisation. The truth is that both sides are to blame for this conflict and international pressure is needed to bring the two sides to negotiate. While the TPLF has been known to exercise violence, the government has also responded in a tit-for-tat fashion, with ground offensives, air strikes and the communications blackout. This has alienated civilians; reports of unlawful detentions and civilian massacres have drawn the neighbouring Amhara region into the conflict. There’s a real chance of fighting spreading to the other regions of Ethiopia as well. Neither side can ‘win’ from here. As I mentioned before, international pressure is needed. This can include the African Union, the UN, the US and China for example. All of these entities have interests in the Horn of Africa. So what should a settlement between the two sides include? Firstly, the fighting must stop from both sides. The transition to peace in the long-term must include a significant demilitarisation of the Tigray region, particularly of the TPLF. They have some of the best armed forces in Ethiopia, which poses a threat to long-term stability. At the same time, the government must agree to independent oversight of the situation to avert future conflicts. This means no communications blackouts and careful supervision from aid organisations and the UN. The second issue is very problematic: solving Ethiopia’s federal system. It’s a system that clearly has its faults. Every party in the coalition had equal power, despite controlling areas of different amounts of the population. This allowed the TPLF to exert power much beyond the size of the Tigrayan population: this is obviously unfair. A system where parties are formed based on ethnic divides is always likely to fuel populist messages, where one party suggests that another is threatening their culture (as the TPLF have claimed Abiy Ahmed is doing). However, Abiy’s solution of merging together the regional parties has left many people feeling disillusioned, as they feel that their ethnicity isn’t fairly represented in the government. The problem is that any change to the current system will create winners and losers, as some groups benefit from the current arrangement and others want to change it. What will be needed is a scaling down of expectations on both sides. The TPLF can’t expect to be dominant in Ethiopian politics as it once was, given that it only contains a small part of the population. At the same time, Abiy Ahmed can’t expect to successfully push through reforms unilaterally. Regional parties that don’t want to join his Prosperity Party shouldn’t be met with clampdown and arrests. We can’t look away from Ethiopia. It’s a humanitarian crisis that will have a hugely damaging impact on Africa. If the international order doesn’t intervene, fighting will simply continue until they run out of financial resources. This is a situation that is spiralling out of control by the day; it desperately requires immediate intervention. The key thing is, no one wins in this war. So when both sides finally agree to negotiate, the focus should be on establishing long-term peace, not fulfilling political agendas. Image Source: Office of the Prime Minister, Ethiopia

With over 40 million cases and 1 million deaths worldwide, COVID-19 is the biggest global challenge in most of our lifetimes. And yet, Western countries have been acting nationalistically. The world’s wealthiest nations (representing just 13% of the world’s population) have bought up 51% of potential vaccine stocks. To tackle this, India and South Africa have proposed a temporary relaxing of patent and intellectual property rules (IPRs) on vital medicines. This would allow countries to reproduce a successful vaccine without paying huge licensing fees and waiting for patent clearance. However, this request has been rejected by the US, EU, Canada, the UK and Switzerland, among other Western nations. So why has the West does this? Many of these countries are at an advanced stage of developing a vaccine, having invested a lot of money in research. If IPRs are relaxed, these countries may not be able to sell their vaccine patents to cover their costs. However, there are dangers to maintaining this stance. Even if a vaccine reaches the final stages of research, the chance of it working is still only 20%. Countries choosing to ‘go it alone’ are running the risk of their vaccine not working and lacking any alternatives. The UK’s approach to counter this has been to buy dosages of six different vaccines (a highly expensive strategy), hoping that one of them works. But there is a more reliable alternative to this. The global initiative COVAX is led by a number of world organisations, including the World Health Organisation (WHO), looking to find vaccines and produce 2 billion dosages by the end of 2021. Importantly, they aim to sell potential vaccines at a low cost, supporting poorer countries too. Over 150 countries are part of this scheme, but the actions of the world’s rich countries (buying up the potential vaccine stock for themselves and rejecting the relaxation of IPRs) are undermining these global efforts. COVAX would work much better when coupled with the suspension of IPRs, as it would grant the world freer access to multiple vaccines and allow for much greater collaboration. Worryingly, however, the USA isn’t even part of COVAX, meaning that neither would they be able to access COVAX-supported vaccines, nor would the world be able to access American vaccines at a fair price. The USA’s absence from COVAX has proved to be highly damaging, reducing funding for it and limiting its effectiveness. Moreover, not only are western governments at fault, western companies have also harmed our chances of a global vaccine. Many world pharmaceutical companies (known as Big Pharma) are using this pandemic to profiteer at the expense of poorer countries. The American company Moderna, one of the leading vaccine candidates, is an example. Despite receiving $2.48 billion in public money, the company has sold all of their supply to rich nations, to make a profit. They charged $35 per dose for foreign countries, pricing out those in poverty. The unfair actions of Big Pharma further highlight the need for the India-South Africa proposal. By enacting this proposal, countries can use freely available information to reproduce successful vaccines at much lower prices than those being offered by exploitative pharmaceutical firms. Wealthy countries argue that Big Pharma companies need patents in order to guarantee high prices to cover their research costs. But this argument ignores the vast amounts of public money that these companies have received to develop vaccines. Charging high prices in addition to receiving subsidies is extortionate and unfair on the poor. Yet, there is hope for a global solution. A few pharmaceutical companies have bucked this trend, promising lower prices for lower-income countries. Novavax, for example, has struck a deal with India, allowing doses to be made and sold to lower-income countries at lower prices. The actions of a few companies won’t be enough, but combined with the COVAX initiative and the India-South Africa proposal, we can hope for more global collaboration. What is clear though, is that the relaxation of IPRs can play a crucial role in saving lives across the world by ensuring quicker vaccine development and wider access. If this proposal isn’t accepted, we risk a repeat of the HIV crisis, where western countries refused to relax IPRs for a number of years. When South Africa tried to access cheaper alternatives to patented HIV treatments, they were sued by 39 pharmaceutical companies. As a result, many people in low and middle-income countries couldn’t afford drug treatments at the height of the HIV epidemic, leading to millions of avoidable deaths. In fact, the prices of HIV/AIDS treatments remains an issue today, with middle-income countries (who still have many people in poverty) often excluded from patent relaxation measures. This means Russia, for example, had to pay 10 times more than lower-income countries for the same treatments. It’s no surprise then, to see that there were 690,000 AIDS-related deaths last year, many of them in such middle-income countries. We’ve seen the damage that was done in the HIV crisis. We cannot continue to make the same mistakes. It’s time for change. The West must stop prioritising profiteering and nationalism, and instead cooperate to solve this crisis. That starts with supporting the India-South Africa proposal.

When Prime Minister Abe Shinzo announced his surprise resignation on August 28th, shockwaves were felt throughout the entire Japanese political establishment. By the time the dust settled, and Suga Yoshihide had become the new Prime Minister on September 16th, observers were anxious to know - which of his predecessor’s many controversial policies would he keep? Perhaps nowhere is this anxiety more apparent than in Japan’s defence sector. Not since 1945 has the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) had so staunch a champion as Abe, who has always had a grand vision of building a strengthened and “normalised” Japan. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, first promulgated in 1947, states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war” and that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” For some six decades, successive Japanese governments have understood this as authorising only a strictly defensive military, and though the capabilities and strength of the JSDF inevitably grew throughout its lifespan, that ultimately defensive nature remained an inviolate shibboleth. Enter Abe. Since 2006 (with a pause in 2007 to 2012, between his first and second terms) he has steadily worked to expand the scope of the JSDF’s activities. In 2006, the Japan Defence Agency was promoted to becoming the new cabinet-level Ministry of Defence; in 2007, Abe oversaw an amendment of the Self Defence Forces Act which formally authorised operations abroad; most notably, in 2015, he successfully pushed through legislation to authorise the JSDF to operate in collective self defence with regional allies such as the USA and Australia even if Japan itself isn’t directly threatened. The impact on the military has been more than just legislative. The JSDF has taken its opportunity to expand its arsenal, perhaps most infamously in the form of the Izumo-class “helicopter destroyers” - which are, in practice, light aircraft carriers. Despite the JSDF’s insistence that these ships are purely for defensive purposes, the acquisition of a predominantly offensive platform would have been unthinkable before Abe’s time. Further questions have been raised regarding the Air Self-Defence Force’s intended acquisition of F-35B fighters, which are some of the only fighter aircraft capable of being operated from the Izumo. It can be safely assumed that the JSDF is preparing itself for a future in which it will finally be allowed to perform expeditionary operations without restriction. So with Abe gone, now what? At first glance, and if Suga’s own statements are to be believed, it seems little will change. The Defence Ministry has sought a budget of 5.4 trillion Yen (£39.7 billion) for the 2021 fiscal year, continuing its seven-year trend of receiving record-breaking budgets. It is also going forward with a program, started under Abe, to procure long range cruise missiles for the Air Self-Defence Force’s growing F-35 fleet. However, despite Suga’s promises of continuity, it is all but certain that the JSDF will lose at least some of the wind Abe put in its sails. Suga, though a close ideological ally of his predecessor, lacks the same personal drive to rearm the military and assert the nation abroad, preferring instead to grapple with domestic issues; moreover, he is inheriting a country in the midst of a pandemic and resultant economic catastrophe. While Japanese public opinion has long been divided on the idea of expanding the JSDF’s operations, all but the most ardent supporters of rearmament will likely prefer Suga to prioritise matters at home before looking abroad. As such, while it is likely Suga will continue to support the JSDF, this will inevitably take a backseat to more pressing domestic affairs. Jeffrey Hornung, an analyst with the RAND Corporation, speculates that Suga may find it convenient to focus on initiatives started by Abe, such as revisions to the government’s National Security Strategy. By doing so, Suga would be able to claim to be upholding Abe’s vision while retaining political capital to act more independently in domains he finds more relevant. The long-term future of the JSDF thus rests on how much of an interest Suga begins to take in defence once Abe’s heirloom policies begin to run dry. Michael Auslin, a distinguished research fellow at the Hoover Institution, takes the view that the behaviour of Japan’s strategic rivals will play a key role in Suga’s own direction. If China and North Korea come forward and try to work with Suga, they may find him less assertive than Abe; if they make no attempt to ease relations or try to exploit Abe’s departure with increased aggression, they may instead force Suga into following his predecessor’s hardline approach. For the immediate future, continuity does in fact seem to be the order of the day. Barring major provocations from regional adversaries, Suga is unlikely to act on defence with anything approaching the same vigour as Abe; having had its fourteen years in the sun, only time will tell how long the JSDF must endure the shade.

Exploring what is happening in Belarus. The poignant words of one of modern Belarus’ greatest writers and 2015 Nobel Laureate in Literature, Svetlana Alexievich, should wake us: “a barbaric era is upon us once again”. Her speech in Stockholm contained many truths relevant to today's situation in Belarus. She spoke during a time when Ukraine was in the heat of a gruesome quasi civil war in the Donbas and Crimea, featuring state sponsored tragedies that the West had thought impossible to occur in the modern era. They did occur, innocent civilians once again felt the deep scourge of war in Europe. The rise of the illiberal forces of the world ought to worry all peace-loving peoples. The latest unfolding events in Belarus underscore what Alexeievich said in Stockholm: “Freedom is not an instantaneous holiday, as we once dreamed. It is a road. A long road. We know this now.” Interestingly, Alexeievich, on 24 August 2020, being a member of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya's recently formed Coordination Council, has been called in by the Belarusian Investigative Committee for questioning. As the world looks on with worry, this post will try to briefly explain what has happened in Belarus over these past few weeks. After elections in Belarus on 9 August 2020, President Lukashenko still clings on to power, despite these elections being widely accepted as rigged and unfair by the international community. As Europe’s longest reigning ruler, President Lukashenko has controlled Belarus since 1994 with an iron fist; quashing basic civil liberties and other freedoms that many readers of this page will have privileged access to. The elections themselves were mired by unfairness. No independent observers were allowed and common tactics to suppress opposition voices were harnessed. The main opposition candidate, Sergey Tikhanovsky, was imprisoned in May. His wife, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, then took the reins of the opposition and ran in the elections competing against, "Europe's Last Dictator", President Lukashenko. Also arrested in June, was another opposition leader Viktor Babariko. Tikhanovskaya had gathered historic amounts of popular support across Belarus for her reform agenda. By official figures however, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya only gained 10 per cent of the popular vote, while the incumbent, President Lukashenko, received 80 per cent. Following the elections, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya fled Belarus out of concern for her own, and her children’s, bodily safety. After being reported missing by her colleagues, she emerged on 11 August. Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Linas Linkevicius, announced in a tweet that: "Svetlana #Tikhanovskaya is safe. She is in #Lithuania". In the interim between the election results and her reappearance in Lithuania however, Tikhanovskaya sought to lodge an official complaint protesting the election results. Thereafter, she was detained for seven hours and made to read off of a script to her supporters that called for: "Belarusians to accept Lukashenko’s 'victory' and 'stop protesting'". Following Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s reappearance, mass protests in favour of the deposition of President Lukashenko swept Belarus. Protests in Minsk, the capital, have revealed the panoply of violence that President Lukashenko had long used in private against his citizens. At least two protesters are known to have died and thousands have been arrested. The "March for Freedom" has gathered the support of hundreds of thousands of citizens with recent estimates of up to 200,000 protesters in Minsk this week. Meanwhile, the sitting president currently struggles to pull public support together without being jeered off stage by factory workers. In a spectacularly démodé publicity and intimidation stunt, President Lukashenko appeared commanding from his helicopter and alighting with Kalashnikov rifle in hand and flack jacket on chest, to cheer on his squad of guards on 23 August. Above: President Lukashenko being jeered off stage by factory workers, 17 August 2020. Below: President Lukashenko appearing armed for state cameras, 23 August 2020. On 14 August Svetlana Tikhanovskaya and other leaders of the opposition formed the “Coordination Council of Belarus”. In the first official broadcast by the Council on 14 August, Tikhanovskaya sought to apply pressure on Lukashenko by claiming victory in the elections that, by the Council’s estimates, she had won by "60 to 70" per cent of the vote. In a broadcast on 17 August 2020, Tikhanovskaya applied further pressure on Lukashenko to hold a fresh round of elections under international observation and she pleaded for security forces to join the Council’s struggle. "Just as with Ukraine, Russia is considered likely to intervene if it seemed to Moscow there was a danger of 'losing' Belarus to the West." - Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House. It would be naïve to try to predict what will happen as these intense political tensions unfurl in Belarus. However, what is perhaps more interesting is how Russia plays into the current situation. In the world of think tanks, Keir Giles (Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House) recently published 'Watching Belarus Means Watching Russia Too'. Giles explores how "just as with Ukraine, Russia is considered likely to intervene if it seemed to Moscow there was a danger of ‘losing’ Belarus to the West." Indeed, if Lukashenko falters, which Giles sees as unlikely, there is a possibility that even the opposition, if they gain power, would acquiesce to Kremlin pressures. There are parallels between the current situation in Belarus and the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine in 2014. The Ukraine conflict was essentially split between West and East; to form closer ties with the European Union or with Russia? What followed was a bloody and protracted conflict filled with banditry and wanton acts of violence such as the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in July 2014 by Russian-backed separatists. Western powers should do all, within their means, to prevent the current turbulence in Belarus from reaching such levels of inhumane aggression. However, President Lukashenko actively promotes discourse that creates a sense of fear claiming that: "NATO tanks and planes were massing 15 minutes from his country's border". Of course this is far from the truth, and more importantly, such discourse tries to create a political playing field which forces the choice between West and East in a dangerous and undiplomatic fashion. After communications between Moscow and Minsk, it was made public that: "Russia was ready to provide aid [to Lukashenko] under the terms of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) if need be, and claimed Belarus was facing unspecified external pressure." The Institute for the Study of War published a worrying report on Russian and Belarusian military movements. "Russia began large-scale exercises with 3,500 personnel in Leningrad Oblast on August 17" however "there is no evidence of an increase of Russian force presence inside Belarus as of August 17". Although, there have been unofficial reports by the Critical Intelligence Team OSINT group that: "more than 40 Russian 'Ural' trucks with soldiers inside driving toward Belarus from Smolensk on August 16". This is in conjunction with Belarusian military forces being deployed rapidly on the country's western border with Poland and Lithuania out of a series of preposterous assertions by President Lukashenko that Poland and Lithuania threaten Belarusian sovereignty. The crucial geopolitical tensions present in Belarus are currently playing out quite rapidly and may have significant consequences not only for the people of Belarus but also of the wider region. European Union leaders such as the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, have rightfully condemned the actions of President Lukashenko in quelling protests with violence. A great deal is at stake in Belarus, and in a world ravaged by the Coronavirus pandemic, economic and political instabilities, and a loss of diplomatic consensus, the world's eyes are watching closely.